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Millennium and Charisma among Pathans

A critical essay in social anthropology

Akbar S. Ahmed

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to my mother and father

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Millennium and Charisma among Pathans

Foreword

Certain styles of political legitimation emerged prominently at the very inception of the Muslim community. The consensus of 'the' Community, the authority of 'the' Book, kinship with 'the' Prophet: these were the ideas which were invoked when leadership, authority or succession were in dispute. The crystallization of the great Muslim sects and their distinctive characteristics hinges to a large extent in terms of the relative stress given to each of these ideas. But the conflicts did not cease after the early, classical period of Islam; and as men seldom fight or engage in political struggle without the invocation of some ideas, these principles continued to live a rich and complex life in the long and often turbulent history of Muslim societies.

The vigour of these principles has deep roots in the life of Muslim communities. Ideas do grip men, but in order to do so, they generally need a firm anchorage in the forms of human association, in the needs and suggestiveness of men's groupings. The ideas which have pervaded Muslim history do indeed have such concrete social underpinning. Nomadic, mountain and even sedentary peasant communities have all tended to display, in the Muslim world, a ferocious independence. They defended the local group against all others and also against the central state. Such local communities needed an organization, both for defence and for internal self-administration. This organization was generally expressed in terms of kinship. No wonder that the idiom of kinship was also extended to the crucial sphere of religion, that sacred leadership should also be thought of as passing in the genealogical line. The autonomous local groups also generally needed holy personages, both for arbitration amongst themselves, and for mediation with the outside world, the central state, and to provide that moral and

economic continuum which 'was' the Muslim world even when political power within it was fragmented.

At the same time, the idea of the authority of the Book, and of the importance of communal consensus in interpreting it, was powerfully represented by the corps of scholars/theologians/jurists, the ulama. The scholars and the holy men were sometimes opposed and sometimes acted in unison. Learning, piety, moral goodness, proximity to God manifested by therapeutic or magical powers, sacred ancestry, capacity to inspire, lead or arbitrate - this was a kind of spectrum of traits which entitled men to positions of authority or respect in the community, and these traits or clusters of them could appear both in combination and in competition. Mr Ahmed tells us

> The Akhund gained such an ascendancy over the minds of his co-religionists that they believed all kinds of stories about him; that he was supplied by supernatural means with the necessities of life, and that every morning a sum of money, sufficient for his own needs and for the entertainment of the pilgrims who flocked to consult him, was found under his praying carpet.

Religion is often held to be a conservative force, a confirmation and ratification of the status quo. A striking feature of Islam is that it can very often also be a charter of criticism, renovation, purification, which far from accepting the existing political authorities, subjects them to severe moral scrutiny. The authority of ancestry and that of learned consensus no doubt fortify the holy lineage and of the corps of scholars; but the authority of the Book is transcendent, a permanent reminder that the norms of the social order are based outside and above it, that no society is its own vindication.

The manner in which later political struggles become conceptualized in terms borrowed from the very beginnings of Islam is strikingly illustrated in this remarkable study, when Mr Ahmed quotes from the Wali of Swat and his invocation of the Age of Ignorance in Arabia:

> It would not be wrong to compare the Swat of a few years before and after 1915, to Arabia prior to the advent of Islam - both were as ignorant and licentious. The powerful and the rich were cruel and immoral; the poor and the down-trodden were weak and uninformed.

The moral laxity of the great, the religious ignorance of the poor - these themes characteristically reappear as justifications of new possessors of authority, who will restrain the indulgent and instruct the ignorant.

State-formation in Swat provides an interesting illustration of the major topics of Muslim political and

religious sociology. The balancing mechanisms of tribal society make it more easy to choose an outsider as ruler; and authority, when established, combines political and religious aspects: '... when called upon by the united confederation of tribes to become King of Swat, the Akhund selected Sayyed Akbar Shah as his nominee rather than a Yusufzai Khan.' In other words, an outsider was preferred to one of the local nobility.

As Mr Ahmed underscores, both the colonial period and post-colonial Independence profoundly modified the context in which the political and religious drama was enacted: 'An expanding non-Muslim (Sikh and later British) presence is partly the cause of the Akhund's emergence and his religious revivalist preachings an effect of it.'

Unfortunately, the Saint and his nominee did not remain in harmony. In the period of anarchic conflicts which followed, 'the legend of the Akhund provided a general source of religious inspiration which his agnatic descendants sought to mobilize in their claims to Swat political authority.' A man who was in the end to succeed in imposing his religious authority on the Swatis, comments on them as follows: 'Swat was a tribal territory in which power alone could command respect; self-interestedness and oppression were the law of the land; it had never been under any firm authority before.' There is perhaps no contradiction between these two things: reverence and violence do often come intertwined.

Swat has of course already acquired great fame in social anthropological literature through the celebrated work of Professor Fredrik Barth. Mr Ahmed feels that Barth's study does not do full justice to the processes through which partially centralized authority, with religious roots, emerged in Swat at all. Certainly, Barth's now classic account concentrates on the 'acephalous', decentralized political relations, in which leaders drawn from the dominant stratum compete with each other. The emergence of the State is only treated at the end of his study, rather briefly. Even the 'Saints' were seen more as complementary poles of the secular chiefs, rather than as exemplars or local expressions of a much wider Muslim phenomenon.

Mr Ahmed endeavours to complement and complete this work. No Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark, and no Swat political structure without the 'State' of Swat, and no State of Swat without its distinctively Muslim foundations. But he does much more than merely extend the dimensions of our understanding of Swat. The broadening of the framework is accompanied by a wealth of data, and we can follow the transformations of Swat from nearly

acephalous society via holy leadership to a locally centralized state, and finally to its full incorporation in the larger Pakistani State. This study must be welcomed by all of us interested in these topics. It was carried out when Mr Ahmed was attached to the Anthropology and Sociology Department of the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, with whose members he had detailed discussions whilst writing, and where he prepared the theoretical framework for the field research in the North-West Frontier Province in which he is now engaged. It does indeed constitute a most important contribution to our understanding of Muslim societies in transition, and of Pakistan in particular, and will be of very great interest to anthropologists, Islamicists and scholars everywhere.

Ernest Gellner
Professor of Sociology, London School of Economics
and Political Science
Fellow of the British Academy

Acknowledgments

This study is an unintended result, though almost an inevitable one, of an academic year (1974-5) in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, preparing the theoretical framework for a research project called 'social organization of economic life among the Mohmand with special reference to credit', in the Tribal Areas of the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Though the research project itself will be an exercise in practical or applied anthropology based on field research this present work has a theoretical slant and is an argument in a dialogue in academic anthropology.

I would like to thank the various agencies and individuals who made this project possible; of the former, the Central Government of Pakistan and the North-West Frontier Province Government arranged the funds and permitted me to proceed on the course; the Ford Foundation provided a Fellowship for the research project which enabled this book to be written; the International Students House, London, provided me with facilities and an atmosphere conducive to work in spite of its central location. These agencies are not faceless; there were individuals in each who took considerable personal interest in the research project.

The list of individuals to be thanked is headed by the late Hayat Mohammed Khan Sherpao; Senior Minister, Home and Planning and Development Departments, Government of NWFP, whose life was so tragically cut short; he was typically enthusiastic and sympathetic to the research project. It is a personal tragedy that he is not alive to see what he so fully helped into existence. I wish to thank the numerous Swatis who answered my questions patiently, and particularly Miangul Jahan Zeb, the last Wali of Swat.

I acknowledge my gratitude to Dr Hamza Alavi, Dr Talal Asad, Dr Michael Gilsenan, and to Professors Aziz Ahmad, Abner Cohen, Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf, John Middleton and Sir Olaf Caroe for critical comments at various stages of the draft. Dr David Parkin and Dr Richard Tapper provided constant intellectual stimulation both in and out of class and never hesitated to give of their time and attention. The book took shape in Dr Parkin's office and without his unfailing confidence and support may never have grown. Professor Adrian C. Mayer, my Supervisor, has repeatedly proved a friend and mentor; his example helps to remind students that teaching will always remain a special art in understanding complex problems involving different generations, disciplines and socio-cultural backgrounds and its finest achievement will remain the task of building bridges. This book has had the fortune of having that most generous of academic patrons, Professor Ernest Gellner. I would like to thank Professor Gellner especially for the Foreword which is of academic and personal significance to me but is not necessarily to be read as a commitment to the arguments contained in the following pages.

I am grateful to Dr Adam Kuper and Mr Peter Hopkins of Routledge & Kegan Paul for consistently exhibiting a combination of patience and efficiency. I am also grateful to Mr Khalid S. Ahmed for his help in scrutinizing various drafts. Finally, my wife is to be thanked for her uncomplaining secretarial assistance, mental stimulation and unbounded enthusiasm; without her presence the logistics of writing up would have become unmanageable. I would like to dedicate this book to my parents: my mother, who embodies for me the finest virtues of her Pathan ancestors and their code of life; and my father, who through his personal example has shown me the way of the Sufis.

It may be emphasized that the faults, whether in the logic of the debate or the construction of the arguments, contained below are entirely mine and do not reflect on my friends and teachers, particularly at the School of Oriental and African Studies.

The author and publishers are grateful to the Athlone Press for permission to quote from 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans' by Fredrik Barth (1959).

Swat chronology

327 BC	Alexander invades Swat on his way to the Punjab.
c.100 AD	Swat, where Buddhism flourishes, is part of the kingdom of Gandhara ruled by Kanishka from Peshawar.
403	Fa Hien, the Chinese traveller, passes through Swat.
630	Hieun Tsang, another famous Chinese, observes Buddhist monasteries unattended and the religion in a state of decay in Swat.
1001	The victory of Mahmud, King of Ghazni, over King Jaipal, near Peshawar, marks the beginning of the Muslim invasions of India. Swat is conquered by Mahmud and Pathan tribes, settling in Swat, accelerate the proselytization of the autochthones to Islam.
c.1485	Sheikh Ahmed and Sheikh Malli are among those who escape a massacre of Yusufzai leaders organized by Ulugh Beg, the Chaghatai Turk ruler of Kabul (and uncle of Babar, later to become the first Mughal Emperor of India), and lead sections of their tribe to the Peshawar valley. In a series of conquests the Yusufzai acquire the areas of Peshawar, Mardan and Swat.
c.1515	Sultan Awais, ruler of Swat, is finally deposed and this is followed by mass Swati migrations to Mansehra (across the Indus).
c.1530	Sheikh Malli devises the system of 'wesh', periodic redistribution of land,

	to determine shares in land corresponding to filiation in the Yusufzai segmentary lineage groups.
1586	An abortive attempt by the army of Akbar, the Great Mughal, to invade Swat.
1835	Abdul Gaffur, known as the Akhund and born in Swat some forty years before, returns after years of wandering and Sufic contemplation.
1845	The Akhund selects Saidu as his centre, henceforth the capital and focal point of Swat politics.
1849	British conquer Punjab (and the trans-Indus Districts) from the Sikhs and occupy Peshawar.
1850	The Akhund selects Sayyed Akbar Shah of Sitana as King of Swat. Standing army raised. The foundation, however ill-defined, weak and temporary, is laid for statehood.
1857	King of Swat dies. No successor appointed or elected either from the agnatic descendants of Sayyed Akbar or the Akhund.
1863	An abortive British attempt to lift the 'purdah' or veil of Swat at the Ambela campaign. The Akhund's presence symbolizes tribal resistance and enhances his reputation.
1877	The Akhund dies. The agnatic descendants of the Akhund and the Sayyed begin the long struggle for leadership in Swat, complicated by involvement with the political struggles in Dir and Bajaur.
1881	Miangul A. Wadud, later to be the Wali of Swat, born to Miangul A. Khaliq, the younger son of the Akhund.
1887	Miangul A. Hannan, elder son of the Akhund, dies at the age of thirty-five after failing to establish a state.
1892	Miangul A. Khaliq, the remaining son of the Akhund, also dies at the age of thirty-five, after leading a life of ascetic piety.
1895	Creation of a Political Agency at Malakand to watch British interests in Dir, Chitral and Swat.
1897-8	Popular uprisings in the Tribal Areas.

	Temporary ascendancy of religious leaders like the Ada Mullah among the Mohmand tribe and the Mastan Mullah in Swat and Malakand.
1901	Creation of the North-West Frontier Province (from former Settled Districts and Tribal Areas attached to the Punjab Government).
1903 and 1907	Miangul A. Razzaq and Miangul A. Wahid, sons of the elder son of the Akhund, killed by their agnatic cousin, Miangul Wadud, the son of Miangul Khaliq, who emerges as the eldest male heir to the spiritual and material inheritance of the Akhund. This ends an intense dynastic struggle for political authority.
1908	Miangul Wadud challenges and checks another attempt by Mastan Mullah to foment trouble in Swat.
1915-17	Sayyed Jabbar Shah elected King of Swat by Yusufzai Khans. Miangul Wadud exiled from Swat.
1917	Miangul Wadud returns to be elected 'Badshah' (King) of Swat by the confederation of Yusufzai tribes. The Sayyed returns to Sitana permanently.
1917-26	Internally: intense State building activity and consolidation of authority: roads, telephone lines, forts etc. Externally: border wars that expand and define the new boundaries of Swat.
1926	Formal British recognition of the State and installation of Miangul Wadud as the Wali of Swat.
1947	Accession to the Government of Pakistan.
1949	Miangul Wadud abdicates in favour of the 'Waliahad' (heir apparent), Miangul Jahan Zeb.
1969	The State of Swat is finally and fully absorbed into the administrative structure of Pakistan as Swat District and a Deputy Commissioner posted at Saidu.
1971	Miangul Wadud dies.

1 Introduction

CURRENT QUESTIONS IN THEORY AND METHOD

The relationship of the individual to his society has been as central to thought in the history of mankind as it has been polychromic in its complexity. It has been considered extensively by a number of disciplines - philosophy, history, theology etc. - which include the social sciences. One of the contributions that anthropology can make is the broadness of its comparative material which is combined with fine-grained ethnographic data about diverse and often remote societies. Hence anthropology, far from being peripheral or an irrelevance, can make substantial and heuristic contributions to knowledge about man and his society. Man in anthropology need not be exotic or isolated and the subject need not only concern itself with algebraic genealogical formulae about them. On the contrary, anthropology can define and underline the socio-economic problems that relate the individual to his social situation within the context of development problems and therefore help to arrive at some of the pressing answers to the questions of today as a growing body of literature testifies (Dalton, 1967, 1971; Epstein, 1967, 1973; Firth, 1967; Hunter and Bottrall, 1974; LeClair and Schneider, 1968; Mair, 1972; Myrdal, 1967, 1970; Srinivas, 1974).

Two major interconnected problems for anthropologists, with theoretical and methodological ramifications, emerged after the Second World War and partly as a result of its political consequences: internally, a crisis both of identity and confidence (but more of the former) reflected in such alarmist themes (1) as 'The end of anthropology?' (Worsley, 1966) and, externally, methodological and field-work problems in the face of rapidly disappearing 'primitive' communities.

This related and inherent problem for both theory and method arises from the nature of the location of traditional anthropological laboratories:

> Equally symptomatic, though for different reasons, are the increasing difficulties which anthropologists encounter now in getting access to their 'traditional subject-matter'. The new states of the Third World have accumulated a dislike of anthropologists whom they often associate with reaction and imperialism. Although many of these states can and do benefit a great deal from the work of anthropologists, they are more interested in the study of the problems of the day: economic development, political modernization, urbanization, migration and employment. It has recently become difficult - in some cases indeed impossible - for anthropologists to get entrance permits to many of the developing countries (Cohen, 1974a, p.11).

Anthropologists are often and unnecessarily viewed unkindly: 'Anthropologists are regarded as reactionaries by the majority of the African intellectuals' (Ahmed, 1973, p.260).

A two-way effect in anthropology is consequently visible: the growth of native 'national' (and by definition 'committed') anthropologists and the perceptible shift in Western anthropology from 'primitive' towards 'complex societies' (2) (Cohen, 1974b). Professor Leach in a Presidential address to the Royal Anthropological Institute expressed the aims of modern anthropology: 'The ultimate social utility of anthropology, in all its forms is that by learning about "other cultures" we gain better insight into our own' (Leach, 1974, p.9).

In spite of this type of controversy around anthropology, and even inside it, important new theoretical ground has been constantly broken, as with the work of Professors Leach and Barth. The post-war iconoclasts (3) challenged the static structuralist and functionalist equilibrium theories of social systems which held the field in pre-war anthropology and represented the collective tradition of the old giants such as Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. The structuralist-functionalist looked at the social totality and explained its parts as organic components functioning to integrate the other parts (kinship, economics etc.) and thereby keeping the whole within a state of equilibrium. This framework was seriously challenged: 'My own feeling at the time was that British Social Anthropology had rested too long on a crudely oversimplified set of equilibrium assumptions derived from the use of organic analogies for the structure of social systems' (Leach, 1954, p.ix). Whereas the previous

generation had explained 'primitive' societies in intrinsic opposition to 'developed' (or 'complex') ones anthropologists like Leach and Barth used the ethnography of primitive societies to illustrate the universality of their analytical framework.

For the theoretical and methodological questions raised in this essay two relevant frames of analytical reference will be consulted and the positions taken within them examined: (4) 'methodological individualism' (deriving its sociological inspiration in the main from Max Weber) and 'methodological holism' (for which Karl Marx may be claimed as a foster-father and Durkheim a father). The former views man as externalized to, and confronting, society. Man is seen as determined to 'better his chances' or 'maximize' them by consciously or unconsciously, 'manipulating' or 're-ordering' society and its symbols such as ethnicity and language. He is the archetype 'economic man', forever weighing costs and benefits in an effort to achieve the 'optimum point'. He is bent on maximizing, be it pleasure (5) or political power: 'it is a model which sees the individuals of a society busily engaged in maximizing their own satisfactions - desire for power, sex, food, independence' (Burling, 1962, pp.817-18). Man is therefore a free agent faced with the problem of 'choices', how he 'values' them, and the alternative 'strategies' open to him to mobilize them. Maximization finds its ultimate expression in the pursuit and attainment of political power: 'I consider it necessary and justifiable to assume that a conscious or unconscious wish to gain power is a very general motive in human affairs' (Leach, 1954, p.10). Social action and analysis is consequently actor-centred:

> This school of thought tends to sweep the theoretical pendulum towards the orientation emanating from the Weberian 'action theory' (see P.S. Cohen, 1968). This theoretical approach (see, for example, Barth, 1966, 1967; Boissevain, 1968; Mayer, 1966; Nicholas, 1965) distrusts analysis in terms of groups and of group symbols, and concentrates on the activities of 'political man' who is ever impelled to the pursuit of power.... Anthropologists of this school of thought present a picture of political life in terms of a continuing 'game', in which every man is seeking to maximize his power by perpetually scheming, struggling, and making decisions. Every action he contemplates is the outcome of a transaction in which the returns are expected to be at least equal to, if not in excess of, the outlay (Cohen, 1974a, p.40).

The 'holists', on the other hand, would maintain that

man is born into a matrix of interacting and largely fixed social patterns (what Marxists would call the 'superstructure'). Accordingly his capacity to manipulate the symbols of society around him is limited to the extent determined by the needs of society for change:

> The other extreme trend in social anthropology at present concentrates on the study of symbols, or of collective representations, often quite out of the context of power relationships. Its orientation is neatly described by Douglas (1968, p.361): 'Anthropology has moved from the simple analysis of social structure current in the 1940's to the structural analysis of thought systems.'
>
> Anthropologists of this school are influenced in varying degrees by the 'structuralism' of Lévi-Strauss who takes in his stride, among many other variables, both symbolism and power relationships in his analysis (Cohen, 1974a, p.43).

The emphasis shifts from the individual as the focus of analysis to groups and social structures.

The final expression of the 'individualist's' man is found in Weber's 'charismatic leader' who is both a concept and a category of authority. The man of charisma combines inherent qualities of leadership with an external ambience of authority which is almost 'divine'. The holists dismiss the man of charisma as sociological fiction and the concept of charisma as sociologically sterile: 'It is the structural situation of the group that determines what type of symbols are more effective than others and hence what type of leader is needed. Charisma is largely a group function, not an individual trait' (ibid., p.80).

Somewhere between the holists and the individualists, though leaning more towards the latter, are social scientists who examine individuals at the centre of 'the social network' (Barnes, 1954; Bott, 1957). Mayer is concerned with clarifying the different kinds of networks and action-sets and measuring their forms and ramifications: 'groups', 'associations', 'quasi-groups' or 'non-groups' (Barnes, 1969; Boissevain, 1968; Mayer, 1966) and lately 'coalitions' (Boissevain, 1971, 1974). The 'quasi-group' which may subsequently become a formal group is 'egocentred' and manipulated by individuals for their own interest (Mayer, 1966). Patron-client relationships illustrate the formation and operation of such relationships (Boissevain, 1966).

Recent developments in the holist-individualist debate within the social sciences argue against the need to compartmentalize:

> A conceptual problem underlies both approaches. Both in structural-functionalist holism as well as in methodological individualism, 'individual' and 'society' are, each, conceptualised as independent entities, set apart from, though influencing, each other. The methodological individualist proceeds with analysis of a pragmatic manipulating, individual who pursues goals vis-à-vis society. The individual's actions are oriented towards society. The implications of such a procedure is an abstract conception of 'individual' man; or one which is, at best, limited to that of a biological and psychic entity endowed with certain intrinsic needs, capabilities and drives - although it is questionable whether even such a limited definition of individual man can be sustained without reference to his social situation. The individual must be defined as a social being (Alavi, 1973, p.50).

The desirability of dialectical interaction between the two frames of reference is advocated:

> These aspects of man in society are lost from view in both the approaches which we have considered; each of them objectifies society and externalises it from the individual. Our problem is, therefore, to search for a framework of analysis which might transcend that dichotomy and the associated mechanistic conceptions of relationship between man and society, so that we might conceptualise man in society as a dialectical unity, neither being prior to the other (ibid., pp.50-1).

A growing body of anthropological literature uses a Marxist framework to attack the colonial spirit of anthropology and therefore its methodology and traditional theories. However, the voices speak mainly on behalf of the Third World and not from it (Asad, 1973; Oxaal, Barnett and Booth, 1975). A Marxist framework of analysis will be sociologically sterile if applied universally to any and all social situations just as the dogmatic application of the holistic and individualistic frameworks. For instance, whereas the Swat Pathans may be successfully analysed in a Marxist framework (Asad, 1972), a satisfactory application of this framework to segmentary, acephalous and stateless tribal societies is still to be made. The understanding of 'alienation' and 'exploitation' in 'kin' and 'junior-senior' terms (Godelier, 1968; Meillasoux, 1964, 1972; Rey, 1975; Terray, 1972, 1975) is not entirely satisfactory as Marxist analysis of segmentary tribal societies is at an early stage of development and still neglected. Such tribal societies are incorrectly seen in the process of 'sedentarization' and 'detribalization' and hence on the evolutionary path to

becoming agricultural-peasant societies. Although 'marginal' and 'peripheral', segmentary societies such as the Nuer, the Berbers, the Kurds and the Pathans require to be analysed in terms of distinct social categories.

This brief survey does not pretend to be either complete or sophisticated: it merely constructs a general framework within which to work out the arguments contained in the following pages.

THE PATHAN FRAMEWORK

When typologizing or relating Pathan (6) tribes with African (Fortes and Evans-Pritchards, 1940; Middleton and Tait, 1958) or Indian (Bailey, 1960, 1961; Haimendorf, 1939, 1962; Srinivas, 1952) tribal categories certain features are noted. These features are not exclusive to Pathan tribes and may well be common to other tribes, particularly like the Kurd (Barth, 1953; Leach, 1940) or the Berber (Gellner, 1969a):

I Pathan tribal society is part of the 'larger' or 'greater' tradition of the Islamic world. To the Pathan there is no conflict between his tribal code, 'Pukhtunwali', (7) and religious principles and he boasts no pre-Islamic period. Islamic principles, cultural mores and jural tradition explain part of Pathan normative behaviour.

II The vast tribal population involved: Pathan society, with over fifteen million people in Pakistan alone, is probably one of the largest tribal groupings in the world.

III Pathan tribal society is not 'pre-literate' or oral society (Bailey, 1960; Gluckman, 1971; Sahlins, 1968). The most famous Pashto poets were contemporaries of John Milton. Nor is Pathan society in a state of perpetual anarchy and war. (8)

IV Pathan dynasties have ruled non-Pathan kingdoms far from their original ethnic homelands (in Bengal, from Delhi and nearer home, at Kabul). They have thus extended their political boundaries and carried forward their ethnic identity. The historical role of warrior-king is part of Pathan consciousness. (9)

V While pushing out their political boundaries the Pathan areas, and particularly the Tribal Areas, were jealously isolated from any form of permanent invasion or non-Pathan administration. Imperial generals, leading great armies, have been humbled and destroyed in these mountains (10) (the Mughal, the Durrani and the British tried to 'incorporate' the Tribal Areas).

VI Mountain ecology thus partly shaped Pathan social

identity, political strategy and economic structure: it also defined 'Pukhtunwali' which approximates to its 'ideal-type' in a segmentary tribal system organized within an acephalous political framework: 'The system has been most successful, and self-maintaining, under anarchic conditions in low production areas' (Barth, 1969, p.134).

Tribal segmentation provides territorial and ethnic identity and also guarantees a form of pastoral democracy. 'The notion of "segmentation" seems more useful than that of "democracy" for laying bare the actual mechanics of the society' (Gellner, 1969a, p.28). However, 'this is a structural, rather than an ideological democracy. It is not based on a theory, on a set of principles or norms' (ibid.). On either side and outside the Tribal Areas the Afghan and British Governments, over the last century, attempted a process of assimilating Pathan society within regular administrative, revenue and criminal laws which the British called the 'Settled Areas'. (11)

A few words about Pathan genealogies may be useful at this stage. Pathans claim descent from their putative ancestor, Qais bin Rashid, who went to Arabia from Kohistan, Ghor, in Afghanistan and was converted to Islam by the Prophet himself in the seventh century. He is said to have married the daughter of the renowned Islamic general, Khalid bin Walid, from whom he had three sons, Sarbarn, the eldest, Bitan and Ghurghust. All Pathan tribes trace their origin to the offspring of Qais.

The focus of Professor Barth's study is the Yusufzai tribe which claims descent from the apical ancestor Yusuf. The Yusufzai are eastern Sarbarni Pathans and like their distant cousins the Khalils and Mohmands descended from Kand. Other Sarbarnis are Hashtnagar Muhamadzais, descended from Samand, and the Shinwaris descended from Kasi. Western Sarbarn tribes include the Tarin, the Abdalis (Durrani) and their cousins, the Popalzai, Achakzai and Barakzai. The other Pathan divisions are called the Bitanis, from Bitan, second son of Qais, and include Ghilzais, Niazis, Lodhis and Suris (the last two ruled Delhi) and the Ghurghust, including the Kakars, Gaduns and Safis. The hill tribes, Afridi, Khattak, Orakzai, Mahsud and Wazir, descend from Karlanri, who is said to have been adopted into the family of the third son, Ghurghust (Caroe, 1965; Spain, 1963).

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AMONG SWAT PATHANS

Professor Fredrik Barth's analysis of Swat society and the brilliant models he created for it (and from it) are by

now a deservedly classic exposition of the individualist frame of reference (Barth, 1959a, 1959b, 1966). Apart from the rich analysis of Swat the study is a major theoretical contribution to the development of anthropological thought away from structuralist-functionalism and illustrative of generative 'models of process' (Barth, 1966). Professor Barth begins his thesis by categorically questioning the traditional functionalist tribal accounts:

> In many anthropological accounts of tribal peoples, one has the impression that political allegiance is not a matter of individual choice. Each individual is born into a particular structural position, and will accordingly give his political allegiance to a particular group or office-holder. In Swat, persons find their place in the political order through a series of choices, many of which are temporary or revocable (Barth, 1959a, pp.1-2).

Relationships are dyadic, contractual and voluntary (ibid., p.3). The two main groups in Swat, 'Pakhtun landowners and persons of holy descent are active as political pretenders; thus two different types of primary political group emerge, namely the Pakhtun chief with his following, and the Saint with his following' (ibid., p.4). Together these 'primary groups combine to form the wider political system, which has the form of two large, dispersed, internally co-ordinated alliances or blocs' (ibid.).

He arrives at this conclusion:

> Where, on the other hand, group commitments may be assumed and shed at will, self-interest may dictate action which does not bring advantage to the group; and individuals are able to plan and make choices in terms of private advantage and a personal political career. In this respect the political life of Swat resembles that of Western societies (ibid., p.2).

Professor Barth has argued that his Swat ethnography supports the main thesis contained in 'Models of social organization' (1966). Social, as indeed all other action, is channelled into political activity which is seen as 'the art of manipulating these various dyadic relations so as to create effective and viable bodies of supporters - in other words, so as to create corporate political followings' (Barth, 1959a, p.4). This has laid 'Models of social organization', and by implication, the Swat study, open to a valid criticism (from a 'friendly' critic): 'The obtrusive place given to "self-interest", "profit", and associated symbols imparts to many readers an ambience of aggressive and ethnocentric market philosophy; on this account alone, some would wish to brush aside Models as anthropologically limited and limiting' (Paine, 1974, p. 29).

The Swat analysis leaves itself exposed to three main and interconnected criticisms:

I It suffers from a degree of ethnocentricity: the Swat Pathan living within a framework of tribal society based on primitive modes of production and a highly developed and defined code of social behaviour in a remote valley of the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan, is analysed in the same terms as the Norwegian 'entrepreneur' (Barth, 1963). This 'entrepreneur', who is not a person, status or role but an aspect of a role, 'embodies initiative' and 'expansive economic policy'. As his social action is symbolized by 'transactional' maximizing strategy based on market behaviour his social identity lies in 'laissez-faire' market philosophy. Life becomes a continuing process or game of strategy in which profits must always exceed costs:

> Put this way, one may see that transactions have a structure which permits analysis by means of a strategic model, as a game of strategy. They consist of a sequence of reciprocal prestations, which represent successive moves in the game. There must be a ledger kept of value gained and lost; and each successive action or move affects that ledger, changes the strategic situation, and thus canalizes subsequent choices. Many possible courses of action are ruled out because they are patently unsatisfactory, i.e. an actor must expect that value lost be greater than value gained.... The structure depicted in this model is a successional one over time - in other words, it is a model of process (Barth, 1966, p.4).

This essay maintains that Kachin religious behaviour or Pathan social organization cannot be entirely and simply understood in terms of political 'manipulations', 'strategies' and 'profits' alone. The origin and understanding of these concepts is embedded in the development of Western political thought (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau) and Western market and trading history. Mauss's 'prestations' and 'reciprocity' (1954) or Barth's 'transactional' analysis are easily recognizable from the template of the 'social contract'. The idea of the social contract, covenant or agreement and its concomitant concepts are central to the understanding of Western, market, industrial and democratic societies and are at the root of modern social theory. Their applicability to a pre-industrial, tribal and Asian society can at best be partial and at worst misleading. The holistic socio-cultural constraints of 'Pukhtunwali' and socio-religious Islamic values are largely absent or explained in entrepreneurial terms of the need to 'manipulate' and 'maximize'. The

Swat Pathan mirrors a recognizable image of West European 'market-man': chapter 9 (Alliances and political blocs) of 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans' concludes on p.126 with a remarkably dense employment of transactionalist terms with which the Swat Pathan operates: he 'wreaks vengeance', 'kills', 'seizes', 'ousts' and 'attacks' with almost insatiable compulsion. He does these things to gain political power which finds expression through ownership of land: 'he must therefore seize land' (Barth, 1959a, p.126).

Malinowski had warned that 'nothing is so misleading in ethnographic accounts as the description of facts of native civilization in terms of our own' (Malinowski, 1922, p.176). Academic and intellectual ethnocentricity can be more complex and involuted than the cultural ethnocentricity of the straightforward chauvinist, who contents himself by categorizing extra-ethnic leaders (12) as either comical, lunatic, or megalomaniac and their people as wogs, frogs etc. It is important to underline that Professor Barth's own cultural and intellectual background are impeccable from this point of view: Norway was neither part of the colonial encounter nor participated directly in religious wars with Islamic people. However, Professor Barth's academic neutrality is somewhat compromised on the question of Pathan character and social behaviour by references which are mainly Victorian and often written with little understanding or sympathy. It would be too much, and perhaps unfair, to expect neutrality from soldiers' accounts based on Frontier campaigns bent on reforming and civilizing missions. For example, an argument opens: 'Many observers have noticed how precious is political status among Pathans and Afghans' (Barth, 1959a, p. 12) and is supported by a quotation from Ferrier written a century ago (1858, p.304). Other authors who appear in Barth's text and contribute to his arguments in undisguised and largely ethnocentric positions are: Baden-Powell (1896), Dr Bellew (1864), General Bruce (1900) and Colonel Wylly (1912).

The study of 'primitive' men by 'developed' ones implies an element of superior knowledge and civilization which would mean an extent of compassion or understanding for 'developing' societies. Unfortunately the severity with which academic ethnocentricism may be applied can lead unthinkingly into cultural ethnocentricity: the comparison of Pathan tribal social organization with American criminal organizations is one such example (Bailey, 1970). A major quarrel with 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans' is that its theoretical models provide the basis for the growth of an ethnographic stereo-type and its

subsequent misunderstanding in the social sciences. The creation of 'the wild Pathan' image is neither fair to the Pathan nor to Professor Barth, and yet the Swat Pathan's image appears to worsen proportionately to the popularity of Barth's analysis. This raises general methodological problems, for both anthropological field-investigation and the nature of theoretical models, around the question of inadvertent 'bias' entering anthropological monographs. In comparison to the work of anthropologists, sociological studies usually (a) examine a larger universe (and therefore assume greater dependence on relatively 'value-neutral' statistics); (b) conduct social investigation in the form of a 'team' (and therefore provide the possibility of cross-references); (c) exhibit the data gathered either in tables as appendices or in the main text. Anthropologists, on the other hand, usually prefer to (a) work alone; (b) with the assistance of a paid and largely anonymous native 'helper'; (c) and are reputed to be somewhat secretive about their field-work notes and material (until they appear in a finalized or published form); (d) vague charges and rumours of spying often crop up during and after field-work - for instance, anthropologists have been accused of simultaneously spying for as many as three nations (Barnes, 1966). Charges of ethnocentric bias are therefore not uncommon.

This bias is not necessarily a simplistic phenomenon confined to large opposing divisions such as an 'Eastern versus Western' view of the world or an 'Industrial versus pre-Industrial' one. On the contrary, it may be exhibited in various degrees in spite of an 'emic' or local stance. Within a country regional, and within a religion, sectarian, bias may often be as prejudiced and tendentious as any 'etic' or outside judgment. Awareness of a certain inescapable bias only underlines the fact that apart from the personal psycho-sociological make-up and experiences of the investigator and his politico-cultural background other factors play a certain part in the eventual formulation of the study. In some studies obvious consideration is given to the prejudices of (a) the finance-giving agency; (b) the audience that the study is addressed to, whether the university department, or a 'general' readership; (c) the people being studied (depending on the extent of involvement with them and their causes); (d) the government of the people studied.

II The Swat analysis is inclined to be reductionist: this is evident both ethnographically and theoretically. Pathan society in its numerous socio-economic forms is reduced to the Yusufzai tribe and its social organization in Swat. However, the Yusufzai Swat Pathan is conscious of

being at the centre of three concentric circles: the first is comprised of the other Yusufzai areas, the second of general Pathan areas, and the last of the larger Islamic world and its Muslim societies. Simultaneous to, and often confirming, his segmentary lineage charter the Pathan carries this blue-print in his head. The importance of this awareness and the response to it, will be evident in the chapter on millenarian movements. Barth has largely left the larger religio-cultural concentric patterns untouched.

Professor Barth is less guilty of this charge than those social scientists who have misread his work and equated general Pathan society to the (Barthian) Swat Pathan: that is, post-1926 Swat. The unique morphological deviance in Pathan society is taken as the general and average Pathan model. This will be discussed later. Theoretically, the Swat Pathan is reduced to an entrepreneur in the methodological individualist mould; holistic analysis of religio-cultural symbolism does not feature.

III The Swat analysis is synecdochic: a social stratum of a particular society, the Yusufzai Khans (one-fifth of the population), has been taken to represent the whole of Swat society. The activities of this minority are assumed as representative of those of the majority without supporting field evidence that this is empirically true. Whereas highly politicized Khans (backed by vast irrigated estates with annual incomes of 50,000 rupees) manipulating and maximizing political power may be a plausible thesis it hardly reflects the social aspirations or behaviour of the majority with annual incomes of about 300 rupees (Barth, 1959a, p.79). The Khans themselves might organize their social behaviour differently over different periods of time or in a different spatial context, as in 'pre-wesh' or 'post-wesh' historical periods and in different geographical locations as in the Tribal or Settled Areas. The synecdochic nature of the Swat analysis is further underlined as it rests on socio-demographic data which, though not 'soft' or imprecise are, none the less, often meagre and limited. Swat man is thus seen through the eyes of the Khan as will be examined later in this essay. Indianists (for example, Dumont, 1972) are often open to criticism on this score for imposing a Brahmin's eye-view of the world on entire Hindu society.

The Swat study also bring into relief a potential and wider crisis in the theoretical and methodological problems of anthropology: is field-work to take its own pace, often running into years (as with the work of the older generation of anthropologists) or, in this age of computers and jumbo-jets, is it to be restricted to short

intensive spells? Professor Barth himself is a believer in the latter: he spent seven months conducting field-work among the Kurds (Barth, 1953), ten months with the Swat Pathans (Barth, 1959a, Preface), three months with the Basseri tribe in Iran (Barth, 1961, Foreword), three months in Sudan (Barth, 1967, p.173), five weeks in the Marri area (Pehrson, 1966, Preface, p.X), and eleven months in New Guinea (Barth, 1975) before writing about them. This raises certain questions related to ethnography and theory: will anthropological output tend to concentrate on deductive 'theories' and 'models' that rest on thin ethnographic data? Is the day of the solid and traditional ethnographic 'village-study' then over? Is ethnography to be subordinated to theory? For instance 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans' divides easily into chapters 2 to 5 containing Swat ethnography and chapters 6 to 9 into model-building exercises.

This essay is worked out on two levels: on one level it is a straight sociological reinterpretation of socio-historical developments and their impact on the political organization of Swat which challenges some of the theoretical and ethnographic assumptions of Barth's models while attempting to offer alternative ones. In parts this is complementary to Barth's material which it may help to view in better relief.

On another level the essay sets out to show that air-tight divisions between methodological individualism and holism in social analysis cannot be empirically sustained and that, on the contrary, a certain dialectic relationship appears to exist between them. In chapter 7 a diachronic analysis of the Swat ethnography will attempt to illustrate how a particular analytical framework may be more heuristically relevant at a certain socio-historical period than another framework within the same spatial universe. The essential irreducibility of cultures or the phenomenon of charisma is not compromised in a holistic argument. The millenarian movements are examined within a larger structural framework and not analysed in terms of individual action. Similarly, the emergence of the Akhund of Swat and the skeletal foundations he laid for a state and, eventually, a dynasty, will be examined methodologically within a holistic framework that includes nineteenth century Muslim marginal tribal communities feeling the shock-waves of the colonial presence.

The Akhund's elder son, Miangul Hannan, attempted to activate the symbols in Swat society that attached to his famous father in order to gain temporal power, but failed. On the other hand his nephew and grandson of the Akhund, Miangul Abdul Wadud, as near the definition of the

Weberian charismatic leader as possible, successfully overcame a series of challenges and succeeded in being recognized by the British in 1926 as the Wali of Swat.

Charisma remains largely a function of success; its qualities are both inherent in the person and in the social situation. The charismatic leader is convinced of his 'mission' or 'destiny' but he must also convince those around him of his capacity for leadership. Though his uncle failed, Miangul Wadud successfully mobilized the symbols of authority and power and driven by a relentless belief in his mission to rule and reform, emerged as the ruler of Swat. The answers are not so simple. They lead to other theoretical and methodological questions: accepting for the moment a Barthian Yusufzai situation (1959b) until the nineteenth century, could an Akhund have emerged earlier in Yusufzai Swat without the stimulus provided by an expanding Christian imperial presence? If so, what factors prevented him?

A weakness in Barth's analysis of pre-Wali Swat is the failure to examine the politico-religious factors that caused (a) the self-perpetuating circuit that maintained the politically acephalous Khan-based structure to break and which (b) allowed for the emergence of the Miangul as the sole leader of Swat. Related and vital questions to Barth's analysis remain unasked: (a) could a Khan have led the millenarian movements against the British? (b) could a Khan have rallied Swat against the Dir forces and consolidated power to become Wali in the first decades of this century? If so, why did this not happen? Similarly, would Miangul Wadud have been equally successful a generation earlier and before the millenarian movements in the Frontier areas?

In Miangul Wadud's case personal and inherent qualities of charismatic 'grace' or 'power' enabled him to succeed where his agnatic ascendants and cousins failed: the framework of sociological analysis is methodologically individualist. However, without the understanding of analysis within a holistic framework that accounted for the emergence of the Akhund and allowed for a continuing latent familial charisma in Swat society he may never have succeeded.

Although the diachronic analysis of the Swat Pathans contains an intrinsic dynamic equilibrium the treatment of the model is synchronic and reduced within a static framework. Barth's 'generative models' (Barth, 1966) had set out to offer an important theoretical break from the traditional structuralist-functionalist models. Part of Barth's thesis is to illustrate that segmentary, acephalous tribal societies need not follow 'fusion/fission'

segmentation in the process of change brought about by external or internal agencies (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940). He offers the Swat material as 'a deviant case' (Barth, 1959b) and thus breaks from traditional 'models of form' which are 'static' to advocate 'models of process' which are 'dynamic'. These models

> are not designed to be homologous with observed social regularities; instead they are designed so that they, by specified operations, can generate such regularities or forms.... Thus by a series of logical operations, forms can be generated; these forms may be compared to empirical forms of social systems, and where there is correspondence in formal features between the two, the empirical form may then be characterized as a particular constellation of the variables in the model (Barth, 1966, p.v).

Part of the quarrel with the application of 'generative models' to the Swat situation is based on the underlying conceptual ambiguity arising from the failure to delimit time and space boundaries. Had Barth taken a defined pre-1926 (pre-State) Swat Yusufzai model and, assuming all other variables constant, introduced the Wali of Swat (and his State) he would have had the results of a 'controlled experiment' and an example of a 'generative model' in action satisfying both (a) 'the means to describe and study change in social forms as changes in the basic variables that generate the forms' (Barth, 1966, p.v) and (b) a 'comparative analysis as a methodological equivalent of experiment' (ibid.).

The major requirements of the 'generative models', and indeed theoretical contribution to scientific analysis, would have been satisfied: 'The adequacy of a generative model, on the other hand, is tested by its success or failure in generating the observed forms; it contains implicit hypotheses about "possible" and "impossible" systems which may be falsified by comparative data' (ibid., pp.v-vi). Alternatively, the dimension of space could have been successfully employed for a similar 'controlled experiment' by adopting the Malakand Yusufzai socio-political organization as the basic model and then introducing defined variables to examine the changes occurring across the State border and in Swat Yusufzai. In either case, minimizing the impact of the Wali on Swat socio-political organization as an epiphenomenon is a more serious misreading than that which functionalists are accused of in leaving out Political Agents and District Commissioners as permanent and fixed agents of change (Asad, 1973). The Wali, in any case, is not representative of a foreign or imperial power. He is an autarchic

but local ruler. The insignia he selected for the State are highly symbolic of Swat political reality and its power base: a religious shibboleth ('Ya-Haddi' - an exclamation to the Almighty for Divine assistance) emblazoned over a military fort. The mainsprings of his power are clearly both religious sanctity and the presence of coercive authority. This important element is therefore overlooked when understanding 'generative models' as applicable to the Swat situation, i.e. 'to explain form one needs to discover and describe the processes that generate the form' (Barth, 1966, p.v). The Wali, as will be seen in later chapters, is explained by the socio-historical 'processes that generate the form' and, in turn, helps to explain them.

Chapter 2 of this essay discusses the Theory of Games as applied to Swat and will put the ethnographic argument, subsequently developed, within a theoretical frame.

Chapters 3 and 4 are based on those elements of 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans' (chapters 2 to 9) which require ethnographic comment. Chapter 3 is thus 'The Swat Pathan understood', in which the main elements of Barth's Swat society and analysis are delineated; the next chapter argues against the usage and understanding of some Barthian concepts and terms. Chapter 5 attempts to build a general economic theory for Pathan social organization. Economic-ecological factors are correlated to both social and political structures and two types of Pathan social organization are analysed and categorized. It is argued that the centralized State of Swat may be explained and understood as a result of, or falling within, a category of Pathan socio-economic organization.

Sufic orders and Islamic revivalism in the nineteenth century form the content of chapter 6. Through the examination of certain homologous developments in Islamic societies a holistic theoretical frame is constructed within which to explain the emergence of the Akhund of Swat and the base he provided for the eventual establishment of the Wali and the State. The chapter may be somewhat digressive to those anxious to restrict the arguments to Swat. Those who wish specifically to avoid it will find the main points recorded at the end of the chapter.

Between the emergence of the Akhund and the rise of the Wali of Swat lies the most turbulent period of North-West Frontier history. This turbulence closes the last century and marks the final incorporation of the Tribal Areas into the British Indian Empire. An attempt has been made to see these related series of tribal revolts in millenarian terms, led by visionary leaders promising a better order, couched in apocalyptic language and assuring divine

assistance. Such popular uprisings have been widely studied. Notable among these are the New Guinea 'cargo cults'. Worsley, for instance, analyses the New Guinea movements largely within a Marxist framework and as a reaction to a white, Christian and colonial presence (1970). Burridge, on the other hand, adds 'ethnographic' 'psycho-physiological' and 'Hegelian' explanations to the Marxist one (1969). The Pathan millenarian movements contained elements familiar in the above theses but were basically an Islamic tribal response to an expanding and non-Islamic imperial power.

Chapter 7 forms a triad: the arguments contained are dialectical and intercausatory. Section one presents the thesis: it looks at the interconnected outbreaks of millenarian movements in the Malakand (13) in the late 1890s within a holist frame of sociological analysis. These religio-populist movements throw up various leaders of temporary charisma. The Malakand ground is 'predisposed' to receive the charismatic leader and he appears in the person of Miangul Wadud. The argument in section two is seen as antithesis and forms around the concept of charismatic leadership and the processes of institutionalization of charisma which are seen as antithetical to the millenarian promise and political expectancy of the movements. The analytic frameworks of the foregoing sections join to achieve synthesis in section three, which examines the origin, establishment and nature of a State among the Swat Yusufzai. The cycle has made a full revolution: from the Sufic asceticism of the Akhund to the formal Statehood of his agnatic descendants. A certain linear development in Weberian types of authority is observed: from the patriarchal traditional authority of the Yusufzai Khans to the emergence of charismatic leadership in the Wali of Swat and the institutionalization of charisma in the State.

The last chapter draws in the various strands running through the book and attempts to sum up. It also contains a section which clarifies why so much has been made of Barth's usage of concepts, like Saints, in chapter 4 of this essay, and gives examples of the misunderstanding of Pathan society that this has inadvertently caused.

Wherever possible, a deliberate attempt has been made to confine references to Swat from 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans' (Barth, 1959a). A certain amount of model-building has followed the attempt to challenge Barth's models in this essay, perhaps with only limited success. These models are open to charges of oversimplification especially as they stand in opposition to more sophisticated ones. None the less, their construction has been a useful exercise to house the methodological and theoretical arguments contained in the following pages.

Part one

2 The Swat Pathans and the theory of games

چرګ خویو مارغه دے چه چا او نیؤو د هغه دے

The hen is a bird belonging to him who seizes it (1)

MODEL

Professor Barth applies 'some of the elementary concepts and procedures of the Theory of Games (cf. Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Stone, 1948), as well as the relevant anthropological theory relating to descent groups and corporate groups' (Barth, 1959b, p.5) to the analysis of the Swat data which explains the interplay, manoeuvre and equilibrium that is involved in Swat politics. Political alliances and configurations in Swat are formed by leaders attempting to maximize political advantage and power, which 'define both the necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of a two-bloc system (2) like that observed among Yusufzai Pathans' (ibid., p.15). It is essentially a 'power' game.

The rules of the 'game' derive from the prominent features of Yusufzai Pathan political organization:

I 'persisting opposition of interests between wards occupied by collaterals in the agnatic descent system' based on 'competition for control of the one basic good-land' (ibid.).

II patron-client type relationships based on 'contractual political alliance between two or several equals'. It is not altogether clear whether the patron-client relationship refers to landlords and their tenants only or to big landlords and their smaller client landowners as well. In the former case, as will be discussed later, reciprocal and symmetrical relationships between patron and clients are difficult to conceive as they are perceptibly tilted

in favour of the stronger patron.

III 'the recognition and positive value given to the status of chief of a ward' i.e. 'a net of indivisible "bonuses"' (ibid.). Clearly quantity alone is not a valid referent; quality is weighted too.

The rules of the game allocate a uniform weight to each player and a free choice in joining alliances to maximize advantage. A five-person majority game - Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947, p.332 ff - where each player 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 for simplicity is vested with an equal value 1. Though each player is restricted to one unit only 'positive value' accrues to, for instance, the status of chief of a ward. As the objective of the game is to win, or maximize one's political advantage, this can be done by manipulating a 'majority' grouping against a 'minority' one. A simple majority is a win for the majority group 'where the final sanction is majority in terms of power' (Barth, 1959b, p.15). It is a 'zero-sum' or 'constant-sum' game: one man's loss is another's gain. An important inherent assumption is that the arena or field of the game has fixed boundaries preventing new or foreign elements from participation on one or the other side. This is intrinsic to the model as it not only defines and limits the arena and fruits of victory (land) but also the number of participants. The boundaries are either around the ward, the village or the State at whatever level the game is played.

Shifting boundaries or an uncertain number of participants would mean imbalanced opposition and make for uncertain rules, which would make nonsense of the 'zero-sum' model based on assumptions of equality between the participants. The game is played to win, not destroy; maximize, not create permanent imbalance. This, simply stated, is the Theory of Games which Barth borrowed from outside anthropology and so brilliantly applied to it.

APPLICATION

The Game-Theory analyses the activities of Swat leadership, i.e. the Yusufzai Khans, who balance each other in power to ensure some form of rough equilibrium, while all the time manoeuvering to join an alliance or bloc ('dalla') that would lead to an advantageous position, and therefore maximizing of power, over the rival bloc of Khans. This effectively checks the abrupt ascendancy of any one Khan and the game proceeds, shifting and balancing, now favouring one bloc and now another. In an adverse situation, loss might be minimized ('minimizing loss'), or in an advantageous one gain might be maximized to the full ('maximizing gain'). Internal to the bloc system, though not directly apparent in the game analysis, is another factor demanding its own equation and as delicate as the balance that maintains the Khans in a semblance of equality. This is the presence, at all levels of social competition, of 'religious leaders', called 'Saints', who counterpoise to an extent, the temporal power of the local Khans. It is important for the Swat analysis that both the Saint and the Khan 'are active as political pretenders' (Barth, 1959a, p.4).

COMMENT

The analytic approach in this essay to the Swat material would be from the same position as that of Professor Barth, i.e. examining a tribal society, apparently in conflict and yet maintaining a structural continuity and coherence by the paradoxical action of political leaders, backed by alliances and corporate groups, fighting to maximize political power. As an abstract construct the model is both attractive and heuristic in helping to explain the structural equilibrium in Yusufzai society, and in Swat up to the emergence of the Wali and the State. However, the points of difference arise at the conceptual interpretation of the historical and ethnographic facts of the Swat situation which will be examined later. This chapter will look at the contradictions in the Game Theory as applied to the Swat situation.

I The primary rule limiting units allocated to each player as 'equal value 1', and therefore of equal value to those possessed by the other players, is immediately violated if the Wali of Swat enters the game. It is never quite clear to what extent he does. The diachronic treatment of Swat creates a certain ambiguity in this regard. Is the Swat analysis one of pre-1926 tribal society or the post-1926 State. (3) This, as has been mentioned earlier, is a crucial question with ramifying results for the subsequent argument.

If the situation before the establishment of the State in 1926 is examined then it would be assumed that Barth is including the presence of Miangul Wadud in the power game and allocating one unit of value to him. This is an obvious historical error as it underplays the role of Miangul Wadud who was active since the turbulent days at the turn of the century, both as a prominent leader in competition with other religious rivals for a voice in the millenarian movements and, as the grandson of the Akhund,

inheritor of vast reserves of spiritual authority and familial charisma against his temporal rivals. He would surely merit more than one unit. From the 1897-8 movements onwards, and partly as a result of them, his star was steadily on the rise and by 1907 he was the eldest male among the Akhund's descendants. Except for a brief setback in 1915, when he had to leave Swat, he was always one of its major leaders. By 1917 he was powerful enough to unite the tribes under him and to be declared their 'Badshah' (king) (Miangul, 1962, p.47). (4) However, with the above caution in view, the pre-1917 Swat situation provides valid material for purposes of Game-Theory analysis. Khans, it could be safely presumed, balanced each other at all levels of social interaction to maximize and maintain power. This analysis is partly confirmed by the Miangul's own vision of Swat political organization before 1917 which he refers to as the 'Pakhtoon Period' (or the rule of the Yusufzai Khans).

If, on the other hand, Swat is being examined after the establishment of the State in 1917 or 1926 (to use the official date as this essay will do) then the basic premises of the game are thoroughly and completely upset. The Wali as head of the State is no 'primus inter pares', a senior chief among other tribal chieftans. He emerges as an autarchic and absolute ruler as will be seen later. The Wali with his police, army, communication system, revenues and personal networks, becomes more than a match for any combination or permutation of Khans. The Wali pre-empts power by control and distribution of its base, i.e. land. Through this control he extends his patronage over the Khans of Swat many of whom are absorbed into the 'administrative' structure of the State where they are aware of client status to the Wali as 'naukaran' (literally servants) (Barth, 1959a, p.48). Recalcitrant Khans, bent on maintaining some semblance of independence in the face of the new and highly centralized authority of the State, are simply expelled from Swat (5) or their property and forts razed to the ground (Stein, 1929, p.5). This is not to say that politics vanishes from Swat in 1926. On the contrary, the Wali consciously keeps some form of political activity alive right down to the ward level but it is now a function of his strategy and plans:

> his policy is explicitly described by the politically sophisticated as one of joining the weaker bloc, thereby gaining victories over the richest chiefs, and also, by 'tipping the scales', gaining a disproportionate influence in the bloc. His great success is attributed in part to his unique freedom to effect such changes of alliance (Barth, 1959b, p.19).

So, as the Wali removes himself from participation in the 'zero-sum' game he none the less allows it to continue along its traditional patterns at all levels, but as a valorized function of the State's political strategy. Politics, if it is meaningfully defined as pursuit of the ultimate or maximum power in the land, is no longer valid although 'game-type' configurations of Khans, form and break alliances. The Wali does not play the traditional 'zero-sum' game of the Yusufzai Khans whereby a check is kept on any one participant gaining excessive units by shifting permutations; he creates a new game. He aligns the teams and orders the rules. The objectives are still 'maximizing'; but the Wali defines the limits, content and direction of the goals. By creating a 'game-type' situation he keeps potential opposition involved in its own localized group conflicts that fall into the mould of 'State politics' revolving around royal families and court intrigues, and reflect the problematic of encapsulation of local isolated communities. Partly with this end in view he is highly mobile and informed: 'The Wali is illiterate but decides every matter of importance himself verbally over the telephone' (Hay, 1934, p.245).

The institutionalization of State power does not rule out the formation of factions at the local level. What is altered is the mode of factional conflict and the prize that they contend for. In the Barth model followers would rally behind a powerful Khan because that would secure for them the resources for their livelihood - land and peace and security. Now land ownership is regulated by State law and security is provided by the State. Why should anyone need to go to the Khan? In the new situation the role of the State becomes crucial, and presents a new problem for the peasant. He needs access to the State machinery. The State, likewise, consolidates its local power base by establishing links with the local level powerholders. The faction leader now sets himself up in business to mediate with the State.

The institutional interest of the Wali in the making and breaking of blocs and alliances at all levels of Swat politics is intrinsic to the State encapsulating, as it does, tribal systems:

> When I visited Swat last time I came across a curious confirmation of this when a man whose father had been killed by his faction leader but who had ambitions to set himself up in business on his own as a leader of a faction, said to me that when it was suggested to him that he might therefore join the rival faction he said: 'That would be a matter of shame' and he went to the Wali and got his 'permission' to set up a rival

faction. In the old system as conceptualized by Barth, the question of getting the 'permission' of the Wali to set up a faction would not arise. But in the new situation it makes good sense for he can be a successful faction leader only if the Wali can assure him that he will be in a position to mediate with the state machinery effectively - and the Wali's 'permission' is a signal to his potential followers that he will be able to deliver the goods. This is an aspect of the institutionalization of state power (Alavi, personal communication, 1975).

The failure to delineate some time-boundary invites an inherent and continuing contradiction in conceptual terms between the model of an acephalous, segmentary and stateless society (pre-1926 Swat) playing 'zero-sum' games and a highly centralized state (post-1926 Swat) that can only permit play on its own terms. In Swat State the two conditions co-exist, although one condition presupposes and even predicts the other. Centralized authority in Swat is not a compromise with acephalous tribal forms but a surrogate for it with all its social and structural ramifications.

The ambiguity remains unresolved: Professor Barth sees the State's 'centralized system as merely superimposed on this (the acephalous system), presupposing rather than attempting to replace it' (Barth, 1959a, p.132). However, it is earlier maintained that the Swat model is based on tribes living outside the State: 'Chapter 9 described the acephalous political organization of Swat as it actually exists today in the part of the valley included in the protected tribal areas of Malakand' (ibid., p.127). The ambiguity arising from the failure to fix time-boundaries and spatial universe or ethnographic boundaries in the Swat analysis continues to detract from its conceptualization. The study is apparently based on the acephalous tribal system 'relating particularly to the Lower Swat Valley (Malakand Agency, North-West Frontier Province, Pakistan)' (Barth, 1959b, p.7). However, the data are almost entirely gathered from Swat State. The important point revolves around the diacritical political (not ethnic) boundary between the Malakand - Lower Swat - and Swat State: six of the seven villages that provide field-work material are in Swat State (Barth, 1959a, map 2, p. 15) and the seventh, 'the giant village of Thana (pop. 10,000)' (Barth, 1959a, p.108) lies just outside the State and because of its urban character is not entirely representative of a tribal village in Malakand. If Barth's ethnographic data are valid then they do not fit easily into his theoretical model; alternatively if his model is

to be applicable to Swat it must fix a time-boundary before the consolidation of power by Miangul Wadud and the establishment of his centralized rule.

II The second point follows from the first though it relates to the main objectives of the Game-Theory which is to maximize political power. Although played on various social levels the major thrust of the game appears to be for political power in Swat and is played by the big Khans. Some conflicts of this nature 'involved armies of the order of ten thousand soldiers, and scores of very prominent chiefs' (ibid., p.71). Now if the Khans do not stand the slightest chance of winning the game which by definition, and certainly by a Pathan one, (6) must approximate, within the boundaries of the game, to ultimate, maximum or the highest possible form of power, as it already stands appropriated by the Wali, then the game itself loses a vital dimension and even significance. It is definitionally altered from a power game to perhaps a social game reduced to a local or ward variant. The shift is from sitting in the seat of power to the gaining of permission to sit near the seat of power; from central actor in the power game to an epiphenomenon. This is doubly difficult to understand both ethnically in terms of Pathan politico-historical observed behaviour and in the theoretical framework of the maximizing transactionalist man that Barth imposes on him.

Unfortunately the causes why no corporate group or alliance of Khans could challenge the Wali are not examined. By definition the Pathan Khan has been categorized as maximizing or political man and could he do so he would have challenged and toppled the ruler. The fight was simply too uneven. The peasantry viewed the Khan as an alien class and an imposition (ibid., p.68) and therefore the Khans's strength, based on the dubious loyalty of his tenants, was partly illusory and created constant paranoia in his mind:

> The fear is prominent in the mind of every Pathan chief, that his nominally subject lineage mates, and persons of holy status, are intriguing behind his back with outsiders, just as he himself is intriguing with the nominal followers of other chiefs (ibid., p.11).

The explanation lies mainly in the nature of the Swat State and the fact that it was a unique morphological deviance in Pathan society.

III The final point concerns the fixed-boundaries of the game. All other things are presumed to be equal, 'ceteris paribus'. This is an essential and elemental tool for synchronic analysis of pure theoretical models but one which does not always correlate to empirical data. But

things were never fixed or equal in the Swat situation, and in the context of the North-West Frontier Province this is an incredible assumption. (7) The Swat analysis ought to have taken into account the Yusufzai tribes living in Dir, Bajaur, Malakand and Mardan for bonds of endogamy, kinship ties, political alliances etc. regulate frequent interaction between them which crosses territorial divisions. Fixed boundaries cannot therefore be assumed unless some local village-level boundaries are determined and it is important here to recall the distinction between 'tribal' village and 'peasant' village politics. The former involves the segmentary group within which it is nested through filiation reckoned through unilineal descent while the latter is virtually a separate, independent and multi-group unit.

Even an academic and retrospective pre-State Game-Model construct would be compromised as larger Khans, endeavouring to absorb neighbouring territory through armed conquest, restructure existing socio-political alliances. The Swat Game-Theory, however, notes 'the empirical unwillingness of the stronger bloc to make the most of its advantage and literally run the opposition out of the village' (Barth, 1959b, p.17). This is not the case empirically for 'the stronger bloc' invariably and 'literally' ran the opposition out of the village, and often the Swat valley, as has been seen earlier. Numerous examples of participants in the 'power game' being expelled from their localities with their followers can be cited: Mohammed Sharif, the Khan of Dir, upon occupying the west bank of the Swat river, exiled local Khans and replaced them with his own Akhundzadas (Parliamentary Papers, (8) Enclosure 2, dated 21 July 1897). The Khan himself escaped with his followers at one stage to take refuge in Swat from Umra Khan until the latter was finally expelled from Dir. Miangul Wadud was forced to quit the Swat valley with his family and supporters (Miangul, 1962, p. 35) by Sayyed Jabbar Shah, the short-lived leader of Swat, who, in turn, was removed from Swat when the Miangul was elected 'Badshah' in 1917. By excluding the larger socio-political context of the Yusufzai areas, and the constant political interaction between them, the Swat Game-Model is given a static quality in spite of the fact that it functions in dynamic equilibrium. The model is thus partly guilty of the charges brought against fusion/fission structural analysis of African lineage (and political) organization: that of creating an isolated and static model of social analysis.

From the date of Barth's inquiry (which would really begin at the turn of the century although it has

implications that take the analysis back by another fifty years to the Akhund's time) the British presence had begun to make itself felt. By the time Miangul Wadud was a young man it was clear that internal forces were combining with external influences in pushing him to a position of political supremacy in Swat. The British administrators, now at the Malakand Pass (some thirty-five miles from Swat's capital), threw their considerable weight behind the Miangul. Their reasons were complex. The obvious one was to create a sphere of stability in a turbulent region and leave it to administer itself through a known or trusted ally: 'Colonial Administrators have a notorious preference for autocratic chiefs' (Leach, 1954, p.198). British recognition in 1926 of Miangul Wadud as the Wali of Swat ended the hopes of the Khans for power except as a function of the Wali's political organization and dispensation and confirmed the realities of the political situation delineated by the events of 1917. Henceforth, the State alone provided the sources of, and avenues for, power.

Swat socio-political history may be examined in terms of Game-Theory analysis but the rules, boundaries and prizes vary considerably and make for differentiated types of games corresponding to Swat historical stages. Three distinct stages are seen: (a) pre-Akhund (until c.1850); (b) post-Akhund (after 1877) but pre-State (1926, with a qualitative change in 1917); and (c) the final post-1926 stage.

To help visualize the complex and shifting balance between the Khans (representing an acephalous segmentary system) and the Akhund (and much more his grandson) representing various degrees of centralized authority, a 'power chart' for Swat over the last hundred years is attempted in Figure 1. This should demonstrate the correlation between increasing central authority and diminishing game possibility.

A marked correlation exists between chaotic conditions during the millenarian movements in 1897-8, allowing a degree of local autonomy and a low ebb in the fortunes of the Miangul family; the two power lines are at their maximum and greatest conceptual distance. As the Miangul consolidates his position by a series of victorious moves his power-line rises in direct relation to the collapse of the Khan's power-line and cuts the latter in 1917 with the establishment of the State. By 1926 when the State is given official recognition the Wali's power-line is seen rising sharply and irreversibly.



FIGURE 1 The Swat 'power chart' and game possibilities

The Wali after 1926 was thus creating a new kind of game situation but no longer participating in it. His emergence is the causal explanation for the type of game peculiar to post-State Swat and not a result of it. It is not quite clear whether or not Professor Barth would exclude the Wali altogether from the game. Would he then argue for a post-Akhund and pre-State situation in which the big Yusufzai Khans participate in 'zero-sum' games. This is a tenable hypothesis but needless to say would alter the focus and scope of Barth's analysis almost beyond recognition and rest more on severely limited historical data than ethnographic ones.

The very real historical, religious, sectarian (inter - as distinct from extra - religious) conflicts have been smoothed out from the Game-Theory Model of the Swat situation characterized by rapidly changing conflict situations, structural shifts and constant political upheaval. It will be seen how the historical religious revivalism of the pre-Wali period was in fact a graver threat to the Wali's emergence than even the maximizing machinations of the local Khans. The 'hows' and 'whys' of Swat State, its foundation and political organization remain confined to

one-line and fleeting explanations. For example, the critical British interaction with the Wali and the State are baldly explained thus: 'In 1926 Swat State was recognized by the British, and Badshah given the title of Wali and an annual subsidy' (Barth, 1959a, p.128). This only furthers the ambiguity regarding boundaries in space and time in the Swat analysis. Neither traditional-functionalist schemata nor the Game-Model, however dynamic its internal structural equilibrium, can be therefore fully meaningful in the dynamic and subjective apperception and interpretation of recent Swat religious and political history.

3 The Swat Pathan understood

خدائے خبر چه تره کافر دے

God knows that the father's brother is an infidel

YUSUFZAI SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: LESSONS IN MYSTIFICATION

> (Swat) village organization, and political life in general, are profoundly influenced by two complexes of myths and values common to the whole Swat area. One of these relates to land tenure and the status of the 'landed gentry', and the other to religious ascendancy and its relevance to daily life. According to the first, the Yusufzai tribes entered the valley as conquerors; their descendants claim ownership and jurisdiction over all land, with exceptions to be noted later (Barth, 1959a, p.9).

Land was the basis of power and status: 'The land tenure system thus emphasized the division between landowning Yusufzai conquerors and their subjects, the former being a dominant, cosmopolitan "gentry", the latter a parochial, subordinate population, serving a succession of different lords' (ibid., p.10).

This relationship between a minority Yusufzai élite and a majority tenant autochthonous population of 'tenant farmers, labourers, blacksmiths, carpenters and other craftsmen, muleteers, shopkeepers, barbers, and shepherds' (ibid.) grew into a symbiotic one but the former remained largely endogamous (ibid., Figure 1, p.20). From the 1520s when they invaded Swat, as a result of a reversal in their political fortune in Kabul, (1) under their chief Sheikh Ahmed, to the middle of the last century when the Akhund emerged and nominated a non-Yusufzai King of Swat, the Yusufzai have had over three hundred years of

unchallenged and undisturbed political ascendancy. No imperial army representing centralized authority has ever penetrated the Swat valley. Akbar the Great tried with disastrous results in 1586 and the Yusufzai of Swat were left alone until the British fought Pathan tribesmen at the Ambela Pass in 1863. This contact with the newly arrived imperial power was to deepen and by 1895 the Malakand Agency was created to look after affairs in Swat, Dir and Chitral. The marginal nature of the Swat valley to the main channels of communication from and to Delhi, the imperial locus of subcontinental power, and its geographical remoteness reinforced this isolation. Inaccessible and difficult mountains cut off and surround Swat from all sides except the southern where there are passes that open into other Yusufzai territory. The mountains act as a barrier and the Yusufzai areas below them as a cushion against invasion and a ready reference of larger and immediate Yusufzai consciousness.

Two related myths for Yusufzai apperception were consequently created and preserved:

I the collective role of an aristocratic military élite embodying the finest and most chivalric virtues of 'Pukhtunwali' and

II the mystification of this role to mean a sort of 'divine right' charter to land in Swat. All political configurations work around this mystification and loss of land is tantamount to loss of Pukhtun status (ibid., p. 112).

The Yusufzai were cast in the role of the blue-blooded Pathans according to this mystification (2):

> The chronicles of the Yusufzai are ancient, going back well beyond the days when the Pathan genealogies were created by the Mogul historians. So pure have the Yusufzai kept their blood-lines and so rigorously have they obeyed the Pathan code that they are universally acknowledged by the other tribes as being the most blue-blooded Pathans of all. This is a rare compliment, since most Pathans spend a great deal of time impugning the Pathan-ness of other Pathans (Spain, 1962, p.73).

Those who administered them were susceptible to this mystique:

> To know and respect, and be known and liked by, the leaders of Yusufzai society means that a man has entered into a sort of Pathan freemasonry, and has reached a position in which the very quintessence of the Pathan spirit begins to be revealed to him (Caroe, 1965, p. 421).

The Yusufzai developed a marked feudal-chivalric social

organization around their vast estates and followings which was similar in certain respects to European feudalism. It was a post-slavery and pre-bureaucracy stage in social history:

> A subject peasantry; widespread use of the service tenement (i.e. the fief) instead of a salary, which was out of the question; the supremacy of a class of specialized warriors; ties of obedience and protection which bind man to man and, within the warrior class, assume the distinctive form called vassalage; fragmentation of authority (Bloch, 1961, p.446).

Characteristic of feudal society lord-vassal dyadic and contractual relationships tended to dominate kin ones. Even Pathan tribal battle, characterized by its individualistic, temporary and guerilla nature, was transformed into a stylized and feudal 'set-piece' form (Miangul, 1962, p.29).

Life in Swat for the Yusufzai as seen early last century was that of a leisured country class:

> Most of the labour being done by the Fakeers (3) none but the poorest Eusofzyes are obliged to work; the others sometimes take a share in the labours of their own fields, but it is rather for exercise, and to set an example, than to work in earnest (Elphinstone, 1972, II, p.32).

Though Yusufzai Swat was organized as an acephelous, stateless society based on segmentary groups, local Yusufzai social organization was autocephalous in that it revolved around the Khan and his estate forming semi-independent islands of authority: 'It is impossible to enumerate all the little republics of the Eusofzyes' (ibid., p.27). The apical and hierarchical organization based on vast estates is recognizable today:

> However, the clan is to be seen at its most formidable in Mardan District, a deceptively peaceful-looking land of lush fields of wheat, corn, sugarcane and tobacco.... Traditionally most of them owe allegiance to one or other of the great Yusufzai Khans whose seats are at Mardan, Hoti, Zaida, Toru, Topi, and at half a dozen other ancient villages. These Khans have in the past been the largest land-owners on the Frontier, some of them holding more than 20,000 acres (Spain, 1962, p. 74).

Clearly this feature enabled the Khans to play a form of 'zero-sum' game in keeping themselves in and their rivals out of power.

Over time, due to their isolation in being cut off from mainstream Pathan tribal society and mainly due to their economy based on large irrigated holdings, the Yusufzai developed marked contrasting characteristics to their cousins living in the mountains and organized into acephalous stateless and segmentary groups. The two types of Pathan societies acquired almost polar characteristics. The Yusufzai based sub- and super-ordinate relationships around the concept of 'qalang' (lit. rent) and land ownership and developed into a hierarchical order. The other type was characterized by its emphasis on the primary 'Pukhtunwali' concept of 'nang' (lit. honour) and its apperception of itself as part of progressively larger nesting segmentary groups and a social identity based on membership of the tribe. These categories of Pathan social organization will be discussed in chapter 5.

What is of interest with regard to the Swat analysis is the distinct growth of a feudal class based on possession of land and the inherent right to that land by virtue of conquest, sanctified, as it were, by the authorship of the land distribution system attributed to Sheikh Malli, the Saint who had accompanied Sheikh Ahmed.

TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS AND SEGMENTARY DESCENT GROUPS

The three remaining sections in this chapter are interconnected and attempt to portray the dominant themes of Yusufzai socio-political organization and Barth's analysis of it: firstly, 'wesh', (4) the distribution of territory based on filiation in segmentary groups which determines both right to land and Pathan identity; secondly, alliances, networks and groups at all levels which form part of the larger 'two-bloc' political system in Swat and are as often the result of agnatic rivalry, the third theme, as the cause of it. Land remains the basis for political power and conflict.

The concept and practice of 'wesh' provide important ramifying diacritica for Swat. Historically, 'wesh' marks the beginning of Yusufzai rule and is symbolic of their rights in lands through conquest; politically, it confers superior and superordinate status to members of the Yusufzai tribe; and, in an ethno-geographic sense, it divides the Yusufzai from the other Pathan tribes who do not practice 'wesh'.

Sheikh Malli devised the 'wesh' system of periodic distribution (or re-distribution) of land circa 1530 (Caroe, 1965, p.183), which conceptualizes the individual's place in the Yusufzai descent charter by shares, 'brakha', in the land based on membership in the lineage segment, 'in other words, he delimited a hierarchy of territorial segments corresponding to the particular pattern of

segmentation within the major Yusufzai lineages' (Barth, 1959a, p.9). Permanent democracy and equality were ensured by a regular redistribution or rotation of ownership over every, say, ten years:

> But no two pieces of land are really equal. So rather than vest property rights to specific fields permanently in any one lineage segment, Sheikh Malli decreed that the land should be periodically re-allotted.... In this way, a completely equitable division of the fruits of conquest was assured (ibid.).

Alienation, for example, through sale, involves a change in the status of land. 'In Pathan terminology the land has been converted from "daftar" (inherited estate) to "siri" (the private property of a non-Pakhtun)' (ibid., p.67). The significance of this system is not restricted to mere economic ownership of land alone for 'only the men who hold "daftar" may speak in this assembly ("jirga"); they are the only full citizens of the community and act as the political patrons of their followers and those who reside on their land' (ibid.).

Another implication of periodical re-allotment of land was that

> to the sedentary villagers, whether tenants, craftsmen, or others, the Pakhtun represents an unnecessary imposition. They have their own web of kinship ties, their local associations for life crises; between them they have all the skills and man-power necessary to maintain the economic system; they have built and must keep up their own houses, they know the fields and the irrigation system better than the Pakhtuns (ibid., pp. 68-9).

Consequently, to non-Yusufzai apperception 'wesh' had a 'flavour of insecurity, military occupation and temporary exploitation' (ibid., p.68). So as it asserted the fact of Yusufzai ownership of land 'wesh' simultaneously established the exclusion of the non-Yusufzai to rights in land. At a stroke subordinate and superordinate social positions were created and maintained; economic status was thus confirmed through genealogical charters.

It is noteworthy that one of the first official acts of the Wali of Swat was to freeze 'wesh' allotments as they stood. Apart from the political purpose this served in consolidating the position of his supporters and exposing those of his enemies, the Wali was dubious about the socio-economic rationale behind 'wesh'. To him the results of 'wesh' were unhappy:

> Consequently, for five hundred years the Yusufzai Pathans of Swat led nomadic lives. They did not remain at one place long enough to found new towns or extend and beautify the existing ones. This unsettled mode of life was a great set-back to the development of agriculture, trade and crafts (Miangul, 1962, p.89).

Though 1920-30 (Barth, 1959a, p.66) is fixed as the period when 'wesh' finally ceased to function (which again raises ramifying problems of a time boundary for the Swat study: is it 'pre-wesh' or 'post-wesh'?) it is not quite clear how widespread and recent this phenonemon was. It appears on closer scrutiny more as approximating to an 'ideal' rather than 'actual' form of Pukhtun socio-economic behaviour and part of the template that established Yusufzai consciousness and distinguished it from the conquered people. Satisfactory data are not forthcoming on how recently the system was practised. It is known why it was practised and who it benefited. But it is not clear

I how long the cycle of allotment took to revolve. For example, Khan A upon acquiring better land from Khan B might wish to extend the re-allotment cycle to twenty rather than ten years.

II whether there was a revenue and administration secretariate that recorded allotments according to shares and the time spent at each cycle on particular fields.

III who, in the absence of an overall centralized authority, supervised and implemented the blue-print of re-allotments?

IV what institution dealt with errant or defaulting Khans? If Khan A was strong enough to refuse to move out after his time had expired could he stay on? If the larger segmentary group mobilized to oust Khan A, then who co-ordinated its movements? For instance, on a much larger scale, it is historically known that the Mandanr (reckoning descent from Mandanr, son of Umar and grandson of Mandai) and their agnatic cousins the Yusufzai (reckoning descent from Yusuf, the apical ancestor of the Yusufzai and son of Mandai), conceptualized regular 'wesh' redistribution between the 'hills' (Swat) and 'plains' (Mardan) but that almost at the outset the re-allotment broke down. The Mandanrs have remained in Mardan until today and the Yusufzai in Swat. The latter had migrated from the Mardan plains in the first 'wesh' cycle and Mardan is still mnemonically called after them.

The historical reality and frequency of 'wesh' in Swat is presumed and supported with somewhat scanty ethnographic material: a single example, with no dates, from the Nikbi Khel section of the tribe (ibid., p.65; Barth, 1959b, p.10). Elphinstone also selected the Nikbi Khel ('Naikpeekhail') to illustrate the 'wesh' division and re-allotment of land. (5) Although Barth does not go back

over 150 years to Elphinstone, he does go to the last century to cite Baden-Powell (Barth, 1959a, p.65; 1959b, p. 10). Neither Elphinstone nor Baden-Powell visited the Swat valley and therefore their information is 'second-hand'; it merely confirms the existence at some historical stage of 'wesh' but does not convincingly argue its current practice personally observed or encountered 'first-hand'.

This section is arguing that in the absence of fine evidence to the contrary, 'wesh' is to be viewed more as a mechanism to preserve the mythology of territorial rights based on tribal conquests that underlines Yusufzai brotherhood and equality than a recent and recorded land tenure system. It is the conceptualization of a pastoral-nomadic egalitarian social philosophy which asserts the rights of every member of the tribe to equal shares in the joint possessions by defining positions within homologous segmentary groups. In Swat, however, it served to create both economic and ethnic divisiveness.

Although its origin and conceptualization are duly underlined, the 'redistributional' aspect of 'wesh' is given secondary importance usually with no statistical evidence of its frequency or existence in creditable accounts of Swat (Ahmad, 1962, p.12) and the Frontier (Baha, 1968, pp.245-6; Caroe, 1965, pp.180-4; Spain, 1963, p.84). Some writers speak of 'wesh' ceasing to be practised by the last century. For example, 'it is noticeable that the "vaish" the periodical redistribution of tribal lands, has entirely ceased throughout the Mohmand tribe' (Merk, 1898, p.8). In the Settled Districts, like Mardan, it ended as a result of the first regular land settlements between 1868-80. And among the Yusufzai generally 'these exchanges persisted among certain sections of the Yusufzai into the middle of the last century' (Spain, 1963, p.84). Dir, the neighbouring Yusufzai area of Swat, did not practise 'wesh': 'Panjkora and Bajaur valleys which are similar to Swat in economy but do not have the land re-allotment system' (Barth, 1959a, p.68). It is clear from the above that the Swat valley, largely because of its geographical isolation, was probably the last Yusufzai area to practise 'wesh' on any scale and frequency.

This point has been laboured as it has important ramifications for the Swat analysis in showing a linear tribal development from a stateless, acephalous and segmentary system to centralized, formal Statehood. It is postulated that

I the 'wesh' system ceased to function as a viable land tenure system universally sometime early last century,

although it could have survived in pockets in the Swat valley up to the time the Wali of Swat officially ended it.

II as a result shifting and ephemeral land ownership became permanent and a feudal, hierarchical stratification began to emerge, symbolized by the presence of the Khan's 'hujra' (men's-house) and its socio-political functions. This is a crucial development in understanding the growth of powerful feudal warlords surrounded by hierarchically ranked and supporting occupational groups and vassals, theoretically equal in the ideological belief in an egalitarian religious system but exhibiting many caste-like qualities of social hierarchy. In turn, the stratification of Swat society helps to understand the base for the emergence of the Akhund, his grandson, the Wali, and the State of Swat and partly explains why Barth fails to see the conflict model developing in Swat by the time of his field-work (Asad, 1972, and Part three of this book).

III permanent settlement implies the beginning of the end of the socio-political utility of the descent segment. Land as a common tribal property was a vital diacritical boundary that kept the individual within his segmentary descent group and one which Sheikh Malli attempted to maintain through his land system. Once land becomes a personal possession it can, through sale or gift, be alienated. One owns land individually and not jointly by virtue of belonging to a descent group.

IV consequent to the breakdown of 'wesh' the individual no longer neighbours, and therefore confronts, his collaterals and agnates across the boundary of his land. 'Wesh', ordering en bloc segmentary shifts, carried the seeds of agnatic rivalry within its system as cousins invariably cultivated neighbouring fields and fought for better land, access to irrigation channels etc. (Barth, 1959a, p.108). The implications for agnatic rivalry are examined in the last section of this chapter.

V permanent settlement also removed a certain mystifying of Yusufzai descent groups and their inviolable claims to the land. The growth of class distinctiveness or awareness may be dated from this event. The Yusufzai Pukhtun is no longer a mythical military figure inherently superior and ordained by descent to rule the land. He becomes a landlord going about the business of increasing agricultural produce and has to come to terms with the tillers of the soil and resolve the problem of 'how to make himself indispensable to the villagers' (ibid., p. 69).

VI most important of all, a permanent settlement over time meant a growing density of segmentary sub-divisions

as population pressure increased on fixed areas of land and created problems of inheritance and fragmentation of plots. Alternative choices were limited: migration, conflict (agnatic rivalry) or further and increased subdivision of land and falling of the standard of living. The latter explains the numerous epigonic Yusufzai who own bits and pieces of land: 'the majority of Pakhtuns are a sort of yeomanry with only small holdings' (ibid., p.44). The very existence of this 'yeomanry' in turn suggests that 'wesh' ceased some considerable time ago. These crofters form a separate category from the big Khans who own vast estates, with client tenants cultivating them, and are in a position to contract tenants in numbers and convert these into political following. The Pathan yeomanry play a significant role in the growth of class consciousness and class conflict (Asad, 1972).

ALLIANCES, NETWORKS AND GROUPS

The Wali of Swat has described a two-bloc system of alliances in pre-State Swat which is easily recognized in Barth's analysis:

> In Swat each of the several regions like Babozai Shamozai, etc, has two parties, invariably at variance with each other. They are headed by two prominent Khans of the area. Both these Khans guard the material and political interests of their respective parties. Whenever a grave situation arises, a meeting of the party-members is held in which a decision is arrived at by unanimous consent. Members assemble in the 'hujra' of the Khans both for consultation and discussion. But conditions have undergone considerable change lately. Since the establishment of 'Tehsils' and courts of justice parties seldom engage in bloody affrays and all controversies are adjudged in courts peacefully (Miangul, 1962, p.15).

The Swat bloc alliances and rivalry have been analysed as 'a divergent case' in anthropology as 'a political system in which ramifying patrilineal descent is of prominent importance in politics, yet where larger lineage groups do not emerge as corporate units' (Barth, 1959b, p. 5). What is of interest as a deviant case in the traditional anthropological fusion/fission lineage models is that

> in a meeting of a council of a wide area, there is not the fusion of interests of smaller, related segments of a minor council vis-à-vis larger segments which one would expect in a lineage system, and which is

> exemplified in the above citations from Evans-Pritchard (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940, p.4). On the contrary, the opposition between small, closely related segments persists in the wider context, and these segments unite with similar small segments in a pattern of two-party opposition, not in a merging series of descent segments (Barth, 1959b, p.9).

This explains 'how the blocs are formed, their political functions, and the way in which certain structural features of the territorial and descent frameworks are reflected in their composition' (Barth, 1959a, pp.104-5). The political alliances and networks which crystallize in Swat into 'two-blocs' are not seen as

> a unique situation. A two-bloc alliance system of named alliances, 'Gar' and 'Samil', is characteristic of southern Pathans as well (Wylly, 1912), though in this case the lineage segments which form the units of the blocs are slightly larger. A corresponding division into two factions, the 'Hinawi' and 'Ghafari', runs all through Southern Arabia (e.g. Thomas, 1929, p. 98) (Barth, 1959b, p.19).

This dual bloc system is also found in Mansehra Tehsil, which adjoins Swat, and is largely inhabited by tribes claiming Swati descent as a result of mass migration following the Yusufzai conquests in the sixteenth century. These tribes maintain their ethnicity and memory of Swat by calling themselves Swatis (Ahmed, 1974). Segmentary groups confront each other in an opposition that divide alliances on all levels in Mansehra and finds expression in the two major blocs: the Swatis and the Khan Khels. But these alliances are neither permanent nor completely transitive and they do not form any fixed pattern along pre-determined segmentary lineages. Alliances and links are established in addition to the segmentary alignment and may cut across the segmentary structure. This is paramount in understanding the Swat structure and for Barth's analysis of it.

What is of key importance to the 'transactionalist' framework is that

> political solidarity between equals is not an implicit aspect of any other relationship, such as common descent or kinship, common membership in a congregation, territorial propinquity, etc. It is a separate subject of contractual agreement and thus of free individual choice (Barth, 1959a, p.105).

Political choice is therefore free and based on a calculation to enhance or maximize chances in life, as 'all relationships implying dominance are dyadic relationships of a contractual or voluntary nature' (ibid., p.3). Swat man

is therefore able to order his life in accordance with the strategy of maximizing 'profit'. He is 'maximizing' 'manipulating' or 'strategizing' man.

The emphasis on the dyadic, contractual nature of relationships between the Khan and his followers brings out, paradoxically, the element maintaining stability (and a semblance of the concept of equality) in Pukhtun social life. Assuming for the moment that the Khan-peasant or patron-client relationship is symmetrical and of equal and mutual reciprocal interest, then neither the patron Khan nor his tenant client can afford to shift loyalties too frequently. In a closed 'face to face' society reputations travel and the value of a fickle client would not be high in the new patron's eyes or, conversely, the value of an unreliable patron. Therefore this factor operates as a built-in mechanism in the social system to maintain stability and balance.

Unlike patrons elsewhere, for instance in Sicily, where patron-client relationships are disguised in the local cultural idiom of godfather and godson, (6) the Khan's patronage is a visible manifestation of the inescapable facts of economic bondage backed by 'coercive authority'. This carries a potential conflict situation which may even exist underneath the facade of 'hujra' solidarity and stability. The 'hujra' merely acts as a social 'integrative mechanism' and provides a safety-valve to release patron-client tensions and establish a focal point of social communication.

The Khan's links in the network connecting him with the bigger landlords reinforce his reputation as having access to the higher reaches of the alliance or bloc while his links with the numerous clients who assemble at the 'hujra' display his political strength and their loyalty. The blocs and alliances of the Khans are to be seen not as permanent corporate groups based on unilineal descent operating within a territorial boundary but as 'networks' or 'enduring quasi-groups' mobilized for immediate political ends (Boissevain, 1968, 1974; Mayer, 1966). Such networks are therefore temporary and take direction from available political strategy and choices and may cut across segment and tribal boundaries or class and 'caste' loyalties. As a result 'these very prominent leaders, by spreading their net of alliances very wide, thus create some degree of consistency in the alignment of local blocs in opposition' (Barth, 1959a, p.124).

However, what is not satisfactorily illuminated is that patron-client relationships implying dominance in Swat are not entirely of a symmetrical order: they involve superordinate and subordinate positions. A client, in theory,

may have choices and strategies open to him but in practice, depending as he does for his land tenancy, 'hujra' membership and a measure of protection on the Khan, would find it difficult to break the contract unilaterally. In a 'post-wesh' and stratified feudal society the client, tenant or peasant could have little room for maximizing manoeuvres and 'choices in terms of private advantage and a personal political career' (ibid., p.2). Reciprocity in this situation assumes an asymmetrical nature and the power to determine the value of the transaction and the choices of strategy open to the client partly depend on the patron Khan. The aid of a criticism relevant to this very point is sought:

> the startling conclusion is that Barth neglects power as a variable of exchange. A.P. Cohen (personal communication) makes a succinct summary of this issue. Power is critical, he says, because it is manifest in the status relationships in which the posited transaction is made, and because it determines the value for the items exchanged. It is true, continues Cohen, that power may be mediated by a transaction, but this possible function limits the range of transactions that can be made and the powerful can better use transaction as a resource (Paine, 1974, p.7).

'TARBOORWALI': AGNATIC RIVALRY

A vital aspect of Pathan social organization and political behaviour is based on the determinate role, markedly peculiar to Pathan society, played by the male agnate ascendants and descendants in the life of ego. This is brought out by a lucid Barthian analysis that relates agnatic rivalry to 'wesh' and in turn to political alliances. Opposition of male siblings and cousins is a common Islamic phenomenon based on agnatic jealousy and rivalry for inheritance (Coulson, 1971; Peters, 1960, p.45). This is not a unique Islamic feature and is found in other societies as well, for example, it is the equivalent of the Rajput (7) 'bhai shatru' 'your brother is your enemy'.

Islamic tribal societies dramatize agnatic rivalry due to problems of leadership and inheritance of land. Pathan tribal society has codified 'cousin rivalry' and numerous acts of normative behaviour may be understood in this light. 'Tarboor' or cousin (i.e. father's brother's son), commonly carries a meaning of enmity, as the popular proverb quoted above avers and male agnatic rivalry is embodied in 'tarboorwali', or the code of the cousin.

'Tarboorwali' is an important characteristic of Pathan

social organization and is succinctly summed up by Barth:

> Such particular cultural factors combine to place close agnatic collaterals in a perpetual relation of opposition and rivalry. This negative charge on their structural relationship is clearly recognized in Yusufzai Pathan kinship terminology. Sibling terms are extended to the children of all these persons, except to the children of Father's Brother, own or classificatory (tre), for whom there is a special term ('tarbur'). Patrilateral parallel cousin is uniquely separated from all other cousins and siblings by a separate term. Furthermore, this term carries the subsidiary connotation of 'enemy' (cf. Morgenstierne, 1927). Only those collaterals with whom one has unfriendly relations are freely referred to as 'tarburan', father's brother's sons (Barth, 1959b, p.11).

Marriage and affinal ties would hope to defuse agnatic tension but marriage patterns do not give preference to cousins:

> In contrast to what is found in some other lineage-based societies in the Middle East (e.g. Barth, 1953), marriages are rarely sought with close agnatic collaterals. Several Pathan chiefs volunteered reasons for this: - Fa Br Da marriage, they said, is known as a device for preventing conflict between agnatic cousins, but it is never very successful. It is better to use the marriage of daughters and sisters to establish contacts or reaffirm alliances with persons of similar political interests to one's own; then one will be strong in the inevitable conflicts with close agnates (Barth, 1959a, p.40).

'Wesh' exacerbates the tension between agnates for 'a re-examination of the land tenure system shows that owners of neighbouring fields and collateral agnates tend to be the same individuals. The traditional re-allotments followed the segmentary scheme of unilineal descent' (ibid., p.108). The dilemma of the Swat Pathan is acute:

> In the patrilineal descent system, the Pathan 'ego' is thus faced with a profound dilemma: the bonds between brothers and the bonds between fathers and sons are given political primacy; yet an organization based on these principles would unite 'ego' with his close agnatic collaterals, who for reasons elaborated below are his prime opponents. The political dual division develops as a direct result of the choices that individuals make in seeking a solution to this dilemma, and the political organization can thus be understood only in terms of the structure of the unilineal descent system (Barth, 1959b, p.7).

This chapter has delineated the major features of social organization in Yusufzai Swat derived from Barth's analysis. The central feature is of Yusufzai status expressed through almost exclusive rights to ownership of land, endogamy and occupational hierarchy. Historical tradition and geographical isolation reinforce the mystification of Yusufzai ascendancy. Territorial divisions correspond with segmentary descent groups and a compulsory interchange of land among the Yusufzai after fixed intervals ensures equality. 'Wesh', or the periodic redistribution of land, is better understood conceptually as there remains a certain measure of uncertainty regarding its implementation and organization. The freezing of the 'wesh' system would involve permanent settlement, fixed boundaries, possibility of alienation of land and a different category of feudal landlord-peasant relationships.

Based on the struggle for land are the political alliances, networks and groups which are largely dyadic contractual and temporary. Such relationships are symmetrical, implying reciprocity. Group alliances seldom join or reflect the larger bloc politics of the lineage system and maintain opposition on their own levels, marked by bitter agnatic rivalry which is exacerbated by 'wesh': 'Thus at every periodic reallotment, the opposition of close agnatic collaterals is dramatized and made acute, while the opposition between segments of higher levels is routinized and involves no particular conflicts' (ibid., p.11).

4 The Swat Pathan misunderstood

چه نن سپک شی صبا ورک شی

Who today is disgraced, tomorrow will be lost

CONCEPTS, TERMS AND USAGE

Traditional functionalist schemata differentiate tribal categories between two polar types (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940): Group A containing organized, centralized tribal states backed by force (like the Zulu and Ngwato) and contrasting with tribes in Group B which are acephalous and organized along the principle of the segmentary lineage system (like the Nuer and Tallensi). The Zulu Induna or chief was usually of royal descent, hereditary and powerful in contrast to the chiefs in Group B where the attitude to chiefship is summed up in the Tale saying that 'chiefship belongs to all of us' (ibid., p. 256; Fortes, 1945, 1949). Between the acephaly of the Nuer (or Tiv - Bohannan, 1955, 1957, 1968) and the monarchy of the Zulu (or the Nupe - Nadel, 1942) and as an intermediary between Group A and B, Southall sees the political system of the Alur in East Africa which he calls the 'segmentary state' (Southall, 1953).

Barth's analysis of Swat rests on the assumption that Yusufzai tribal society is of the acephalous, 'stateless' Group B category (or as is shown in the next chapter of the 'nang' Pathan type). This assumption is only partly true. Although there is no centralized authority (until 1926) the Yusufzai social organization of Swat is in itself a ranked and hierarchical social order based on occupational and ethnic strata. The picture that emerges is not of a segmentary and stateless society of the Nuer type. Important conceptual and morphological differences

exist and a drawing up of a comparative checklist, which ought not to be taken as a suggestion that Barth equates the Swat Pathan to the Nuer, would bring them into relief. For instance, a segmentary, acephalous and stateless tribal society comprises several connected elements:

I it contains an intrinsic philosophy of 'internal' social cohesion reinforced and maintained by the presence or potential of hostile 'external' agencies.

II the tribe is culturally and racially homogeneous with very slight and bridgeable differentiations within its socio-political organization. Although affiliated parasite pariah people often attach themselves alongside the main tribe and provide a symbiotic relationship they remain outside the lineage and phyletic boundaries.

III the tribe reckons unilineal descent through a common and recognized ancestor.

IV the tribe is structured as an identifiable homologue of its larger (and smaller) segments; what Gellner refers to as 'monadism': primary, secondary and tertiary segmentary groups mirror each other's structures. 'The smaller group is an embryo tribe, the tribe is the smaller group writ large' (Gellner, 1969a, p.48).

V the economy is mainly pastoral and primitive and functions largely on a 'reciprocal' basis. Modes of production are primitive and a response to the needs of the immediate tribal unit.

VI there is a patterned correspondence between territorial division and lineage segmentation and membership of the tribes is defined in terms of filiation in this order.

VII tendency to 'fusion' and 'fission' of segmentary groups explains alliances and political interaction. Opposed groups on a similar level join to confront a larger group.

VIII the social system, defined through the segmentary groups of the lineage charter, is wider and more dominant than the religious and political systems which it interpenetrates and cuts across.

IX and, of course, the structure prevents the growth of a central authority of any type. 'Fusing' groups split up into their own segmentary groups after the tribal crisis that brought them together has been dealt with. Chiefs, as for instance the Nuer 'leopard-skin chiefs', exist only to mediate and consult. There is a recognized ceiling to their authority and a conspicuous absence of 'coercive authority' behind them.

Taking Barth's Swat model of Yusufzai tribal society, after unambiguously excluding the Wali from it, to make a point by point comparison with the above characteristics major conceptual and irreconcilable differences are observed:

I 'internal' social cohesion is maintained through the visible presence or use of coercive force. 'External' pressures only widen and alter the existing bloc alliances (Khans from Dir or Bajaur exploit internal Swat conflicts to attack or annex parts of Swat, often with the assistance of Yusufzai Khans and ostensibly to help them). Social cohesion for the non-Yusufzai carries an 'old flavour of insecurity, military occupation and temporary exploitation' (Barth, 1959a, p.68).

II an occupational hierarchy of numerous strata, almost a 'caste' system of heterogeneous ethnic and functional groups, is dominated by a feudal military aristocracy in Swat. This stratification is not entirely along ethnic lines as non-Pukhtuns may move up through acquisition of land or merit.

III although the Yusufzai Pukhtuns claim descent from a distant and near-mythical ancestor, Yusuf, the vast majority of the non-Yusufzai population including the autochthones, have no such equivalent descent pretensions or genealogical memory.

IV the endogamous caste-like strata in Swat do not exist in any wider relation to Pukhtun society in general; smaller groups mirror the fortunes of their Khans and not a wider tribal picture.

V the economy is 'redistributional' and functions around a central point which first gathers in and upwards goods and services, and then re-allocates them downwards to several points.

VI a degree of correspondence between territorial division and lineage segmentation survives as a result of 'wesh' and the periodical re-settlement assures constant shifting of the Khan within a certain territorial and lineage framework.

VII 'fusion' and 'fission' are mainly a political function of power blocs and changing strategies of personal choice. Close collateral segments confronting each other do not 'fuse' in the face of a larger challenge but continue to oppose each other within larger blocs, and illustrate a deviant case from the traditional functionalist 'fusion/fission' model (Barth, 1959b, p.19).

VIII the political system dominates all aspects of Pathan Swat society.

IX though Swat is a 'stateless society' with no central authority (except for the brief ineffectual period in the middle of the last century when the Akhund of Swat had helped elect a King), powerful Khans hold complete sway over their own territories.

Clearly, the sum-total of the Swat picture is not of an acephalous, segmentary society of the Nuer or Group B

type; nor, in fact, is it of the Zulu or Group A type. The conceptualization of Swat tribal organization as a 'segmentary acephalous system' (Barth, 1959a, p.134) leaves Barth's definitions and their employment open to comment and reexamination.

A comparison of an African tribal kingdom, like the Shilluk, with the Walidom of Swat may help to contrast the formal, functional and ritual aspects of the two and to bring out the differences in socio-political organization within which they operated and which they, in turn, ordered:

	SHILLUKDOM (1)	WALIDOM
I	The King is 'divine', he is a religious figure symbolizing mystical properties, and providing a symbol of unity to the Shilluk. He is descended from generations of kings (thirty-one, starting from the common-ancestor of the tribe and their kings, Nyikang, who is the medium between God and man).	Spiritual and temporal power buttressed and supported by the army and state apparatus. No divine property attached to the Wali except as descendant of the near-mythical Akhund. The royal genealogical line is not deep (it ends with the great-grandson of the Akhund).
II	The King (in his person) and the kingship (in the office) symbolize Shillukdom for both the main tribe and their client tribes. The King's frailties are believed to cause natural disasters.	The Wali does not symbolize either the Yusufzai Pukhtun or Swat. He is, however, accepted as a prominent and religious leader by the majority of both.
III	The King has little control over secular matters arising from disputes over lands, crimes etc. as his main role is sacerdotal. Chiefs and heads of lineages (often one and the same thing) are not appointed by the King, although he confirms them.	The Wali, through the State bureaucracy and army, exercises complete control and appointments of any importance are made by him.
IV	The kingship is circulated (although recently fixed) as is the capital.	Both Waliship, based on primogeniture, and the State capital are fixed.

From the above it is clear that the nature of the Wali's role is quite different to that of the traditional and symbolic role of the Shilluk King. The former rules a highly centralized State and backs his authority with a vast and visible 'coercive authority'. The Shilluk King, in contrast, rules his tribal society from afar and his physical presence is epiphenomenal to his spiritual and symbolic role. The latter, embodied in Nyikang and inherent in all his descendants, is of overriding tribal importance. The Wali manipulates and uses his spiritual charisma inherited from his grandfather, the Akhund, but has to fight a series of internecine dynastic battles to establish the Walidom and the State.

Certain conceptual problems, which will be discussed in the next section, arise as a result of labelling all Sayyeds, 'Mians', 'pirs' and 'faqirs' as Saints ('for simplicity in exposition I shall apply the term Saint to all persons occupying holy status, whether prominent or not' - Barth, 1959a, p.57).

Categorizing Mians and Sayyeds as 'Saints' in a Pathan society raises conceptual and heuristic problems. It is almost as misleading as categorizing all Oxbridge graduates as 'Lords' because some do become so. These stereotypes are not as fanciful as the above example might suggest: rural people on the Indian subcontinent are only now realizing that the once omnipotent 'mai-baap' ('mother-father') figures of the British Raj do not survive in the new generation of hippies and students who visit them. Mians and Sayyeds are no more Saints than Oxbridge men are Lords; both are merely candidates. But then, theoretically, every Pathan Muslim can aspire to Sainthood as can every Englishman to a title. A Saint has different and specific overriding attributes.

Similarly, a caveat is to be added when equating 'Khan' to 'chief' (ibid., p.73). Even if employed for sociological analysis this may prove confusing or misleading as this appellation is universally used by Pathans to define themselves. Non-Pathans generally use the word Khan as almost synonomous to Pathan and as an ethnic category. However, in common parlance there is a nuance to the usage which indicates a big man or petty chief of an area: 'the Khan of so and so area'.

The use of the concept of 'caste' with its ramifying social implications, in any sociological analysis of non-Hindu communities on the Indian subcontinent, requires some care, however 'structural the criteria' and whatever the distinctions from the 'Hindu philosophic scheme' (Barth, 1971). On the subcontinent it is a value-loaded concept with definite and fixed religious-cultural

connotations. (2) 'Caste' implies as its operating interconnected features:

I opposition of 'purity' and 'impurity' which subsume (a) ritual categories and (b) strict observance of commensal rules.

II occupational categories and

III endogamy maintaining and underlining hierarchical Hindu socio-religious stratification.

The Swat Yusufzai hierarchy, although formidably rigid in appearance (Barth, 1959a, p.17) was always open to social mobility through channels of marriage, money, conquest and religious reputation. Indeed, within an ideological framework of Islam which claims equality for its believers no stratification can be permanent or rigid. For example, the Akhund 'descended from a subject ethnic group in Bajaur and himself a goatherd' (ibid., p.100) married into the aristocratic Nikbi Khel section of the Yusufzai (Caroe, 1965, pp.362-3). (3) Another observed social mechanism for mobility is the process of 'Pathanization'. An instance of this and of mass upward mobility is that of the descendants of the carpenter group, the Jambal Khel 'who some 200 years ago so distinguished themselves in war that they were given land and Pakhtun status' (Barth, 1959a, p.27). Of the 476 marriages based on statistics gathered from four villages 60 per cent were 'caste' endogamous (ibid., p.20). Kin endogamy may be valued but statistically shows a low rate of frequency. (4) The 60 per cent figure is not surprising when considering lack of communication and occupational status that act as factors reinforcing endogamy in rural areas. What is significant is that in spite of all these factors some 40 per cent of marriages were hypo or hyper-gamous and exogamous to 'caste'. Rural marriages, in agricultural, whether tribal or peasant, societies, in any case usually take place within 'the kindred of cooperation' (Mayer, 1960). A 60 per cent figure for endogamy is not conclusively high especially keeping in mind Muslim preference for parallel cousin marriage. More convincing are the figures for the Kurds where tribal endogamy was as high as 80 per cent (Barth, 1953, p.68) although the sample size of 21 was small.

SUFIS, SAINTS AND KHANS

Division of Islamic society into 'warriors' and 'priests' or men of God is a common feature in the sociology of Islam. The nomad and pastoral Somali are thus divided:

In the north especially there is a very clear-cut ideal

> distinction between the spiritual and secular order which assumes concrete expression in the division which is made between 'men of God' ('wadaad', the Somali equivalent of the Arabic Shaikh) and 'men of the spear' or 'warriors' ('waranleh') (Lewis, 1969, p.263).

Empirically, however, this division is rarely sustained and its boundaries constantly crossed and recrossed:

> In reality, all men - men of God included, however reluctantly - remain finally subject to the bonds of common dia-paying group allegiance which afford the only sure source of security for person and property. In practice therefore, while the distinction between the two orders is theoretically maintained and is buttressed by the mystical power which is generally attributed to priests, the pastoral social system is in effect all-pervasive (ibid.).

Therefore for Barth to equate 'religious men' to Saints (while discussing the role of the latter in opposition to the Khans) has important ramifications in the Swat analysis. An understanding of the Pathan's apperception of his religion, and his own role in it, is essential to understand the relationship between the 'Saint' and the Khan.

Sociologically, this relationship derives from two features peculiar to Pathan social organization, one with a genealogical and the other with a geographical foundation:

I Pathans are notably unequivocal about the purity and depth of their religious genealogy. Descent is claimed from the putative ancestor Qais bin Rashid who was converted to Islam by the Prophet himself. The social significance of this religious belief is of utmost importance in understanding Pathan tribal societies. Each individual identifies with a line of unilineal descent that takes him to the very foundation of Islam. He is aware that he carries Islam atavistically and is no recent convert to it as a result of conquest or commerce. The 'mullah' or 'Mian' must constantly prove his spiritual worth if he is to achieve status or be given respect. This is borne out by examples showing typical attitudes to 'pirs' (Barth, 1959a, p.100n). Pathan tribes are not anthropolatrous like the Berbers of the Atlas and their Saints, for instance. Their enthusiastically orthodox Islam allows reverence to the holy but inhibits the growth of an established Saint class. The behaviour of the Saint, for example, of Tetuan (5) (Turner, 1974, p.68) would result in the rapid death of the Saint and his partner.

The Pathan is susceptible to Islamic symbols such as 'jihad', religious wars, and quick to respond to them, but his 'ideal-leader' combines both a spiritual and temporal authority. He cannot compartmentalize the two

conceptually. It makes the establishment of a regular 'priest' or 'Saint' status difficult if unsupported by non-religious sanctions or constant visible proof of religiosity. The prototype of the Pathan leader is Ahmed Shah Abdali: Sufi by temperament, warrior-king by profession and Muslim by definition.

II The other important factor in understanding the inhibition to the establishment of a regular priesthood in Pathan areas, within the context of the Indian subcontinent, is the absence of large non-Muslim groups in juxtaposition or opposition to Pathan groups. The Pathan, not faced with religious threat, had no need to adopt a defensive posture against a non-Muslim presence. He, in short, needed a priest only for social 'rites de passage'.

In a society where there is no formal priesthood the lines dividing the secular and the religious are often so thin as to be indiscernible. Once the holy or religious man enters the political game he is subjected to the same rough and tumble that the other players encounter. No holds are then barred. The fate of Sayyed Ahmed Barelvi, who ruled Peshawar in 1830, and was soon deserted by his tribal followers and killed within a year, is a stereotype of Pathan tribal reaction to a continuing assumption of political power by a 'Saint'. This is also evident in the tribulations that faced the agnatic descendants of the Akhund in their attempts to establish political supremacy in Swat. In this context the illustrations given from the life of Nalkot Pacha who told Barth 'of the dilemma of choice, at critical moments in his career, between arms and the white turban, and even of the quick change from one to the other in the middle of battle' (Barth, 1959a, p.59) are quite clear. The Pacha is a Sayyed (hence Pacha) but when he enters active politics he is no longer immune to the rules of the Swat power game as applied to all its participants. The switching to arms from the white turban is not clear unless it is for the relative security of a battle head-dress; otherwise it carries little symbolic significance in war.

To place the 'Saint' and Khan on the same level of politics (ibid., p.4) distorts the political perspective of local socio-political interaction. Religious leaders, whether 'mullahs' or Saints, only emerge as natural leaders in times of great religious crises and usually against non-Islamic forces (as will be seen in chapters 6 and 7). Otherwise the 'mullah's' role is institutional, functional and humdrum. He runs the village mosque, teaches children and conducts village ritual. He may be respected but is rarely held in awe: 'One of the favourite derogatory jeers of Swat Pathans is "you wife of a mullah"' (ibid.,

p.47). Although placed outside the Saint category the 'mullah' may enter it:

> if a 'mullah' successfully assumes the role of a spiritual leader, making his religious and moral teaching relevant to the social problems of his day, he may come to be regarded as a Saint (usually labelled as 'faqir' in its strict meaning of a dedicated property-less man,) and his descendants will be classed as the descendants of a Saint (ibid., p.57).

The 'Mian' or (Barthian) Saint in tribal society fulfils the functional role of neutral buffer in the absence of a central adjudicating authority between 'sub-tribes in friction'. (6) It is important to note that all religious individuals or groups are directly dependent on the good will of the tribal village council, the 'jirga', and in a socially stratified village on the Khan. It is significant that these religious people are not allowed a voice in the 'jirga'. The social development of the 'hujra' in Pukhtun society created a structural balance with the village mosque. In the Punjab, for instance, where there are no 'hujras', the mosque remains the important village socio-political focus and forum. In Pukhtun areas the 'hujra' provides the platform for political manoeuvre and tests of strength.

Chapter 7 will show the emergence of 'mullahs' (along with categories of Barthian 'Saints') as charismatic leaders, during the numerous tribal revolts in 1897 in the Frontier areas. These leaders will be seen to arise out of nowhere expressing an Islamic response to a non-Islamic threat, giving identity to a moment of social history, having 'temporarily achieved control of very large groups' (ibid., p.61), and then disappearing like bubbles. The emphasis is on the ephemeral nature of the following and the leadership.

It is difficult to conceptualize either 'mullahs' or even the local 'Mians' sustaining political authority over time unless, like the Khan, they base it on acquisition of irrigated land and incorporation into the feudal élite; 'Hence the political interests of a Saint, as well as his power to exert political influence, increase as his landed property increases. A Saint may obtain land by inheritance, gift, purchase or conquest' (ibid., p.93). This picture almost removes the thin dividing line between Barthian Saint and Barthian Khan. The words of the prominent Saint, 'I look like a simple man; I live simply - but oh! the things I do!' (ibid., p.98) could have been uttered by a Khan. Similarly, Nalkot Pacha whistling to his men to declare themselves and thereby out-manoeuvering his opponents provides an example of a quick-witted

leader. The Saint's argument is useless without his guns. This is the crucial fact of the argument and bound to cause confusion and be misunderstood if the concept of Saint is used. Nalkot Pacha (Barthian Saint) appears to be a priestly Khan, or a very laic 'Saint'. Partly because he equates the Wali to a Saint, and partly because Pukhtun chiefs and Saints 'are active as political pretenders', Barth analyses Yusufzai politics as shifting from Saint to Khan, and vice versa, on all levels of socio-political interaction: 'the establishment of a state ruled by a Saint in one part of the valley, and the expansion of the formerly small Khanate of Dir, ruled by a Pakhtun chief, into another part' (ibid., pp.134-5). The proposition of power oscillating between Khans and Saints over Pathan socio-political history is not a valid hypothesis.

Professor Barth's inflation of the Saint's role and influence in Pathan society can only be traced to his using the Akhund and the Wali as models for the Saint category. This is obvious in his dealing both with the Akhund and the Wali as 'Saints' rather than as extraordinary and charismatic leaders transcending religious and political loyalties and symbolizing supra-tribal unity. The Akhund is equated to a Saint, as the term is used in the accounts of his career (ibid., p.60). Miangul Wadud is also so equated: 'The Badshah of Swat, himself a Saint...' and 'The more prominent Saints are generally active in a larger area. Thus Miangul Abdul Wahdood, later Badshah of Swat...' (ibid., p.102).

What is unique in Pukhtun tribal history is that a religious leader established a formal and centralized State. He did so not only backed by spiritual sanction but also by a combination of political factors and considerable inherited material property. Both the creation of the State of Swat and its religious origins are a unique phenomenon in Pathan history. What deserves to be underlined is that Miangul Wadud became Wali of Swat not because he was a religious leader but in spite of being one.

Leadership in Swat society has been divided into Khans and Saints. Had Barth further sub-divided the category of religious leaders into the orthodox ('mullahs', 'Sayyeds', 'Mians') and the unorthodox ('Sufis', like the Akhund) instead of eliminating the latter from his analysis the problem would not have arisen; as it stands important ramifying sociological consequences are overlooked. Whereas the orthodox 'mullah' (and also 'Barthian Saints') work within the village social organization, and in practice with the good will of the Khan, the Sufi works outside the village organization and established normative patterns of

social behaviour. Sufis often chose to ignore the orthodox expressions of religion whereas the Saints interpret them. A tripartite division of mankind was advocated by the great eleventh-century Indian Sufi, Ali al-Hujwiri: the worldly-'ahl-dunya' (Barthian Khans), the religious-'ahl-din' (Barthian Saints and including 'mullahs') and finally the 'special ones' - 'ahl-khususiyyat' (Sufis and mystics). It is the last category that is conspicuous by its absence in Barthian analysis.

The importance of Sufic development and interaction in Pathan (and Islamic areas) will be discussed in later chapters. The Sufic base to saintly power provided by the Akhund is vital in an understanding of subsequent developments in Swat. The Akhund's male descendants formed a separate social category from those mentioned in 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans' (ibid., p.57) under the general title 'Miangul': thus Miangul Abdul Wadud. This does not, of course, imply that all the Miangul are Sufis. The general usage of Sufi has to be guarded as this essay does not wish to leave itself open to the charges made against Idries Shah, a renowned Sufi writer and master (which are similar in content to those made against Barth's liberal use of 'Saint'): 'One of his most misleading practices is indiscriminately to label every Islamic poet, personality, religious movement, as "Sufi", a habit that leads him, for instance, to describe Omar Khayyam, the Yazidis, and the Isma'ilis all by the same term' (Elwell-Sutton, 1975, p.13).

The conclusion of Turner's chapter, 'Saint and Sheikh', in his book on 'Weber and Islam' may be quoted to sum up this section:

> In this discussion of maraboutic institutions, I have tried to show that, given the specific sociological nature of Islam and its cultural traditions, Islam did not and could not have social roles corresponding to the Christian saints, Sheikhs, yes; saints no (Turner, 1974, p.71).

'TRANSACTIONALISM' AND THE CODE OF THE PATHANS

The underlying theme of Pathan society is maintenance by all means and at all levels of its code of life, the 'Pukhtunwali': 'The value orientations on which it (the Pukhtun code) is based emphasize male autonomy and egality, self-expression and aggressiveness in a syndrome which might be summarized under the concept of honour ("izzat")' (Barth, 1969, p.120). Four typical examples of this are given, under the title, Cases Relating to Blood Revenge,

in the Appendix to 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans'.

The code rests on various 'ideal-type' approximates found in varying degrees of practice (perhaps, nearest to pure forms in the more remote Tribal Areas for reasons discussed in chapter 5). The code sets up ideal standards of behaviour and acts as a constant yardstick to measure normative or deviant behaviour. In the Tribal Areas the code would be more visible than in a feudal situation like Swat, none the less even the most rapacious Khan would heed it and derive his symbols of ethnicity from it and measure the extent of his prestige by it. If Amir Nawab is accused of killing 'forty-one men by his own hand' (Barth, 1959a, p.125) he not only provides an unusual example (7) of mass homicide but also runs a very poor insurance risk. Pathans measure warrior-prestige or martial status by valour or deaths in battle and not over quarrels for land; and for every man killed the code demands compensatory 'badal' or revenge. Amir Nawab would have to be a very powerful man or migrate to a far-away land to survive for any length of time; and in point of fact he was killed (ibid., p.126). 'Badal', in effect, acts as deterrent to any such homicidal tendency in Pathan society.

The Pukhtun is seen as building political power through 'melmastia' (hospitality) for 'only through hospitality, through the device of gift-giving, does he create the wider obligations and dependence which he can then draw upon in the form of personal political support - in the final resort, military support' (ibid., p.12). Intended and unintended consequences that affect social structure may follow:

> Structural change is created through the actions of individuals.... The individual continually seizes the opportunities thus presented to him, exploits them in his own interest, and in so doing possibly changes the structure of society in as much as he redefines some norm of behaviour or creates a new status (Lloyd, 1971, p.73).

To Barth 'this striking hospitality and reckless spending only seems intelligible if we recognize that the underlying motives are political rather than economic' (Barth, 1959a, p.12). The Swat Pathan is thus maximizing power:

> This use of maximization as a scientific strategy involves seeking out the norms or motives (or whatever the investigator sees as the impetus of behaviour) and attempting to rank order them so as to see the behaviour as the (conscious or unconscious) maximization of these things (Cancian, 1966, pp.465-70).

An explanation of the code of hospitality and honour that Pukhtuns pride themselves on simply in terms of maximizing political power, is difficult to accept empirically. (8) One of the conscious or unconscious motivations and results of excessive hospitality might well be political power and 'hujras' are no doubt one mechanism for furthering such ends. 'Maximizing' tendencies among the Khans are not to be discounted: on the contrary the Pashto proverb quoted above, 'the hen is a bird belonging to him who seizes it', corroborates Barth's vision of Swat and Swat politics. But this is only one of the aspects of Pathan hospitality, and one of the interpretations of its usage. Firstly, if 'political support' alone is the reason for hospitality then this argument cannot be sustained in explaining the 'striking hospitality' of the ordinary Pukhtun villager to any passing stranger or foreigner. This aspect of his code has passed into the mythology of Pukhtun society and history. Secondly, the concept of 'melmastia' relates to that of 'nanawatee' or the granting of asylum to anyone, including an enemy, who seeks it. Barth gives an undue political emphasis by relating this basically cultural aspect of Pathan society to the political power struggle in Swat. It is not being debated that central village institutions, like 'hujras', are not used for political ends but that their function and emphasis is not entirely political. They are at least as much a cultural phenomenon as a political one.

Hospitality is part of the larger consciousness of Islamic society and is embodied in popular maxims and Quranic verses that exhort the believers to practise it. Examples of this are numerous and may be cited from all over the Islamic world. (9) Barth himself observes that among the Basseri 'hospitality is an admired social virtue ... though economically unwise' and 'politically unprofitable'. In fact,

> The hospitable man is admired and people speak highly of him whether he is present or absent. Men seek his company and flock to his tent, though without importunity. By their own standards, then, most Basseri are miserly; and a few glaring examples are held up for public ridicule. Thus one of the largest herd owners in the group is popularly known as D.D.T. Khan because, they say, he is such a miser he eats his own lice (Barth, 1968, pp.424-5).

One should rather see 'melmastia' in terms of another Barthian concept, that of maintenance of cultural identity and ethnic boundaries (Barth, 1969). Hospitality whether in the 'hujra' or outside it becomes symbolic both of the expression of political loyalty and of ethnic identity.

For hospitality whether individually or collectively expressed, is one of the major cognitive, tangible and coherent symbols of 'Pukhtunwali' to the Pathan. A Pukhtun does or lives the Pukhtun code which enables him to be respected in the eyes of his fellow men. Hospitality is one source of such respect. Thus legends glorify the Pukhtun virtues of generosity and bravery on which rest honour, 'nang'. These are the major constituent elements of 'Pukhtunwali' or the code of the Pathan and they cannot be interpreted in terms of 'political support' alone.

The Yusufzai Khan is, therefore, aware of the nuances of his pivotal role in interpreting 'Pukhtunwali', which in itself distinguishes Pathan from non-Pathan behaviour. The Khan would play Game-Theory politics to a point. Beyond a certain stage he would come up against the severe constraints imposed by his cultural and religious codes.

If the Barthian landlords are busy 'seizing', 'attacking', 'manipulating' and 'ousting' they still represent only the activities of a very small percentage of the total population (Barth, 1959a, p.44). It is difficult to envisage the small Pathan landlord or a peasant 'attacking' and 'seizing' with impunity. Certain examples of Pathan behaviour can be understood mainly in terms of mystical Sufic behaviour as for instance, the Akhund's granddaughter, who spent her entire and long life fasting and praying in a tiny mud hut by a Swat stream, where she died a few years ago. Her parallel cousin, the Wali, failed to persuade her to move to the State capital at Saidu. Although the surrounding villages called her 'Bandai Bibi' (the Lady of the village) she neither provided them with incantatory spells and charms nor attempted to elevate her status to sainthood. Her stark material poverty cannot be explained away in transactionalist terms by imputing Islamic 'strategy' to her behaviour in order to 'maximize' spirituality. This aspect of Islamic behaviour is an important dimension that Barth has chosen to ignore; the sincerity or motives that underlie it cannot be questioned as it is to be seen and understood through the eyes of the actor. The imposition of the transactionalist framework, in toto, on the Swat Pathan lays Barth's work open to charges of a form of academic ethnocentricism as has already been suggested in the Introduction. The Norwegian entrepreneur embodying 'initiative' and 'expansive economic policy' (Barth, 1963) is barely disguised as the Swat Pathan. Considerations of profit, choice and strategy chart his social behaviour while attempts to exploit and manipulate determine his relationships. The 'Pukhtunwali', and its immediate socio-cultural constraints, and the larger Islamic socio-religious framework are therefore reduced to epiphenomena.

LINEAGE AND STRATIFICATION IN SWAT

Lineage provides a birthright to land among the Yusufzai in Swat. However, with the process of density of segmentation and corresponding scarcity of land a stratification within the Yusufzai tribe is observed, which is distinct from the main cleavage between Pathan landowners and non-Pathans. This section explores the consequences of the former development. 'To the sedentary villagers, whether tenants, craftsmen, or others, the Pakhtun represents an unnecessary imposition ... they know the fields and the irrigation system better than the Pakhtuns' (Barth, 1959a, pp.68-9). This statement is not clear in explaining how the small landowner or crofter (as the vast majority of Pukhtuns are - ibid., p.44) remained ignorant of the irrigation systems that fed their lands after living on them for over four hundred years. Barth employs the argument of the 'wesh' system, whereby land is periodically changed among landowners. But it is historically unlikely that the majority of small (two- or four-acre) Pukhtun landowners took part in the 'wesh' resettlement and no evidence to support it.

The lack of a quantitative comparison of Pukhtun landowners with the Pukhtun non-landowners is a serious omission, (10) considering that land is fundamental to maintaining positions of superiority in Swat (and to playing games based on economic dyadic alliances and manipulations). Dr Asad makes this point with structural and conceptual implications for Barth's Swat study and particularly for developments in post-Barth Swat in the 1960s and 1970s (Asad, 1972). Barth's references are to landowners and non-landowners, but no systematic use is made of the distinction between the big 'landlords' and the small 'owner farmers':

> Of all Pakhtun landowners a very small proportion holds most of the land. So that the majority of landowners in Swat are small holders, and the remainder possess very large estates. In other words very few Pakhtuns are in a position to make the traditional economic contracts with agricultural tenants and labourers (ibid., p.87).

The big Khans or landowners extracted as much as four-fifths of gross produce from tenants (Barth, 1959a, p.11). This is a high figure by any feudal standards and if even partly applied to the 'poorer' Khans, who often cultivate for 'richer' Khans but are aware of common Yusufzai descent and therefore willing to stand up for their rights, a direct conflict course may be set. These small Pukhtun landowners are often in the vanguard of struggles

that suggest class conflict against the bigger landowners in the 1960s and 1970s. The small Khans or landowners find themselves in the 'wuge sari' (hungry men) category (ibid., p.79), who not only lose land to the big Khan but also their Pukhtun status (ibid., p.112). Barth notices the growth of a poor non-landowning Pukhtun class

> In fact, the evidence indicates that in the present century the sloughing-off process has more than offset the natural growth of the Pakhtun population and that land has been progressively concentrated in fewer lines and fewer hands (ibid.),

but he fails to follow it up. These poor Pukhtuns slip into the life pattern of the non-Pukhtun villagers. The substantial difference in incomes between the big landlord and the average villager is brought out by Barth himself (ibid., p.79).

For purposes of this argument it is felt that perhaps individual consent and dyadic links have been underlined at the cost of analysing collective exploitation and class structure. Dr Asad's reconsideration of Barth's Swat data challenges the equilibrium model based on a landlord-class maintaining social order in a classical functionalist mould

> in fact the orderly social life and potential self-sufficiency of the non-landlords in contrast with the parasitic social existence of the landlords, suggests something else: that the total political activity of the landowning chiefs is simply the historical form through which class domination and exploitation find expression not the necessary basis for social order (Asad, 1972, pp.91-2).

The non-landowners in an age of the mass media and a highly politicized environment no longer remain 'merely a kind of sea of politically unorganized peasants and craftsmen' (Barth, 1959a, p.69). Resentment is apparent: 'Thus I have heard Swati farmers abusing their Yusufzai overlords and cursing the incompetence of their ancestors in the decisive battles of the sixteenth century' (ibid., pp.24-5).

Force provides the historical base for landownership: 'Rights to land and the status of landowner are validated among them by traditions of conquest, and the lineage organization of the Pakhtuns is intimately linked with conquest history' (ibid., p.25). Alliances, therefore, cannot be rigid or permanent except if mutually beneficial or maintained by force, 'the position of a leader is thus never secure; his following may swell or shrink almost without warning' (ibid., p.73). So what, apart from temporary 'dyadic contracts' and 'alliances', keeps the

50,000 inhabitants of Babuzai from revolting against their 1,000 Pathan rulers or the 20,000 inhabitants of Thana against their 500 Pathan overlords? An obvious answer is the 'exercise of coercive authority through the use or possibility of use of physical force'. One form of coercion was provided by the 'mercenaries' (11) the Khans employed to maintain the political system and allow them to dominate its blocs and alliances. This cannot be a permanent or harmonious solution to 'maintenance or establishment of social order'. The failure to develop the conflict analysis upsets the Barthian Swat model in the 1960s and 1970s where horizontal class alignments based on political ideology and aspirations begin to replace vertical lines of traditional alignment.

THE WARLORDS AND THE WALI

The Yusufzai warlords of Swat played a 'zero-sum' game at a certain macro-level of Malakand politics (ibid., p.128). The nature of their game reflected their failure to unite, and consequently their failure to prevent the Wali from gaining ultimate ascendancy. In fact the Khans played a secondary but crucial role in two critical contests involving the Wali: the first was the dynastic battles between the agnatic descendants of the Akhund, when Khans supported first one cousin, then another (Hay, 1934). Allegiance was constantly shifted to keep the balance of power in check: 'In an attempt to check the power of the newly appointed head of Swat, Jamroz Khan of Babuzai and most of his allies then shifted their allegiance to Shirin Sahib, the Badshah's brother and only remaining collateral' (Barth, 1959a, p.128). The Wali clearly saw the game the Khans were playing

> lest Amir Badshah (the Wali's cousin) be held solely responsible for what ensued, I would affirm that he was merely a tool in the hands of those unscrupulous and self-interested Khans of Swat who were afraid of our being united again and, quite possibly, hindering them from their cruel practices (Miangul, 1962, p.12).

The second contest involved the wars of consolidation and annexation that the new ruler of Swat launched after 1917 (Hay, 1934). The Wali, however, was fully aware of the nature of Swat politics and social organization, and his capacity to exploit this knowledge led him to succeed where others, like the Khan of Dir, had failed. His military tactics were based on the classic tradition of 'divide et impera' which found a ready expression in the two-bloc system already in existence in most parts of

Swat. He would invade an area only after allying with the weaker bloc and thus 'tilt' the balance in his favour. The 'zero-sum' game ceases when participants gain power (or value) that permanently imbalances the possibility of success for the other side. The Wali was already making his own rules for the game. After emerging from the dynastic struggles and the border battles of consolidation he turned to confront the problem of the Swat warlords. The fragile peace, and his short rule, could have been upset by a simple majority of Khans in a typical 'zero-sum' combination. The solution had to be as permanent as congruent with Swat socio-political organization.

Firstly, the Wali approached the problem of the Khans in neo-populist and neo-reformist terms. The Khans were seen as 'cruel' 'tyrants' and 'despots'. The pre-1917 era, before he became Badshah of Swat, was seen as 'the Pakhtoon Period' of the 'despotic Khans' (Miangul, 1962, p. 27):

> To quote only one instance: once in the hilly tracts of a despotic Khan's property a fruit, being over-ripe, fell from the tree. A poor peasant, who was passing by, committed the fatal sin of eating this fallen fruit, for which unpardonable audacity he was punished with death.... Such tyrants had made life a source of continual worry and unbearable misery (ibid., pp.27-8).

Secondly, he symbolized a policy that carried the majority of the non-landowners and small Khans wanting peace and stability in Swat with him:

> Every day that passed was a new life gained, no one could be sure of seeing the next day. And, strange enough, there was moral degeneration apparent in every walk of life: people had grown faithless and treacherous to a degree that none were trustworthy, all were abject slaves of power and authority. People worshipped the rising sun, regardless of the honour of the family and the tribe or losing or gaining good-will and a good name. Mammon was the deity in vogue (ibid., p. 28).

The Wali moved swiftly to extract the teeth of the Khans permanently by a series of ramifying 'reforms', among them:

I the Swat population was completely disarmed. Simultaneously, loyalist supporters were armed (ibid., p.109).

II roads and telephones spread out ubiquitously in an effective network to keep him informed of any possible revolt; a well-equipped and large army stood ready to deal with any emergency (Barth, 1959a, pp.129-32).

III the economic base that provided both social identity and political power to the Khans was drastically altered:

'wesh' was abolished and the land taxes that the Khans took from their tenants were partly diverted to the State in the form of 'ushar'. The sources of social mobility and economic patronage, through administrative posts, the ruler's favours etc. were demonstrably with the State and no longer with the Khans. The Wali thus bypassed the Khans to reach the vast number of non-landowners in a direct relationship (see Diagram 3). Loyal Khans were rewarded while the rebellious ones were punished:

> but with the success of the Miangul they received their reward. Everywhere else he had caused forts and towers of local headmen to be razed to the ground, and had imposed his own trusted servants to manage affairs and enjoy the sweets of office (Stein, 1929, p.110).

As the dyadic, political contracts and alliances between Khan-patron and tenant-client are not based on symmetrical positions of power but are manifestly asymmetrical so in turn, the Khans face the Wali with grossly uneven strength. The relationship between the warlords and the Wali is not one of equals and not symmetrical. The formula of a transaction used in 'Models of Social Organization' (Barth, 1966, p.13) is expressed thus:

$$A^{x} \rightleftarrows_{y} B \quad \text{where for} \quad A,^{x} \leq Y$$

$$\text{and for} \quad B,^{x} \geq Y$$

However, the formulae for the transaction based on various socio-political interactions between the Wali(W) and the Khans (K) $(W^{y} \rightleftarrows_{x} K)$ would look like this:

for the Wali, $W,^{x} \leq Y$

and for the Khan $K,^{x} \leq Y$ who emerges a constant loser in the transaction

The Khan is consistently giving more in terms of personal autonomy and power than he is getting. For surrender of autonomy he might be rewarded with status or wealth by the State. This aspect of political relationships and their omission in Barthian analysis (ibid.) has been the subject of an illuminating recent comment (Paine, 1974, p. 7).

THE SWAT UNIVERSE AND THE SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC BASE

Professor Barth uses his tools of analysis on his models in the way that a master-surgeon uses his instruments; they cut away quantitative data, the flesh and blood of the anthropological study, so neatly as to go almost unnoticed. There is a notable lack of ethnographic detail which leaves gaps in the Swat study. The central and unique factor in land tenure, 'wesh', which explains Yusufzai dominance and identity is illustrated by one example only, that of the 'Nikbi Khel' section (Barth, 1959a, pp.65-6; 1959b, p.8). The 'hujra', to take another example, plays a central institutional role as the base and index of political strength of a Khan and as an institution that provides an integrative mechanism to underlying social tension. Although there is an entire section on 'the Men's House', a statistical portrayal or analysis of the expenditure by the Khans on the 'hujras'' upkeep and the results in political loyalty over time based on the details of a randomly selected group of 'hujras' is not attempted. Such a cost-benefit analysis would have shown correlative directions and conclusions. Even one detailed case-study of the fortunes of a 'hujra' in relation to those of its owner would have been interesting, although Barth does excuse himself on this point (Barth, 1959a, p.80). A study of the relation between tribal affluence and proliferation of 'hujras' (as among the Yusufzai Khans in contrast to the fewer 'hujras' in the Tribal Areas), and their effect on local political patterns and bloc balances, would clearly demarcate the boundaries of one category of social and economic Pathan organization from another. Contrary to what Barth observed in the Peshawar valley, (12) the growth of general affluence, as a result of changing agricultural cropping patterns in favour of cash crops, has resulted in a proliferation of 'hujras'. Whereas formerly each village or ward might have supported one 'hujra', now any Khan with money to spare from cash crops sets one up. Such 'hujras' are not entirely for political ends alone: visiting relatives, officials, friends and strangers break their journeys and are entertained in them.

Yet again little is perhaps made of 'ushar' and 'qalang' (the varieties of taxes and rents the landlord took from his tenants). How were these fixed? Who gathered them? Were they gathered in kind or cash? What were the sanctions to ensure payment or for default? The answers to these questions would alter with the change in the status of the landlord from a 'rotating' to a 'permanent' (and 'post-wesh') one.

The Victorian impact on anthropology is still evident when anthropologists add up the reciprocal services husband and wife perform for each other. Wives invariably appear to 'provide' sexual services (Barth, 1967, p.161) while the contribution of the husband does not appear to qualify as a service in a positive or valued sense. In the year of Women's Liberation this arithmetic would be open to charges of male chauvinism. The explanation of Pathans sleeping in men's-houses, 'its use as a dormitory is consciously related to feelings of sexual shame at being associated with women' and visiting 'their wives only briefly and secretly during the night' (Barth, 1959a, p.55) is not satisfactory nor is it observed Pathan behaviour; it has no derivative tradition from either Pathan customary behaviour or Islamic values.

Of the seven villages that provided the statistical data for the Swat material, five are urbanized or near urban centres - only Nalkot and Biha, neighbouring villages, are remote and towards the north (ibid., p.15). Statistically, it is not clear how representative these villages are of tribal organization and how they were selected. Professor Barth's emphasis on theoretical abstraction rather than social ontology tends to leave ethnographic gaps. For instance, demographic shifts, population growth trends, immigration and migration, those dynamic and influential factors affecting the shape and structure of rural society would have been most useful in analyses of socio-political trends after the freezing of 'wesh' and the establishment of the Swat State. It has been documented elsewhere that there were large migrations out of Swat in search of employment after the establishment of the State which weakened and altered traditional social relationships (Ahmad, 1962, p.71).

In concluding this chapter it may be observed that what seemed, at times, an exercise in hair-splitting, especially in the early sections, was considered necessary not only to clarify concepts and terms but to explain the bases of some of the misunderstandings that have risen regarding Pathan society. Explaining the most basic socio-cultural codes as 'melmastia' or hospitality, in political terms alone has been challenged as it is partly responsible for the excessively anarchic image of Pathan society in sociological literature derived from and generally equated to Barth's Swat models. Such material will be examined at greater length in a separate section in the last chapter.

The argument differentiating acephalous, segmentary societies from centralized states appears to employ a sledgehammer to crack a nut. None the less it was felt

necessary to draw a general framework of the differentiated types of tribal organization within which to illustrate and illuminate Swat social organization. Using terms like 'Saints' for all people of religious status is widely misunderstood in spite of Barth's warnings to the contrary, for example, 'mullahs' are equated with Saints and elevated to their status (Tuden, 1966).

The exclusion of a Sufic framework of reference neglects the ambience within which the Akhund lived and emerged, and its connections with the nineteenth-century Sufic revivalist movements in the Islamic world, which is expanded in chapter 6. Discussion on Sufism also underlines the qualitative differences in the understanding of Sufis and Saints in Islamic societies.

The Swat study would have benefited by inclusion of more demographic figures generally and hard data on key socio-political features such as 'hujras', 'wesh' and 'ushar' particularly. These data could have thrown light on the growing stratification in Swat society resulting in horizontal lines of political alignment that replace traditional vertical ones; a restructuring borne out by recent trends and events in Swat. It is relevant that earlier in the century the Wali had cast himself in the mould of a neo-populist and neo-reformist leader. The Khans were seen as tyrannical and despotic warlords. The Khans could then play 'zero-sum' power games and hold the balance among the agnatic descendants of the Akhund and Swat's powerful neighbours in their bitter struggle for power.

Finally, certain minor points need mention in passing, if only because they have survived numerous prints of 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans', and are given in a note, p.148. (13)

Part two

5 A theory of Pathan economic structure and political organization

غرنګ او خور دامان تلنګ او خور

Honour ate up the mountains and taxes ate up the plains

'RECIPROCAL' AND 'REDISTRIBUTIVE' ECONOMIES IN TRIBAL SOCIETIES

Barth's theoretical model and its assumptions rest on land as the basis for political interaction and power and this chapter will put Swat society in a larger economic context to bring its structural features into greater relief. Although the social structure of Swat is formed by its distinct economic and ecologic base Swat society does not form a discrete socio-economic category. It forms part of wider tribal socio-economic systems differentiated and identified by answers to two key questions: the extent of irrigated land and the systems of land tenure. Most related socio-economic answers follow. It is through the economic structures and ecological constraints in Pathan society that political organization and power are to be understood. The tribal Pathan lives within three recognizable types of economy, familiar in anthropological discussion, which can be generally categorized:

I an economy based on 'reciprocity' (further subdivided into 'general', 'balanced' and 'negative reciprocity' corresponding to distance from the household) of gifts, goods and services induced by social obligation derived from kinship which produces a balance in inhibiting the growth of a person or groups of persons beyond traditionally sanctioned roles (Sahlins, 1965). The modes of production are 'domestic' and 'familial' and the economy atomized into household units. However 'familial mode of production' is not synonymous with 'familial production'

(Sahlins, 1968, p.75). Segmentary groups are presupposed and their existence strengthened by this economy. As is tribal democracy,

> Some tribal societies, we have seen, are ranked, but none is a class society. Standing against class formation, as it stands against economic stratification, is the system of autonomous family production. The people's hold on their own means of production is fatal to any such design of economic power. The appropriation of critical productive means by some few is precluded, and thereby the economic servility of the many others. Whatever other means tribesmen devise to elevate a man above his fellows, and they are several, this one, history's most compelling, is not open to them (ibid., p.76).

Movement is between correlative points of symmetrical groups. Pukhtun society in the Tribal Areas operates within a segmentary lineage system and, being patrilineal, has developed those symptoms of authority that approximate to Weber's patriarchal or gerontocratic forms of authority. 'Reciprocal' economies and social relationships are a characteristic feature of the Tribal Areas.

II the second integrative economic mechanism is a 'redistributional' economy (the channelling upwards of goods and services to socially determined allocative centres - king, chief or priest, who then redistribute to their followers) and is found in the richer Frontier Districts of Peshawar, Mardan and Swat, inhabited by Yusufzai tribesmen owning large tracts of land and employing client-tenants to help cultivate it. An asymmetrical patron-client relationship defines and binds the landlord and his tenant in a feudal and hierarchical order. 'Hujras' become the channel for 'melmastia' and the locational focus and index of political strength and loyalty. Investment is thus in followers and clients. As was seen in the last chapter, each Khan will afford his own 'hujra' whereas in the first category the entire village might operate one jointly; a fact which is indicative both of economic differentials that explain the affluence of the Khans and the different Pathan social structure within which they operate. Post-Wali Swat, as indeed pre-Wali Swat, fell in this category. Goods and services (in the shape of labour and taxes) were given to the Wali and re-channelled to the people in the form of free schools, hospitals, etc. (cf. Diagrams in chapter 7).

III 'market' or 'modern economy' is restricted to urban centres like Kohat or Bannu, where money replaces other standards of value and acts as an 'all-purpose' medium of exchange. Trade is impersonal and profit-making. Markets

deal with customers and not kin. None the less, tribal networks though latent or obscure, seldom die. Studies indicate the persistence of tribal cohesiveness operating along established tribal networks in, or juxtaposed to, modern economic market systems (Cohen, 1972; Ahmed, forthcoming publication).

None of the above are isolated categories; the earlier two forms often occur together or overlap in non-market economies. They are simply generalized and vectorial stages of economic growth. Most societies evolve in a manner unique to them in response to their own individual needs in relation to external pressures.

'NANG' AND 'QALANG' AS SYMBOLS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CATEGORIES

In the foregoing section Pathan tribes and areas were generally classed into 'reciprocal' and 'redistributive' economic categories to put the argument of their internal socio-economic structures and boundaries within a theoretical frame. However, for taxonomical purposes Pathan tribes are traditionally divided:

I linguistically, into those who speak hard Pukhto (like Yusufzai and Mohmand tribes living generally north of Peshawar) from those speaking the soft Pashto variant (like Khattak tribes living south of Peshawar) or

II administratively, between the tribes living in the 'hills' or Tribal Areas, where the regular criminal and judicial laws do not apply (i.e. in the six Tribal Agencies of the North-West Frontier Province and mainly along the International border) and those in the 'plains' or Settled Districts (in the three Administrative Divisions of the Province). These categories may often prove arbitrary and empirically misleading: Khattak groups speaking the hard Pukhto are found living in the middle of the Yusufzai area in Mardan. As regards the second category, the Yusufzai are found both in Tribal Areas like the Malakand Agency and Settled Districts like Mardan and Swat.

This chapter will attempt a classification of Pathan social organization deriving from ecological and economic factors and based on two key concepts, 'nang' and 'qalang', that influence and explain differentiated Pathan social organization and behaviour. These are 'ideal-type' structures based on frequency of observable behaviour and a concept of a species type and not based on quantitative analysis or statistical averages. Ideal-types help explain the 'ideal' while examining the 'actual' and to contemplate the 'pure forms' and not the 'average'. Like all

'ideal-type' formulations the categories suggested in this section sometimes overlap and often borrow from each other especially at the borders; they are not entirely discrete nor mutually exclusive. As categories they serve to conceptualize and answer the two related questions of where the boundaries of social organization between 'nang' and 'qalang' are drawn and how they are maintained. Together they constitute the template that forms the social phenomena which explain Pathan behaviour and social organization to a large degree.

Tribal or 'hill' Pathans organize their socio-political life along egalitarian lines and more in accordance with the ideal concepts of 'Pukhtunwali' than their cousins in the 'plains' (Barth, 1969, p.13). The important variable generating multi-dimensional changes is located in the difference in ecological and economic environment. Hill Pathans organize themselves within segmentary lineage groups corresponding to known territorial boundaries: 'The frontier tribe, whether within or beyond our border, has almost without exception a very distinct corporate existence, each tribe and within the tribe each clan occupying a clearly defined tract of country' (Ibbetson, 1883, p.201). They are stateless and 'ordered anarchies' familiar through those categorized for African tribal societies (Middleton and Tait, 1958). Tribal battles and raids combine with seasonal migration to maintain a rough demographic balance between population and economic resources.

The position and authority of the 'Malik' ('big-man' or 'petty-chief') symbolizes the socio-political structure. The 'Malik' 'is seldom more than their leader in war and their agent in dealings with others; he possesses influence rather than power; and the real authority rests with the "jirgah", a democratic council composed of all the "Maliks"' (Ibbetson, 1883, p.201). The 'Malik' of the Mahsud tribes in Waziristan, for instance, derive authority from 'distinguishing themselves in council and war, through wisdom and bravery' (Afridi, forthcoming publication). Deviant behaviour is confronted by tribal and customary laws based on 'Pukhtunwali' and interpreted by the 'jirga'. The 'Malik' cannot enforce decisions outside 'Pukhtunwali' for the 'maintenance or establishment of social order within a territorial framework, by the organized exercise of coercive authority through the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force' (Radcliffe-Brown, in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940, p.xiv). Among the Mahsud,

> tribal ties disallow the rule of might and the most powerful and affluent Malik will think twice before imposing his will through force on the poorest or weakest of his clansmen. The consequences of any rash act are so severe that they have a deterrent effect (Afridi, forthcoming publication).

Tribal life is supported by primitive modes of production and equitable forms of distribution. Equality is thus inherent in the economic situation and acts through circular causation with existing socio-political factors to reinforce itself: 'Force is decentralized; legitimately held in severalty, the social compact has yet to be drawn, the state nonexistent. So peacemaking is not a sporadic intersocietal event, it is a continuous process within society itself' (Sahlins, 1965, p.140).

The economy is part-pastoral and part-agricultural. Land is poor and unirrigated in the main and supports no large towns or market places. Senior agnates often exhibit examples of segmentary 'fissures' and start their own fort-like settlements to live within talking (or shooting) distance of their main collateral group but as separate economic units. Production is mainly organized by and for families and carried on as a domestic activity. The classic distinction between 'production for use' (i.e. provisioning) and 'production for exchange' (i.e. profit) here becomes apparent and relevant.

Apart from a few roads built by the British for purposes of military strategy no road networks exist. Historical caravan routes survive at the mercy of the tribal section through which they pass. The building of roads over the last century was a costly affair often involving military action. The construction required new negotiations with each subsection of a tribe as it entered their territory and military expeditions often followed breakdown of talks. The vital Kohat-Peshawar road built late last century through Afridi territory is a famous example.

The picture that emerges is of a reciprocal and primitive economy supporting acephalous and segmentary tribal groups that organize social life according to traditional tribal customs and codes. No man may become excessively powerful or excessively destitute: there is an inherent limit to both in the tribal social structure. Beyond a certain stage in either case the individual confronts his immediate sub-group and the tribal norms that his situation affect.

In the absence of any other law, life revolves around 'Pukhtunwali' and its most important and dominant component element which is the concept of 'nang'. The reasons are not difficult to seek. Economic channels of mobility and power are so obviously restricted in the ecological situation in which the tribe finds itself that

'nang', as a symbol of prestige and social mobility, assumes a key aspect. 'Nang' may take various shapes approximating to the ideal concept inherent in 'Pukhtunwali'. In point of fact an entire codification of behaviour around its meaning has developed in 'nangwali' or the Code of Honour. 'Nang' thus becomes a pivotal concept and a standard of reference in understanding normative tribal behaviour and socio-political interaction. In the face of severe economic poverty, personal valour, marksmanship and skill in combat become the symbols that confer 'nang' and therefore status. For a different and older age-set wisdom and propriety achieve honour. The emphasis is on individual and personal prowess. Khushal Khan Khattak, the famous seventeenth-century poet, exemplified this type of tribal category. The word 'nang', he wrote, drove him 'mad with emotion' (Howell and Caroe, 1963). In a disparaging reference to the Yusufzai the worst expletive he could think of was 'tillers' of the land, or agriculturalists. This form of Pathan socio-political organization, itself a consequence of its economic environment, may be called the 'nang' Pathan category. In distinction to the 'ideal-type' 'nang' category, and implying a different social structure through a different economic base, is the 'qalang' category of Pathan social organization.

'Qalang' is taken to mean 'rent' or 'tax' for land usage (Barth, 1959a, p.51). It is seen as the pivotal socio-economic concept in a tribal society where large tracts of irrigated land are cultivated and 'redistributive' rather than 'reciprocal' economic interaction orders social life. Its 'giving' or 'taking' determines and differentiates subordinate from superordinate social relationships. 'Qalang' delineates the symbiotic roles of patron and client and underlines the nature of the symbiosis. It is the definitional and final act that delimits and maintains social boundaries within a stratified society. As land is the content of social interaction, 'qalang' is the form in which the latter expresses itself. The nature of 'qalang' both asks and answers the key questions in agricultural landlord-tenant relationships: who owns the land? how is land hired out? how is the rent fixed? what are the rights of the tenant? what are the sanctions for arrears or default?

It also symbolizes a stratified, hierarchical and agricultural society. It is significant that 'wesh' does not appear to have existed in the 'nang' areas as there was no need to conceptualize equality already inherent in the segmentary descent groups. On the other hand, in 'qalang' areas 'wesh' both conferred status through shares in the land based on filiation in the descent group and divided

Yusufzai from non-Yusufzai.

As social status is directly related to the economic base of the individual, social prowess becomes more a matter of mobilization of resources than one of personal talent. The difference is one between the 'warrior' (tribal) and the 'warlord' (feudal). The former participates in 'raids', the latter organizes 'battles'. Status is largely ascribed through birth and marriages are endogamous within social strata corresponding generally to occupational ones. 'Purdah' and the concept of seclusion are emphasized and begin to correspond with the status of women and their homes. 'Nangwali', as the operative element in the code is replaced by 'tarboorwali' (agnatic rivalry) based on disputes over irrigated lands and succession to property.

'Qalang' Pathan society is culturally rich and urbane. Its language is refined, its intonations orthodox and standard. Forms of address are influenced by Urdu and Persian and differentiate those of higher and lower status: 'taso' (you) for the respected and 'te' applied generally. In contrast the only form of address in the 'nang' areas is 'te' (you). From 'qalang' society come the poets and writers. The great and saintly names: Sheikh Malli, Afzal Khan, Pir Baba, Akhund Darwezah, the Akhund of Swat. Life is orthodox, formal and literate and there is a tendency towards urbanization. Mingora, Thana and Mardan are large Yusufzai towns along the main road to Swat.

> The 'hill' cousins are seen in an unkindly light: But the Pathans of our territory have been much softened by our rule and by the agricultural life of the plains, so that they look down upon the Pathans of the hills, and their proverbs have it - 'A hill man is no man', and again 'Don't class burrs as grass or a hill man as a human being'. The nearer he is to the frontier the more closely the Pathan assimilates to the original type; while on this side of the Indus, even in the riverain itself, there is little or nothing, not even language, to distinguish him from his neighbours of the same religion as himself (Ibbetson, 1883, p. 200).

It is no coincidence that whereas the 'qalang' areas have produced the established and orthodox names in Pashto literature, like Akhund Darwezah, author of the 'Makhzan-i-Afghani', one of the first extant Pashto works, the 'nang' areas have produced popular Sufic poets writing and reciting verses that reflect the informal, mystical and rural aspects of Pathan life, like Abdul Qadir Khattak, Rahman Baba, Hamid Mohmand and Khwaja Bangash. The

Roshaniya heresy in the Mughal era was supported by sections of the Mohmand and Afridi tribes falling into 'nang' categories while the orthodox answer to the Roshaniya came from the Akhund Darwezah and was supported by the Yusufzai. The division within Islamic societies between the rural, informal and mystical and the urban, formal and orthodox is examined in the next chapter but here it may be pointed out that the 'nang' areas coincide with the former division and the 'qalang' with the latter.

Mardan, Swat and Dir Districts, mainly inhabited by the Yusufzai since they conquered these areas in the sixteenth century, find themselves in the 'qalang' socio-economic category. These lands are amongst the richest in the Frontier Province, watered as they are by its major rivers, the Panjkora, the Swat and in certain areas, the Indus and the Kabul. They contain vast reserves of forests and grow rice, wheat and more recently cash crops, such as tobacco, in abundance.

The 'nang-qalang' division clarifies the confusion of explaining exceptions to general inter-tribal classifications. A society may now be viewed as a form of morphological development from a particular type of economic environment. Thus the Yusufzai may fall within the 'nang' category in parts of Bajaur and Dir, and the Mohmand in the 'qalang' category as landlords of vast tracts in Mardan. An example of a single tribe dramatically divided in the 'nang-qalang' category is provided by the Mohmand. In the Mohmand Tribal Agency in Pakistan they form an acephalous, segmentary society living within defined subtribal boundaries and following the 'Pukhtunwali'. On the other hand the Mohmand around Jelalabad, in Afghanistan, are landlords owning vast tracts of irrigated land and organized apically into a stratified society based on tenants, like the Tajiks, from extra-ethnic groups. The Mohmand Khans of Lalpura before their incorporation into the State in the last century once wielded immense feudal power similar to that of the Yusufzai Khans of Dir and Swat.

The 'qalang' Khans whether Yusufzai or Mohmand, are vulnerable to the pressures that an encapsulating system can bring to bear:

> any landholding, dominant group will therefore be forced, sooner or later, to come to terms with these centres of power (centralized governments) or they will be destroyed. Such landlords are trapped in a social system where pursuit of Pathan virtues is consistently punished, whereas compromise, submission and accommodation are rewarded. Under these circumstances, Pathan descent may be remembered but the distinctive behaviour

> associated with the identity is discontinued ... such groups ... are the ones scathingly referred to by Pathans as speaking but not doing Pashto (Barth, 1969, p.129).

This exposure to central authority and the dilemma to Pathan values it poses is not new. Since the Yusufzai migration to the Peshawar valley they have been confronted, and eventually encapsulated, by central authority. In the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example, they were fully involved in the dynastic struggles of the Mughal princes.

Pictures confirming Yusufzai organization, in this case in Swat, in the 'qalang' category are given by successive writers on the Pathans. Yusufzai 'qalang' organization presupposes ranked social groups and Elphinstone wrote early in the nineteenth century:

> The complete property of the soil was vested in each clan, and the Swautees who remained were reduced to the condition of villains, or, as the Eusofzyes call them Fakeers. This is the state in which things are at this day (Elphinstone, 1972, II, p.14).

The Yusufzai are seen as earnest cultivators and agriculturists, almost in the celebrated Punjab mould, by the British administration and too exposed to direct Government action to be the sort of threat the tribal or 'nang' category Pathan constantly posed. They permit the encapsulation of their social structure and in turn they are seen as representing the best of Pathanness (Caroe, 1965, p.421):

> The Yusufzai is an agriculturist, generally a fine, well-limbed man, of good physique and appearance, with a great deal of race-pride, well-dressed and cheery, while his hospitality is proverbial. They have an established and recognised gentry, and all blue-blooded Yusufzai have a hereditary share in the land, their names appearing in the book of hereditary land-owners kept by the village 'patwari'. The Yusufzai plain is very flat, and the soil, where properly irrigated, is very fertile (Wylly, 1912, p.56).

In the middle of this century the picture of Yusufzai social organization remains unaltered (Spain, 1962, p.74).

The 'qalang' areas are today characterized by vast tracts of irrigated (often canal) lands which provide more than one crop. Cash crops are grown and marketed (for instance, tobacco and sugar-cane in the Mardan District). Individual ownership of land and contact with Government Departments result in 'progressive farming': improved seeds, mechanization, tube-wells etc. As land has always been a vital ramifying factor in Pathan social

organization its ownership and tenure are defined and recorded in land revenue records and field boundaries are jealously fixed. Excess produce, augmented by the tenant's contribution, creates the necessity and capacity for storage facilities. Perishable grains are converted into liquid forms of currency and this is often reinvested to consolidate socio-political authority. The larger encapsulating social systems merely exacerbate and underline growing social differences: the rich send their sons to one type of school and the poor to another, for instance. The logical result of this social organization is a life-style structurally and qualitatively evolving away from that of the 'nang' areas.

Although economic and ecological environmental factors impose restraints and reinforce sociological differences between 'nang' and 'qalang' the division is not structurally immutable as, for example, between the African Lele and Bushong tribes. The Lele and Bushong, as has been studied, in spite of a common origin, related language and similar houses, crafts etc.,continue to remain differentiated (Douglas, 1962). The Bushong, for historical and ecological reasons, are a richer and more industrious tribe than the Lele. No such structural or inherent quality differentiates the 'nang' tribes from the 'qalang' ones.

Yusufzai organization in Swat, based on irrigated land and ranked social groups, as Barth's study clearly illustrates, would fall in the 'qalang' category. Barth, in an illustrative conversation with a Wazir Pathan from the 'nang' areas, found it difficult to convince him that Swatis were also Pathans subscribing to the 'Pukhtunwali':

> By basic Pathan values, a Southern Pathan from the homogeneous, lineage-organization mountain areas, can only find the behaviour of Pathans in Swat so different from, and reprehensible in terms of, their own values that they declare their northern brothers 'no longer Pathan'. Indeed, by 'objective' criteria, their overt pattern of organization seems much closer to that of Panjabis (Barth, 1969, p.13).

This is comprehensible within the socio-economic framework of this chapter and when Pathans of the 'nang' area confront the social organization and behaviour of the Pathans in the 'qalang' areas. The latter, they argue, 'speak' but do not 'do' Pashto (ibid., p.129).

The Wali himself unconsciously touched on these categories when he suggested that Swatis were different to tribes that organize themselves around the 'nang' concepts:

> Centuries had passed since they had lost contact with other Pathan tribes and deviated from their way of life in all respects, so considerably that when a Shinwari, Bannuchi, Afridi or Khattak came to Swat he felt himself to be among strangers. This was not surprising, for morally, socially and culturally the Swatis were entirely unlike any of them (Miangul, 1962, p.90).

Yet Barth's analysis treats Swat largely as if it were in the acephalous, segmentary 'nang' tribal category. Both categories, as has been seen, are embedded and largely predetermined by the social relations within which they function. The 'qalang' category, however, remains more readily adaptable in its Yusufzai Khan manifestation to Barthian 'transactionalist analysis'. The 'nang' and 'qalang' analysis affects the Swat argument directly as it partly explains the socio-economic preconditions for the emergence of the Wali and the State: both would have been a socio-political impossibility in the 'nang' Pathan areas. The Wali's emergence was possible only in the 'qalang' areas because of the stratified and pyramidal nature of society. Although pre-Wali Swat was a confederation of acephalous tribes without centralized authority its village society was autocephalous with apical social structures. The stratified nature of Swat 'qalang' society enabled a homologous but vastly enlarged paternalistic State to be imposed on it without much friction. Once the main Khans were pacified through alliances or subdued through force, and the number of contenders limited, the main challenge to the Wali came from other sources as will be examined in chapter 7.

The 'nang-qalang' thesis does not contain a mechanism allowing for a 'gumsa-gumlao' type of oscillation (Leach, 1954). The movement is uni-directional, from hill to plain, from pastoral to agricultural economy; from 'tribal' social category to 'peasant-agricultural' category; (1) from concepts of 'nang' as the motivating social factor and key symbol in understanding normative behaviour to those of 'qalang'. Movement to 'qalang' category is movement to either feudal landlord or tenant status. The tribal movement is not as schematized as Ibn Khaldun's tribal theory for it operates within tribal boundaries and movement is of tribal segments rather than tribes. It is difficult to envisage a reverse movement from 'qalang' to 'nang' areas. Warlords would neither find the economic resources to support their power nor the social structure to maintain political hierarchy. The categories are thus antithetical.

Ideal-type Pathan tribal social organization corresponds to ecological-geographical boundaries and it is empirically observed that groups from acephalous segmentary

tribal systems passing into irrigated plains become part of stratified social structures interacting with other ethnic groups, symbolized in the shift from central concepts of 'nang' to 'qalang'. However, 'nang' concepts are not altogether ejected from Pathan 'qalang' consciousness. They reappear in other shapes and symbolic forms, for example, the greater emphasis on individual hospitality in the Khan's 'hujra', in the understanding of 'melmastia', i.e. 'qalang' 'hujras' maintaining 'nang' values. 'Nangwali' is also exhibited in typically feudal chivalry in war (Miangul, 1962, p.29). Pathan mythology and consciousness are deliberately kept visible and active by frequent reference to 'nang' values.

The major differentiated and opposing socio-economic attributes are listed below to illustrate the characteristics of the 'nang' and 'qalang' categories of Pathan social organization suggested in this chapter:

	THE 'NANG' CATEGORY	THE 'QALANG' CATEGORY
I	hill areas	plain areas
II	largely unirrigated	largely irrigated
III	pastoral tribal economy	agricultural feudal economy
IV	no rents or taxes	rents and taxes
V	mainly 'achieved' status of 'elders'	mainly 'ascribed' status of Khans
VI	outside, or juxtaposed with, larger state systems; informal, illiterate, oral tradition	encapsulated within larger systems; members of Civil Service, District Boards etc. literate, orthodox, written tradition
VII	warriors participating in raids	warlords organizing battles
VIII	acephalous tribal society organized in segmentary descent groups	autocephalous village organization under Khan within larger acephalous society
IX	scarce population dispersed in 'fort-like' hamlets and nucleated settlements	dense population in large villages and tendency to urbanization
X	emphasis on 'nangwali' (Code of Honour)	emphasis on 'tarboorwali' (agnatic rivalry)

XI	'jirga' represents interests of entire tribe (the vast majority of the population)	'jirga' members from landowning Yusufzai only
XII	egalitarian social organization	hierarchical social organization based on autochthonic population

The taxonomical division of Pathan tribes presents complex problems as it involves tribal demographic shifts that express polar socio-economic organization within highly differentiated economic-ecological and political-administrative systems. An attempt has therefore been made in this section to simplify the divisions in order to create valid models which would explain subsequent and ramifying social developments. The two key symbols that explain and presuppose differentiated Pathan social organizations, 'nang' (honour, an intangible concept) and 'qalang' (rent, a material and quantifiable transaction) are not apparently congruent as they neither relate nor measure on a common yardstick. None the less, they have been selected, over other important symbols, as best helping to explain the division and types of Pathan social organization and behaviour. It is significant that Pathans themselves relate 'nang' to 'qalang' as diacritica between types of 'hill' or 'plain' social organization as in the proverb quoted at the beginning of the chapter.

The important qualifying features in understanding both the forms the symbols take, and the types of social organization they represent, are the economic-ecological and political-administrative boundaries within which Pathan tribes organize themselves. These features, in turn, define and reinforce the boundaries which maintain and perpetuate the distinctive social systems.

6 A note on Sufic orders and Islamic revivalism in the nineteenth century

نیستی پاکه بادشاهی ده -دولت مندئ له لِزّتَ خبر نه دی

Poverty is a pure sovereignty and the rich man knows not of its delights

This chapter will attempt to explain the emergence of revivalist Islamic movements in the nineteenth century in the hinterland Muslim areas within a conceptually holist framework. These movements have certain recognizable features as they are stimulated through interaction with colonial, European and industrial powers. Religious and racial (Christian and white) differences only underline and exacerbate the nature of the encounter. The Islamic response, still archaic and traditional, as are its symbols and weapons, is led by men of religious 'baraka' (sociologically translated as 'charisma').

The first section of this chapter is parenthetic in nature but provides a sociological framework for the argument developed later. However, it should be underlined that the explanation of Sufic behaviour and apperception is the Sufi version (1) and not necessarily a sociological one. The discussion is therefore consciously monolithic and undifferentiated in order to enable an understanding of generalized Sufi ideal-types and the models that derive from them. The reader who finds the argument excessively circuitous may go to the conclusions on p.98.

The argument will attempt to pick up the universalist strands connecting, with mutual effect, socio-religious normative life of geographically distant Islamic communities. The point at issue is to argue (with Swat in mind) that an examination, however particularistic or synchronic, of an Islamic community or society in isolation from its wider socio-religious context, is to exclude a basic dimension of its form and thereby to omit an

important variable in its analysis.

Islamic societies are notorious in requiring a holistic framework of analysis due to their homologous structural arrangements and in the universality of their politico-religious symbolism which are maintained by contact in general with contiguous Islamic communities and persistent contact in particular with Mecca and Medina. These latter cities act both as common Islamic source-points for socio-religious activities and as disseminating points for revivalist-reformist ideas and movements. Conceptually, this locational factor gives the Islamic world a physical orientation around which to order its existence and from which to derive its spiritual inspiration. Universal and easily identified Islamic symbols are carried into and exist in the most remote Muslim societies: (2) numerous identical words and verbs, common socio-religious festivals and certain normative values. Various groups, both formal and informal, keep the channels of communication open within the Islamic world: hajjis, pilgrims, missionaries, scholars, migrants and traders. These channels sometimes block up or fall into disuse but have generally remained functional. (3) It is this channel, for example, that provided news of a Turkish victory over the Greeks in Europe in the late 1890s and stirred enthusiasm amongst the Pathans in the North-West Frontier of India against the British. Secret British Government Reports invariably begin despatches regarding tribal revolts by linking them to international events and 'foreign agents'. Conversely, Islamic defeats are reflected in the tone of the Friday sermon in the mosque where the congregation is apprised of the calamity and exhorted to reform and thereby purify itself for the 'coming crisis'. Identity with the stricken Muslim community is assumed. Such examples of information, however belated and distorted, arriving from far-away Islamic encounters to encourage and reinforce local Islamic 'jihad' or movements, are historically commonplace. (4)

The nineteenth century was one of prolonged and major crises for Islam. The crises were reflected both in external and internal Islam, the former forcing the pace of the latter. A syndrome of defeat enveloped Islamic endeavour: Islamic Empires disintegrated, Islamic armies were shattered by technically superior European forces, Islamic capitals lay in foreign hands, and the Islamic élites were dispossessed. Muslims turned inwards to confront the crises stemming from problems of identity. Once before, after the climactic sacking of Baghdad in 1258 by the Mongols, had such a universal long-lasting despair gripped Muslim consciousness and for centuries afterwards

Muslim art and literature depicted transient and despondent themes (Sadiq, 1964). Then too, the urban, formal Islamic States and their armies lay paralysed and Islamic response came in the form of informal and personal Sufic activity in rural areas both as escape from reality and as a valid alternative form of worship. The Islamic world through various periods in the nineteenth century reacted to the European presence in certain predictable ways of which two concern this essay. The 'modernist' (5) reaction (which eventually became the 'nationalist') accepted the fact of subordination and resolved to accommodate itself with the new order (Sir Sayyed Ahmed of India is the prototype example (6)); and the 'traditional' symbolized by Sufic reaction which provided the impetus to Sufic activity and which concerns the argument in this section. Traditional, but at the same time reformist, leaders selected remote, peripheral and often tribal communities to live in and through preceptorial example created Islamic confidence and revivalism. Reformists, like Ahmad al-Sanusi and Abdul Ghaffur, the Akhund of Swat, confined their teachings within a Sufic framework of mystical contemplation heightened through simple incantations. Their message was inner-directed and non-material and, what is more important, non-political. However, their preachings and popularity outstripped their core-message and created an atmosphere of predisposability to an Islamic revivalism which subsequently changed successfully into both millenarian activities and charismatic leadership, as will be seen in this chapter.

GENESIS OF SUFISM

The emergence of the Akhund of Swat and the impact of his career (and that of his agnatic progeny) on the nature of Swat socio-political organization is not seen as an isolated historical incident, but within the framework of the reformist-revivalist Sufic movements of the nineteenth century interacting with the European presence. An understanding of the Akhund and the sources of his religio-spiritual motivations entail a brief word on the nature of Sufism and its origins in the person of the Prophet of Islam in Arabia. (7)

The Sufis trace their origin to the Prophet and the Holy Quran. (8) The Prophet symbolized Sufic practices and his personal experiences provide Sufic behaviour precedents:

I Sufic austerity derives from the Prophet's style of life: he slept on the floor, mended and washed his

clothes and on his death, in 632 AD, left behind seven 'dinars' which he had willed to the poor (Esin, 1963, p. 116). The Prophet's saying 'my poverty is my pride' (ibid., p.104) became a Sufic shibboleth. The word Sufi itself derives from 'Suf' or wool worn constantly by the Prophet. None the less, Sufic origin in the austere person of the Prophet did not prevent the growth of a whole range of exotic and syncretic Sufic forms.

II Sufic retreat and contemplation can be traced to the Prophet's retreats to Mount Hira (where the Quran was revealed to him).

III Sufic universality derives from examples set by the Prophet. His saying that none could love Jesus more than himself was well-known (ibid., p.109). (9)

IV The Prophet insisted that Sufism must not be an ontological escape mechanism from social reality but incorporated within it. Sufis are consequently not restricted within any occupational or social stratum. Many Sufi orders like the Tijani (Cohen, 1969) or Sanusi (Evans-Pritchard, 1949) concerned themselves with organization of practical life; asceticism was a stimulus to eschatological problems not a substitute for it. The 'popular' image of the semi-nude, mud-covered Sufi gyrating in perpetual ecstatic trance is partly created by the urban and orthodox imagination based on Sufi orders such as Rumi's and Mevlevi's (dancing 'dervishes') and partly through Sufic association with Hindu 'sadhus' (popular Sufism in mainland India was extensively eclectic and syncretic and forms a unique category of its own).

Sufi socio-religious organization revolves around the pivotal role of the Sheikh of the 'zawiya' (lodge) and is based on dyadic relationships between him and his followers. Sufic structural organization is thus autocephalous in nature and carries structural potential to convert fluently to political or economic activity in changed circumstances. It will be seen later in this section how Sufic orders preaching mystical contemplation and universal peace were converted to militant political organizations involved in extra-ethnic or extra-religious wars. Until the colonial contact, encounter and interaction in the nineteenth century the Sufis maintained their traditional posture of low-key, non-political socio-religious organization (Trimingham, 1971).

To comprehend a Sufic frame of reference in Barthian 'transactionalist' terms (such as 'manipulating', 'maximizing', 'strategizing' - Barth, 1966) is to fail to understand the dominant elements in Sufi consciousness and the cognitive values as seen through Sufi eyes; it is also to impose a sterile sociological framework of analysis and

reference. There is a polarity of difference in the two vocabularies and even in the definition of similar concepts. 'Maximization' to Barthian man is just that, whereas to the Sufi the cognitive definition contains a semantic reversal: to him 'maximization' is 'minimization' which is not the same thing as 'minimizing-loss' as distinct from 'maximizing-gain' but a deliberate, conscious 'minimizing-gain'. For instance in the Swat situation, the Akhund repeatedly refused the kingship of Swat. He was neither 'manipulating' nor 'strategizing', but simply limiting an increasing involvement in extra-Sufic activity.

The Sufi is in the world but not of it. While the bourgeois-capitalist and the Marxist-socialist stand on opposite ends of the politico-economic continuum and confront each other, the Sufi stands outside the relationship forming a third mid-way and triangular point. The Sufi is not unaware of the material world; he confronts it, comprehends it and then rejects it. The interaction remains mechanistic and the world peripheral. (10) Marxist and Barthian man (as 'maximizing entrepreneur') on the other hand, confront the material world, comprehend it and wish to possess it; the interaction is dialectical and the world is central.

The world of Islam has been seen as dividing into two contrasting and opposing socio-political categories: the legal, rational, formal, orthodox, urban (evolving into empires and supporting vast armies) in opposition to the pacific, mystical, informal, unorthodox and rural. (11) These categories are clearer as abstract constructs than as empirically observable and discrete phenomena. (12) Professor Gellner is the most articulate exponent of these opposing Islamic categories (1969b). However, major exceptions and shifts within this division are empirically observable as for instance, successful Sufic establishments in modern urban environments (Gilsenan, 1973). The opposition of the two ideal-types within Islam is a useful heuristic tool of analysis to postulate and examine socio-historical development, with the warning that the categories are neither rigid nor permanent. (13)

It has been argued in the above passages that when the encounter with nineteenth-century Europe proved disastrous to the 'orthodox-formal' category of Islam the focus of (unconscious) resistance and (conscious) revivalism shifted to the 'rural-informal'. (14) This shift has traditionally provided elasticity and resilience to Islamic societies in times of crisis although it signifies more a demographic projection of political reality than a perceptible change in theological ontology.

It is no coincidence that the 'nang' category of Pathan tribal social organization generally coincides in its characteristics with the rural, informal form of Islam and the 'qalang' category with the formal and orthodox.

The selection for comparative analysis, at this point, of three Sufi reformist leaders in the nineteenth century is not entirely at random as their personal history typifies the shift in focus from the 'orthodox-formal' to the 'rural-informal' category which they symbolize within their local geo-political situation. So far, thus, the argument is concurrently methodologically holistic as it is deterministic.

THREE CASE-STUDIES: THE SANUSI, THE MAHDI AND THE AKHUND

The fundamental aim in this section is to illustrate the homologous and similar structural and biographical sequence of the three case-studies, in order to understand the universal features that span two continents and diverse tribal communities, as crucial variables in the social analysis of Muslim ethnic groups. This sequential and biographical similarity can be largely examined in methodologically holistic terms applicable to Islamic societies that allow the discovery and activation of religio-political symbols of action in each society (whether tribal, as in all three examples, agricultural-peasant or urban). A socio-historical comparison will illustrate this point.

Early life and Sufic Orders

Sociologically, it is of interest that none of the three contemporaneous leaders came from the élite or feudal social strata; they were thus 'marginal' to established society and central political authority and not being bound by either could reject their norms. They thus symbolized the transcendent, permanent and universal values of Islam to their followers.

Sayyed Mohammed bin Ali al Sanusi al Kabir was a man of great wisdom and learning (Evans-Pritchard, 1949). Perhaps the most learned of the three leaders under discussion. He synthesized his experience and knowledge of various Sufic orders to found his own Order, the Sanusi, named after him. Abdul Ghaffur, the Akhund of Swat, was of the Naqshbandi Order which lays stress on seclusion and silent contemplation. Mohammed Ahmed, the Mahdi of Sudan, belonged to the Samani Order (an offshoot of the Qadari Order). These three men spent their early years in

intense piety, austerity and contemplative seclusion: al-Sanusi at a remote oasis in the Sahara, the Akhund on the banks of the Indus river and the Mahdi in a cave also by a river. Each of them was attached to one or several Sufic masters - and subsequently outshone them as their own learning and fame grew (correspondingly equated to 'baraka' and 'charisma').

Religio-political symbolism

Though often in the eye of the storm the three leaders were only reluctantly drawn into the political arena, and then with varying consequences - largely dependent on the extent of involvement with European powers. They preferred to remain king-makers rather than kings. The Mahdi appointed Abdullah as Khalifa, while the Akhund nominated Sayyed Akbar Shah as King of Swat. Al-Sanusi simply refused to engage in any form of political activity preferring to direct his energies in strengthening and establishing his 'lodges' as centres of learning.

The holistic and universal symbols of Islamic tradition were activated and reference to these symbols legitimized the revivalist nature of their movements and confirmed their charisma and status. The Mahdi's nominee was the Khalifa (tracing, at least mnemonically, his descent to the Rashidin Caliphs and Companions of the Prophet). Sayyed Akbar Shah became 'Amir-e-Shariat' (leader of the Faithful in the classic Islamic mould) and Swat was declared an 'Islamic State'.

To symbolize the establishment of the religio-political order new townships were constructed: al-Sanusi settled at Jagbub oasis (later to house a great Islamic University); the Akhund chose Saidu (later to be the capital of Swat) and the Mahdi built Omdurman.

Their charismatic appeal lay primarily with tribal and rural populations and their following was initially and largely among the poor. Thus the 'Sanusi Empire', the Mahdist 'Derwish Empire' and the 'Islamic State' of Swat became explicit symbols of two interconnected drives: chiliastic hope on the one hand and Islamic revivalism on the other. To the poor and dispossessed they signified the simplicity and austerity of early Islam and not the awesome grandeur and pomp of the imperial courts of Medieval Islam.

It is sociologically important to note that the tribes these leaders worked among were already Muslim: theirs was thus a revivalist-reformist mission rather than a proselytizing one. (15) This difference becomes marked as

the movement proceeds. Revivalist-reformist symbols, sooner or later, begin to cluster around the Islamic concept of 'jihad' to regain lost glory.

The colonial encounter

Living in remote and peripheral areas and amongst tribal peoples the religious reformers were largely ignored by central authorities and sometimes even accorded a certain measure of local respect. However, in the last century, when the central authority was organized by colonizing Europeans (as distinct from colonizing but co-religionist Turks, as in Cyrenaica's case) friction regarding limitation of various socio-political boundaries became inevitable. It is an illustration of al-Sanusi's sincerity in wishing to avoid contact with the Turkish administration that he shifted his headquarters deeper into the desert. (16) It was only when the Italians (replacing the Turks) systematically launched a programme to destroy Sanusi lodges in Cyrenaica that the Order mobilized and converted its socio-religious organization into a militant and political one. Al-Sanusi himself died in 1859 and did not live to see his organization change its objectives and character so radically. This 'conversion' is a common phenomenon in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Islamic world where the 'orthodox-formal' units of Islam capitulated or were destroyed necessitating the struggle to be carried on by the 'rural-informal'. The colonizing European presence is the one crucial variable determining the conversion of peaceful religious organizations into militant 'nationalist' ones. For instance, it was only after 1912 when Morocco was declared a French Protectorate and military incursions were made into the Atlas mountains that the 'igurramen', the Saints of the Atlas, abandoned the pacificist scholarly tradition established since the fourteenth century by the founder of the Ahansal lodge, Sidi Said Ahansal, and provided leadership for political guerrilla bands. (17) After six centuries of living within well-defined boundaries of piety and peace and in harmonious opposition to the secular, temporal authority of the local chiefs they were confronted with the colonial situation and forced into radically new leadership roles; from Saints who spoke to their community they became leaders who spoke for their community.

The case of the Mahdi is to be examined in the context of a colonized Sudan and an Anglo-Egyptian presence with its centrepoint at Khartoum. The town of Khartoum assumed a focal position for prestige and strategy to both the

Mahdi and the Anglo-Egyptians. It thus became a symbol of imperial honour on the one hand and local religious fervour on the other and subsequently, with the names of the main actors of the drama, among the more evocative names of the Victorian era. A revivalist Sufic organization was almost at birth engaged in colonial interaction and placed in a position of confrontation. This confrontation had distinct religious and ethnic overtones; 'jihad' against the British Christians and political struggle against the Egyptians. The Mahdi thus became a millenarian leader providing evidence of his charismatic powers in repeated success against enemy forces and promising a better life to his followers after the establishment of his order. Both Gordon and the Mahdi became cultural-political symbols for their people of supreme moments of heroism against alien and great odds. The Mahdi, 'the Saviour', to his people became the notorious 'False Prophet' to his enemies. It had to be a fight to the finish. (18)

Swat provides an interesting example of a religious leader who, in spite of mobilizing tribal society and involving the British Indian Army in a major campaign in 1863, emerges in colonial eyes as the best possible alternative to anarchic tribal elements. The Akhund is accepted as a man of genuine peace who is interested in creating an area of stability. Imperial objectives in creating zones of stability are seen in congruence with the Akhund's work. In this situation an interconnected set of strategic reasons explain imperial strategy:

I The British had emerged shaken from the ferocity of the 1857 upheavals in India and looked to 'areas of stability' and 'men of authority' who could keep them so.

II They had only recently crossed the Indus and were still in the process of cautiously pushing towards what was to become the International Frontier (or the Durand Line) in 1893 dividing British India from Afghanistan. The last thing they desired was a tribal irruption from the north led by the Akhund who by then was an established figure.

III The Akhund had convinced the imperial authorities that he wished for external peace with his neighbours in order to impose internal peace in Swat. The British administration, in turn, would rather negotiate with one established leader than discordant and amorphous tribal groups.

The critical variable affecting the personal success or failure of the three leaders is the extent of local European involvement on the ground: the Mahdi and the Akhund illustrate this. The Mahdi grew in a colonial situation that made encounter inevitable; the Akhund, working in a

peripheral tribal area outside British boundaries, on the other hand, was left alone as long as he made no attempt to cross his tribal borders and into the Settled Districts the British administered.

The 'jihads' in the colonial encounters of the nineteenth century were a last grand and futile gesture of the 'traditionalist' forces of Islam tilting against the most powerful nations on earth. The inevitability of the outcome merely underlines the conceptualization of the rationale contained in the 'jihad' by its participants: the struggle is more important than victory; the principle more important than the objective.

Sufis and States

Certain similarities are observed when analysing the political career of the agnatic progeny of the three Sufi figures into the twentieth century. The grandsons of al-Sanusi and the Akhund helped to create, and then ruled, formal States supported and recognized by the British. Their official State title displayed their sources of religio-political authority and legitimized their secular authority: 'Amir' Idris in Libya and the 'Wali' in Swat. The agnatic descendants of the Mahdi also staged a comeback and continued to play a vital role in Sudanese politics (both in Cabinet and as symbols of the Mahdist party in the countryside).

The wheel of a family's fortune is said to turn in three generations in sociological lore. In the three cases under study this cycle also symbolized the crossing of the boundary from the 'rural-informal' to the 'orthodox-formal'. What were once the symbols of religious revivalism and political resistance in the face of the colonial presence now became, in changed circumstances, the symbols of orthodox and formal establishment. The descendants of the old rulers faced their own people and the new nationalist post-war sentiments that found expression in dissatisfaction with traditional orders and the need for rapid socio-political change. As a result King Idris and the Wali of Swat directly, and the Mahdists indirectly, were set aside by military governments.

THE AKHUND OF SWAT

There is some genealogical uncertainty regarding the ethnic origin of the Akhund but none concerning the social order he came from. Early sources write: 'Born of Gujar

parents (in 1794), probably in upper Swat, Abdul Ghaffar began life as a herd-boy' ('Peshawar Gazetteer', 1883-4, p.221; Bellew, 1864, p.102, for a contemporary and similar view; Wylly, 1912, p.112). Other, more recent, sources trace his genealogy to the Safi tribe (Hay, 1934; Miangul, 1962, p.xli; Spain, 1962, p.68). Barth favours the former version (Barth, 1959a, p.100). From an anthropological point of view this uncertainty is revealing as it illustrates the priority given to ethnic rather than social status in the framework of the Yusufzai social organization. The Gujar not only falls at the bottom of the Swat caste schemata but is also extra-ethnic in non-Pathan origin. Telescoping and fusion of ancestral links are common tribal phenomena in organizing genealogical maps (Peters, 1960). So is reorganization of genealogical charters (Bohannan, 1952). The Akhund's descent is graphically traced to Qais bin Rashid in the seventh century in the account of Swat by his grandson (Miangul, 1962, Appendices, p.xxii).

The Akhund's early life is structured along the classic Sufic pattern:

> About the year 1816 he accordingly settled down, as a young man of barely twenty, to a life of the greatest austerity, at a lonely spot on the banks of the Indus, below the village of Beka, ten miles above Attock, where for twelve years he followed the Nakshbandia form of religious devotion - sitting silent and motionless, his head bowed on his chest, and his eyes fixed on the ground. His food was an inferior kind of millet moistened with water, and throughout his life - he died at the age of eighty-three, his diet was equally simple, milk being however, subsequently substituted for water. His fame as a saint dates from his sojourn at Beka, and even to this day, in the most distant parts of Persia, he is still remembered as 'the Hermit of Beka' (Wylly, 1912, p.112).

It is illustrative that his main intellectual stimulus came through knowing the entire works of the great Pashto Sufi poet, Rahman Baba, by heart (Miangul, 1962, p.lviii).

Around the age of forty (a critical age for Muslims in Islamic tradition) he returned to Swat to preach in earnest. Soon stories of supernatural powers and extraordinary perception were attributed to him (Barth, 1959a, p.101). In the context of Muslim Indian Sufic tradition exhibition of supernatural strength through 'competitive spirituality' was a key factor in establishing the reputation and augmenting the following of the Sufi (Ahmad, 1964, p.134):

> The Akhund gained such an ascendancy over the minds of his co-religionists that they believed all kinds of stories about him; that he was supplied by supernatural means with the necessities of life, and that every morning a sum of money, sufficient for his own needs and for the entertainment of the pilgrims who flocked to consult him, was found under his praying carpet (Wylly, 1912, p.114).

Unlike either the Mahdi, who engaged totally in the colonial encounter, or the Sanusi who withdrew from it, the Akhund was personally present in only two battles, one against the Sikhs and the other against the British. But it appears his heart was not in it. The Imperial Gazetteer records the importance of the Akhund's role in pacifying Swat tribes and defusing the political situation after the battle at the Ambela Pass in 1863:

> the Akhund advised the people of Swat and Buner, and other independent tracts, to behave towards us as good neighbours, and if they offended the British Government, to meet such demands as it might make, and to comply with such terms as might be imposed ('Peshawar Gazetteer', 1883-4, p.180).

A few years earlier, in the critical days of the 1857 upheaval in the plains of India, the Akhund had also acted as a modifying factor:

> When the mutineers of the 55th Native Infantry, flying from Mardan before Nicholson, crossed the boundary into Swat, he caused them to be deported beyond the Indus; and he supported our government so far as lay in his power during the anxious days of the Mutiny (Wylly, 1912, p.115).

His presence as a leader wishing to impose some social order upon an anarchic tribal society was therefore welcomed. Swat was notorious as a den of sedition and crime:

> Plunderers and marauders, mounted and on foot, issued from Swat, passed through Ranizai, and raided into our territory. They kidnapped almost all classes except Pathans; and Swat became an Alsatia where evilly-disposed persons, criminals of all shades, and people hostile to the British Government were readily granted help, asylum and countenance (ibid., p.121).

The Akhund organized an informal economic network around his pivotal person that reinforced his spiritual authority and lent material support to his reformist preaching. The resources and gifts of his rich followers increased his own wealth (Miangul, 1962, p.lix) but a great deal of this was channelled into feeding the poor: 'He established an alms-house for the poor and needy, which also served as the public kitchen for the hundreds of devotees who came to Saidu Sharif every day. Food for

five hundred men was cooked there daily' (ibid., p.lx). In return, the gift-givers and followers earned a form of socio-spiritual merit defined in this transaction and thereby created dyadic bonds with the Akhund.

This asymmetrical material and spiritual relationship (of gifts from the richer in exchange for spiritual merit and to the poor) helped to shift and even alter the traditional existing dyadic alignments between patron Khans and their clients. A new element thus entered the old alignments in drawing up two mutually exclusive circles of relationships whose successful functioning would have implications for the breakdown of traditional patron-client relationships in Swat.

In terms of political analysis, based upon social class origin and related to Swat structural arrangements, it is important to recall that when called upon by the united confederation of tribes to become King of Swat the Akhund selected Sayyed Akbar Shah (19) as his nominee rather than a Yusufzai Khan. This act is of ramifying significance; it legitimized the concept of a central authority, it confined the political arena to religious contestants and limited them numerically, and by placing the crown on a non-local, non-Yusufzai head, excluded the Khans as legitimate claimants for kingship. The selection of Sayyed Akbar also reflects Pathan respect and susceptibility to men of extraordinary religiosity and traces the links to events and places outside local Pathan areas.

The political symbols of the State indicated a theocratic order: the King was called 'Amir-e-Shariat' and the State was to be an 'Islamic' one. However, a 'coercive authority' was created too: 'a force of 800 mounted men, 3,000 footmen and five or six guns' (Wylly, 1912, p.125). It would be a foolhardy Khan who would challenge the combined religious authority of the King and military authority of the State.

This incipient standing force (20) marks the foundation of statehood. The key-word in tribal politics is 'standing force'. Where 'jihad' or tribal wars are organized in Pathan societies on a temporary basis a regular force, however diminutive, can be a most decisive instrument in maintaining military initiative and political supremacy. Of particular note is the cavalry component which in the context of local tribal clashes may be seen as a formidable factor. The above figures clearly indicate some form of elementary political establishment in Swat. Their significance has been overlooked by Barth in his idealized acephalous model of tribal Khans preventing the emergence of centralized authority in Swat, and each other from gaining political pre-eminence.

The Akhund led an uneventful life and died in 1877. Perhaps his most fitting epitaph was written by the British:

> He lived the life of an ascetic and religious leader, deeply venerated by the people, over whom, not only in his own valley but throughout North-Eastern Afghanistan, he gradually acquired an unbounded influence, which, to his credit it should be said, he used invariably for purposes that were good according to his light; inculcating truth, peace and morality, allaying as far as he could the interminable feuds among the people, and enforcing the precepts of the Muhammadan Law as far as was compatible with ineradicable Pathan customs ('Peshawar Gazetteer', 1883-4, p.179).

Saidu came to symbolize the town of the Akhund and contained his shrine which soon became an important focal point for religious pilgrimages, 'The shrine of the great Akhund of Swat at Saidu, is one of the most important in Northern India' (ibid., p.221). Saidu thus became the capital of Swat and was identified both physically and spiritually with the Akhund, a factor that was to play heavily in favour of his agnatic descendants and their political contests with the descendants of Sayyed Akbar Shah. The Akhund, after his death came to be called, as he is to this day, Saidu Baba after the town which was given the appellation 'Sharif' (noble) to indicate its special status. Unlike temporal rulers such as the Khan of Dir, the descendants of the Akhund could legitimize their argument for political leadership with spatial reference to Saidu and its shrine.

The Akhund's life and emergence, embedded in a structurally holistic socio-religious frame, laid the base for, and partly symbolized the sequence of, socio-political development in Swat. A connection perhaps not apparent at the time:

I An expanding non-Muslim (Sikh and later British) presence is partly the cause of the Akhund's emergence, and his religious revivalist preachings an effect of it.

II The emergence of the Akhund is the first historical event in Swat since the sixteenth century that challenges, and then overrides, the authority of the Khans. A skeletal spatial and conceptual framework for a Swat State is organized and the foundations of 'Swati' ethnicity laid by-passing the feudal Yusufzai social organization in both cases.

III His spiritual and economic authority establish a base for familial charisma which subsequently became an important lever in the hands of his agnatic descent in their struggle to establish political supremacy.

IV Swat is finally and directly involved in the larger tribal politics of the North-West Frontier.

In concluding this chapter the implications contained in the above arguments for the analysis of Barth's Swat Pathans are a failure to come to terms with the other level of Islamic consciousness and social organization i.e. the 'rural-informal' and mystical. Thereby a crucial aspect and dimension of Islamic rural leadership and organization is omitted. (21) As a result:

I the sociologically holistic framework that partly explains the emergence of the charismatic Akhund and the derivation of a personal lifestyle traced to the Prophet of Islam (which almost structures Sufic physical existence and spiritual exercises) is absent. This explains the failure to come to terms with the Sufic ambience which, for example, explain the defining and motivating force behind the Akhund and his descendants. The Wali is partly to be explained by atavistic Sufic urges. After playing the power game successfully and emerging as the ruler of a centralized State the Wali, at the height of his career and in full command of his faculties, abruptly retires to a life of austerity and contemplation. His life and character form an interesting comment on the two categories of Islamic socio-religious behaviour under discussion. It will be seen in the next chapter, when the Wali is discussed, that the categories cannot typologize permanently or entirely.

II the social organization of the Swat Khans, though not urbanized, is still formal, orthodox and militaristic-aristocratic and (based as it is on 'qalang') would tend to fall naturally into the 'orthodox-formal' rather than 'rural-informal' category. This division is significant in an analysis of the Swat political structure for it shifts the argument for a mystical 'saviour', defined by his social origins, outside the 'orthodox-formal' category and to the other one. The Akhund was not and could not have been a 'Khan' and he therefore symbolized chiliastic hope and articulation for the Swat majority who were the rural dispossessed and poor.

III as mentioned earlier, Sufis fail to appear in the general category of Swat Saints who would fit squarely in the non-mystical, 'orthodox-formal' category. This enables some of them to live like surrogate Khans. The greater division of Sufi and Saint (using Barth's definition of Saint as 'all persons occupying holy status, whether prominent or not' Barth, 1959a, p.57) dissolves the weaker division between Saint and Khan. The famous examples and shrewd behaviour of 'the Saint who whistled' (ibid., p.99) or 'the Saint who took his turban off'

(ibid., p.59) merely underline the frailty of the Barthian division between the secular (Khan) and the religious (Saint) and would have been incomprehensible and unlikely in terms of Sufic behaviour.

IV and finally, the Swat analysis appears limited both in space and time within its methodological individualist framework as it fails to take into account the redefining of the traditional dyadic patron-client, Khan-follower alignments through the interconnected dialectical events starting with the emergence of the Akhund, passing through the universal upheaval of tribal millenarian activities and ending with the establishment of Swat State. These events, in turn, are seen as the final expression of the Akhund's life-work which left behind a network of spiritual organization to be activated by agnatic descendants and charismatic leaders which will be examined in the following chapter.

Part three

7 Millennium and charisma among Pathans

پیر نه الوزی خو مریدان ئے الوزی

Though the pir himself does not fly his disciples would have him fly

THESIS: MILLENARIAN MOVEMENTS IN MALAKAND

Between the death of the Akhund in 1877 to the election of his grandson as the Badshah of Swat in 1917, lie forty years of anarchy, chaos and uncertainty. The long and fierce struggle for power between the agnatic descendants of Sayyed Akbar and the Akhund was reflected in the turbulence of Swat social life. The Yusufzai Khans of Dir and Swat supported first one and then another candidate for Swat leadership as fortunes rose and fell, often as a direct result of external factors (Hay, 1934).

Miangul Hannan, the elder son of the Akhund, had political ambitions

> after the death of Amir Sayyid Akbar Shah, it was he who approached Saidu Baba with the request that he should be made the Amir of Swat.... Though Miangul Abdul Hannan could not be the Amir, after the demise of Saidu Baba he lived and behaved like one. He owned several thorough-bred horses, maintained a regular Swati 'lashkar' (irregular force) and participated in the battles between the Nawab of Dir and the Khan of Bajaur from the one or the other side. He lived in great comfort and luxury (Miangul, 1962, p.lxiv).

However, he failed to gain power and establish a State before his death in 1887. His younger brother was of religious bent, 'Miangul Abdul Khaliq was a devout Muslim like his honoured father. His entire life was moulded upon the "shariat". He spent his nights in prayers and

fasted during the day throughout the year' (ibid., p. lxviii). He, too, failed to establish a State before his death in 1892. Through the process of elimination and a singular determination on his part Miangul Wadud, son of Miangul Khaliq, the younger son of the Akhund, emerged as the single main leader in Swat at the turn of the century. In 1903 and in 1907 Miangul Wadud literally eliminated his only two agnatic cousins and sons of the Akhund's elder son (ibid., pp.9, 13) and by the age of twenty-six (in 1907) was the sole heir to the Akhund's legacy.

Between 1877 and 1917 lie the millenarian movements and tribal revolts of 1897-8 which affected traditional local structures and introduced new elements into them. They provided a shift of power and focus, however temporary, from the feudal Khan to the 'mullah', created an air of popular militancy and rebellion against authority and raised new expectancy and hopes. The Miangul, though a young man, was quick to seize the opportunities for leadership and emerged as the champion of the Swat tribes although he was initially pre-empted in this role by the Mastan Mullah (who was finally shifted from the Swat centre stage in 1908). After a short period of exile from Swat as a result of the election of Sayyed Jabbar Shah as ruler of Swat in 1915 he returned to be proclaimed 'Badshah' of Swat. This event was followed by formal recognition of the State in 1926 and internal and external consolidation of authority.

The closing years of the last century saw momentous happenings pregnant with immense political significance in the most northern and inaccessible reaches of the British Indian Empire at a time when a decade of food shortage was spreading famine and economic hardship all over the subcontinent. Chitral, Dir and even Mohmand were invaded and occupied by British troops. The 'purdah' of Swat was lifted. To the south of Peshawar the Kurram valley, the Samana range and Wana town were occupied. The sound of bagpipes was heard for the first time north of the Malakand Pass. These areas had last seen foreign troops with some of the most famous conquerors in history, Taimur, Chenghiz Khan and Alexander the Great. The Durand Line demarcated tribal boundaries and included tribal areas in the British Empire which had never known conquest and special Political Agencies were created. The nineties were an era of triumph for the Forward Policy over the Closed Border System (Bruce, 1900) and the 'scientific frontier' (from Kabul to Kandahar) was advocated. Cantonments followed troops and these in turn were followed by churches and schools and roads and bridges and, as the wheel turned full circle, soldiers again. Suddenly some of the most

remote areas of the subcontinent found themselves confronting an entirely new species of warrior, representing an entirely alien social system. Local life was disrupted, challenged or affected at all levels of human existence. Economic and politico-religious crises coincided to threaten and disrupt normal values and traditions.

The banners of Islam were unfurled and the word 'jihad' appeared on the lips of men as groups of the faithful rallied around religious leaders to prepare to throw back the foreigner. Receptive tribesmen listened to the exhortations of a new breed of leader carrying messages of hope. Wild rumours of Turkish (Muslim) victories over Greeks (Christian) added revivalistic fuel to the fire. An uneasy but portentous calm hung over the mountains of the Malakand in early 1897. (1) A report from Major Deane, then Political Agent for the Malakand Areas, to the Foreign Secretary, Government of India, begins: 'I have the honour to report that persistent efforts have been and are being made to arouse Muhammadan fanaticism in Bajaur, Swat and Dir territory against Government' (PP Encl. 7, dated 9 May 1897). The summer of 1897 was to be a remarkable one.

A spark was needed to start the conflagration. It came in the form of an attack in June on the party of the Political Agent, Mr Gee, and his camp in Maizar in a remote part of the Tochi valley, Waziristan, hundreds of miles from the main scene of action. A fortnight later the Malakand tribes rose and by August the Mohmand tribes joined them. Within two weeks Afridi and Orakzai Tirah had risen and the Khyber post fell. This chapter will focus on the movements in Malakand to enable an understanding of the holistic framework from which the Wali of Swat emerged; it will therefore not deal with those that took place simultaneously in other parts of the Tribal Areas.

What occurred then in the form of popular and mass uprisings along the Frontier can only be categorized under a blanket term: millenarian movements. 'Millennium' here is not defined strictly in the biblical or eschatological sense, but loosely as meaning a spontaneous, universal and historically short-lived, native reaction to economic or political stimulus, expressed through the presence of foreign troops and administrators. The reaction is led by messianic leaders, nationalist heroes and prophets, (2) often claiming mystical talents, promising some form of utopia in the future or reversal to a happier order in the past, and supported by the dispossessed and the rural. This definition is more akin to the millenarian movements

studied by Worsley in New Guinea which contained an anti-colonial, anti-white direction than the movements Cohn studied of the rootless poor of western Europe in the medieval period who were 'violent, anarchic and at times truly revolutionary' (Cohn, 1970, p.14). The latter were revolting within a society and as a result of rural migration to urban areas rather than against foreign domination.

There is a significant difference in both the stimulation and objectives of the millenarian movements in the Frontier areas and those studied in, for example, New Guinea. Although both confront Western civilization at the zenith of its political power the former wish to reject the new order and revert to an older one. The historical idiomatic response through which Islamic sentiment expresses itself in times of extreme crisis is 'jihad'. The major stimulation is religion. Millenarian movements create an atmosphere of predisposability to the emergence of charisma: the relationship is dialectical and not mechanical. In New Guinea the movements wish to absorb the new order as symbolized by its 'cargo' and the major stimulus is economic. The charismatic leader, in turn, attempts to create a state which helps define the 'institutionalization of charisma'.

It is important to underline that the Frontier movements fought to re-establish the old order and reject the new one rather than imitate or absorb the new order. The New Guinea movements were of the latter kind in wishing to possess the religious secrets that would provide them with the cargo. The contents of the Frontier argument were cultural and religious rather than economic and material. The tribes wished to hold the social boundaries between them and the British, whereas in New Guinea the movements wished to alter these boundaries so as to include them. Yali, the New Guinea millenarian leader, felt 'humiliated' and 'ashamed' on confronting the cars, streets and bridges, the symbols of the White Man's civilization, in Brisbane (Lawrence, 1964, p.123). Among the Frontier tribes there was no such cultural complex of inferiority. The Islamic framework within which these tribes ordered their social life gave them a cultural vitality and religious confidence. It also provided the basis for the movements and is seen as the primary explanation of them over 'ethnographic' 'psycho-physiological' 'Marxist' and 'Hegelian' frames of analysis (Burridge, 1969). Islamic tribes were in fact predictably reacting to a multi-dimensional invasion of their lands: the seeds of millenarianism were carried in the nature of the colonial interaction and situation. The ethnic-religious character

of the 1897-8 encounters is reflected in the regiments attached to the Malakand Field Force, raised in 1897 and commanded by Sir Bindon Blood, to deal with the Frontier problems: Muslim regiments were conspicuous by their absence. (3) British military authorities were obviously conscious of the religious (and ethnic) nature of the tribal uprisings and were not taking any chances.

The historical narrative of the millenarian movements in the Frontier is not of concern to this essay but the interconnected socio-political features they contained may be enumerated:

I The British penetration of hitherto untouched and sequestered areas, harbouring some of the fiercest, and enthusiastically Islamic fighting tribes of the subcontinent, was seen as a direct physical threat to moral and religious values and the immediate cause of the uprisings.

II Spontaneous and universal manifestation of support swelled tribesmen fighting numbers into war parties large enough to raid British forts. Shabkadar was raided by the Mohmand tribes, led by the Ada Mullah and the scale of the fighting may be judged by the 200-300 tribesmen who were left behind dead (4) (PP Encl. 27, dated 12 August 1897).

III The sudden proliferation of charismatic leaders along the Frontier, claiming that portents indicated that the 'appointed' time had come and salvation from the British was at hand. It is important to note that the leaders, such as Ada Mullah, Manki Mullah, Palam Mullah, and, in Swat, the Mianguls symbolized a religious or Islamic answer to the political situation and provided a religious focus for millenarian activity. They promised a land free of the infidel and a return to Islamic values (an Islamic utopia).

The Ada Mullah, perhaps the most famous of the millenarian leaders, saw the process as 'jihad' - a holy war, a fight for salvation and a return to Islam. In a letter circulated to tribal elders and 'mullahs' he explained,

> The Kafirs have taken possession of all Mussalman countries and owing to the lack of spirit on the part of the people are conquering every region. They have now reached these countries of Bajaur and Swat but though these people showed want of courage in the beginning they have now realized their mistake and - attack them (the Kafirs) day and night (PP Encl. Appendix C, undated).

An extract from a communication of Ada Mullah concludes: 'Help from God (awaits us) and victory is at hand. God willing the time has come when the Kafirs (infidels) should disappear. Be not idle. What more should I insist on' (PP Encl. Annexure to Encl. 34, undated).

These leaders were not - or no longer - the ordinary every-day village 'mullah' but were possessed men of charisma claiming supernatural powers or having such powers attributed to them and progressively magnified by the faith of adherents. The ground was ripe for charisma and heightened suggestibility made men believe in extra-ordinary events and leaders of immense supernatural force. Sadullah, the Mullah Mastan (5) or as he was to be known, the Mad Fakir of Swat, entered British despatches in the following manner: 'About the 18th July reports were received of a Fakir who had suddenly appeared in the country and established himself at Landakai, (6) professing that one small pot of rice which he had with him, was sufficient to feed multitudes' (PP Encl. 28, dated 8 August 1897).

Churchill writes in his first-hand account:

> As July advanced, the bazaar at Malakand became full of tales of the Mad Fakir. A great day for Islam was at hand. A mighty man had arisen to lead them. The English would be swept away. By the time of the new moon, not one would remain (Churchill, 1972, p.29).

This is the classic 'prophet' of a millenarian revolt, he is an unknown entity with no social status or rights to lose who turns up inexplicably and 'suddenly'. Besides supernatural and unseen support he has magical powers too:

> about the 20th and 21st the Fakir began giving out that he had heavenly hosts with him, that his mission was to turn the British off the Malakand and out of Peshawar, as our rule of 60 years there was up. He claimed to have been visited by all deceased Fakirs, who told him the mouths of our guns and rifles would be closed and that our bullets would be turned to water; that he had only to throw stones into the Swat river, and each stone he threw would have on us the effect of a gun (PP Encl. 28, dated 8 August 1897).

The Tuka cult leader in New Guinea, Ndugumoi, claimed prophetic, miraculous and occult powers and his spirit was said to leave his body and move around the country (Worsley, 1970, p.30). In Swat 'one of the superstitions indulged in by the people regarding the Fakir was that he could render himself invisible when he chose' (PP Encl. 28, dated 8 August 1897). As in the Cargo Cults of Melanasia (like the Taku movement, for example) personal property was left unattended to. It would be claimed after the objectives at hand had been achieved: 'This confidence was so marked that cattle and grain etc. had all been left in the villages' (ibid.).

To the British Administration the entire eruption of uprisings seemed inexplicable in its suddenness, ferocity and logic, 'The whole rising has been an astounding business and the people seem to have lost their heads and all view of their own interests in a blind belief that we should be turned out of the country' (ibid.).

It is of some significance to our analysis and to subsequent political developments to show the distrust and apprehension felt among the bigger Khans to the movements. Such upheavals contain a recognizable anarchic content and threaten to 'disrupt' societal structures and not merely to create 'conflict' within them. There is therefore a real possibility and sense of change; of a new beginning and not merely an alteration of existing arrangements. In almost every area of revolt the Khans and privileged groups were in secret touch with the British, fearing political anarchy and the uncontrollable and unpredictable religious fanaticism of the 'mullahs'. Their predictable dilemma was either to chose the uncertain path to 'national' and religious glory or risk local opprobrium by keeping their options open through contact with the imperial power. They chose the latter. In the event their policies paid handsome dividends.

The Khan of Dir foiled the Palam Mullah's attempts to disrupt the peace of Dir and to block the only and crucial route to Chitral. The major Halimzai Khans of the Mohmand tribe petitioned the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar:

> The (Ada) Mullah has gone to collect forces. If we do not comply with the Mullah's orders we are denounced as Kafirs; on the other hand, the British authorities attack, kill and burn us. We beg to inform you that the Mullah's lashkar is coming to Gandab. We are obedient servants of British authorities - we furnish this information in order that we may not be blamed afterwards (PP Sub Encl. A to Encl. 18, dated 2 September 1897).

Another report discloses that

> some thirty leading Mohmand Maliks of Tarakzais, Halimzai and Pindiali sections came in to Stuart Waterfield day before yesterday asking what service they could do at this juncture. Waterfield told them that they had only to keep quiet and to arrest any emissaries who might visit them from the Mullah of Adda (PP Encl. 7, dated 30 July 1897).

In Swat the Akhund's agnatic progeny, the Mianguls, with the Musa Khel Khans, were obstructing the Mastan Mullah: 'The Mianguls have sent servants to remove the Fakir from the country as they fear disturbance, but the man has taken great hold of religious superstition of the people throughout the valley and on Dir side' (PP Encl. 3, dated 26 July 1897).

> Some years later the Mullah reappears in Swat:
> The Sartor Fakir ... severely beat a messenger of Gulshahzada Miangul Wadud ... it seems possible that more will be heard of it, because the last claim which the Miangul's best friends make for them would be that they have forgiving tempers (Political Department, P.A.'s Diary, 31 May 1908, p.83).

However, the changed attitude of the British to the Miangul and his strategy is apparent in the official note recorded by the Political Agent:

> Sartor, induced by Afghans, prepares for another raid - on the 9th instant Gulshahzada Miangul (who of late years has become very friendly and even received the Political Agent as a guest in his sanctuary at Saidu) sent word that he had heard the Fakir had reached Azzi Khel country with his 'lashkars' and expressed his willingness to do anything that was required in the matter. Swat was of course instantly alive with excitement, and it seemed best to take the Khans as frankly into our confidence as we had the Khans of Dir (ibid., 16 May 1908, p.66).

But by this time the fury of the millenarian movements was spent. The generalized charismatic ambience had evaporated. The Mullah was out of tune with the times. A new force in the person of Miangul Wadud was emerging in Swat. The Mullah called off his campaign and disappeared from the Swat stage:

> The Sartor Fakir next departed Northwards, sending, as a Parthian shot at Gulshahzada, a sealed letter to me stating that he had been forbidden to go on by Nakashband Khan, and that it was for his sake and not the Miangul's that he had given up his plans (ibid., 24 May 1908, p.66).

Subsequently, and over the next few years, it is not difficult to construct why the British Administration would be so readily prepared to negotiate with and support traditionally established rulers, as in the case of the Khan of Dir, or officially patronize emergent rulers like the Mianguls of Swat. It was in the mutual interest of both negotiating parties not to let such popular movements, and such revolutionary and fanatical mass leaders, get out of hand. The 'status quo' had to be promptly restored. After the swift and numerous punitive expeditions, trials and punishments, the old order was restored. The official Administration Report records with satisfaction that by 1903,and due to the loyalty of its rulers, Chitral, Dir and Swat were 'more or less free from the pernicious preachings of religious agitators' (Administration Report, 1903, p.26).

Reward was not long in coming. Formal titles were conferred on the loyal rulers: the 'Mehtar' of Chitral, the 'Nawab' of Dir and the 'Nawab' of Nawagai. The former two were also decorated with the CIE and as a final symbol of imperial gratitude the three rulers were invited to the grand assembly of Indian royalty that had gathered at Delhi to attend the Coronation Darbar in 1903. Swat later joined the Malakand States as a new State with the Wali of Swat as its ruler. The lesson that the British had firmly learnt from the 1857 Indian 'Mutiny' was that their interests coincided squarely with those of the ruling houses.

The tribal movements grew passive but never quite died out. A direct and far-reaching consequence was the creation of a separate North-West Frontier Province, under the viceroyalty of Lord Curzon, in 1901, and the quiet death of the 'Forward Policy' on the north-western marches of the British Indian Empire. The movement's subsequent history merges with the struggles of the nationalist parties to end British Rule in India and later to create an Islamic State for the Muslims. However, for purposes of our analysis, the only religious leader who survived the movements intact and emerged politically victorious was Miangul Gulshahzada, the future Wali of Swat.

ANTI-THESIS: INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CHARISMA IN SWAT

Social pre-conditions and cultural idioms

The millenarian uprisings in the Malakand areas were led by leaders predicating spiritual affiliation with the Akhund: 'The Adda Mullah, the Manki Mullah and the Palam Mullah are the principal remaining followers of the Akhund of Swat' (PP Encl. 7, dated 9 May 1897). The legend of the Akhund provided a general source of religious inspiration which his agnatic descendants sought to mobilize in their claim to Swat political authority. The Mianguls had joined the 1897 movements but, as has been seen in the last section, kept their options open with the British. Once the movements subsided and the 'mullahs' lost their importance the Mianguls still remained as prominent leaders; from these emerged the future Wali of Swat. There is thus a certain cause and effect relationship between the millenarian movements of Malakand and the emergence of charismatic leadership in Swat.

Amorphous followings around visionary leaders promising apocalyptic victories in a series of uprisings constituted the thesis of the last section. The emergence of one man

who gathers around him various sections of society and, while embarked on a definite 'mission' to fulfil his 'destiny', institutionalizes charismatic leadership is the opposite and antithetical theme of this section. His emergence is partly a consequence of the thesis and partly an explanation of it. The emphasis in the analytical conceptualization of the argument shifts from the holistic frame of reference to one centring around a main actor who translates and reorders the symbols of power and authority in society into cultural idioms understood by his followers. Action and reaction, to a certain degree, become a function of the actor's stratagem; which, in turn, purports to satisfy and interpret the majoritarian needs of society. Sociologically, the actor becomes a charismatic leader - he possesses

> a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader (Weber, 1947, pp.358-9).

Barth's omission from his analysis of the social and political conditions from which the Wali emerged, and of his subsequent career, as mentioned above, is similar to the omissions made by functionalist anthropologists who conceptualize isolated and static African social structures without direct reference to the office and functions of the colonial representative as agents of socio-political change (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Fortes, 1945, 1949). The omission clarifies why the Swat analysis falls into the well-known trap of equating fundamental 'contradiction' between irresolvable oppositions in society (created by the foundation of the State, and the extent of its interpenetration on all levels of Swat society in this case) for 'conflict', that involves opposition between principles of social organization (Bailey, 1960, pp.7, 239; Gluckman, 1971, pp.xxii, 109-10).

In 1947 Miangul Abdul Wadud, while on tour with Sir Olaf Caroe, then Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, stated that 'never in all history, not even in the time of Akbar or Aurangzeb, much less under the Durranis, were the Yusufzais of this country the subjects of any empire' (Caroe, 1965, p.205). This statement left unsaid the most remarkable event of Yusufzai history. The Yusufzai were now the subjects of the autarchic speaker, the Wali of Swat.

Miangul Wadud was no stranger to the concept of

established authority. Although his uncle, Miangul Hannan, had failed to establish temporal authority over Swat, his father, Miangul Khaliq, had succeeded in maintaining the administrative foundations for a religious State laid by the Akhund: (7)

> without an army or a regular force Miangul Abdul Khaliq succeeded in establishing an Islamic rule in Swat. He governed the people with the help of his followers, known as 'sheikhs'. These 'sheikhs' were a sort of police and enforced the laws and carried out the Amir's orders throughout the length and breadth of the State. Swatis entrusted him with full powers to punish them for their crimes in accordance with the 'shariat' (Miangul, 1962, pp.lxvi-lxvii).

Funds and followers go hand in hand with a charismatic leader and are a vital index of his fortunes. There is a circular and cumulative causation between funds, followers and charisma. The relationship with his followers was based on the same principles of redistributive economies that the Akhund had established: 'The alms-house founded by Saidu Baba was run by Miangul Abdul Khaliq on the same grand scale as before. Food for five hundred men was cooked there every day, often the number went up to two thousand even' (ibid., p.lxix).

The future Wali was just over ten years old when Miangul Abdul Khaliq died in 1892 (ibid., p.1). A fierce internecine agnatic struggle both educated and matured him

> before I proceed to give an account of the domestic tussle and hostilities with my cousins I should like to mention that through these conflicts we received a sort of practical training which was very valuable in days to come. We shouldered responsibilities of life at a time when others of our age amused themselves in childish games. As a result, in this school of adversity, we gained experience and attained qualities and capabilities which no scholastic training or academic education could have imparted. While still young, we came to possess political understanding and organizing ability which later proved an asset not only in everyday problems but also in the establishment of the State and the battle of life in general. Even in childhood we won prominence as leaders in the field of action (ibid., p.3).

A sense of intense competitiveness corresponded with belief in his religious destiny and drove him:

> I was active, hardworking and persevering, with a proud record of having always beaten my equals in travelling on foot, riding, mountain-climbing and marksmanship. These personal merits were desirable qualifications for

> one who was ordained to be the ruler of the Pathans some day (ibid., p.6).

The example of his father and grandfather was never far from him:

> During the four years following my father's death, I lived in seclusion to prepare myself to be the spiritual successor of Sahib of Swat, and offered prayers regularly.... From the time of Amir Badshah's death when I was twenty-four till today in my seventy-seventh year I have never missed or even delayed one prayer, whether at home or on a journey (ibid., pp.133-4).

The deep sense of religious motivation and belief in destiny were confirmed by those who dealt with him:

> He was according to his lights, a very religious man, his prayers, his beliefs were absolutely genuine and sincere and he was convinced in his own mind that he was performing a great work under the eyes of and with the approval of, the Almighty (Caroe, personal communication, 1975).

The conclusion that in power lay the key to the Swat solution was reached early in his career, 'Swat was a tribal territory in which power alone could command respect; self-interestedness and oppression were the law of the land; it had never been under any firm authority before' (Miangul, 1962, p.46).

Swat at the turn of the century passed through great socio-political anarchy and turbulence. Swat tribes 'in fact want a guiding hand to help them establish internal peace which they have not enjoyed since the death of the old Akhund of Swat' (PP Encl. 2, dated 21 July 1897). The Miangul himself complained in a letter to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab: 'now all the people of Swat have assumed the profession of robbery and "dakoiti" (dacoity)' (PP Sub Encl. to Encl. 1, dated 12 June 1897). In his autobiography he writes of the conditions prevalent in those days and that: 'the Swatis are still an insular, narrow-minded and uncivilized people, and it will take a little more time to outgrow these undesirable traits' (Miangul, 1962, pp.90-1).

Chaos and disorder reigned supreme. The leadership of the Khans was bankrupt. All sections of society looked to strong leadership, to a saviour: the ground was ripe for charismatic leadership.

Miangul Wadud, facing and clearing a series of hurdles on his way to Walidom, illustrated at each stage how the interests of one or other section of the community, at one or other period of Swat history, coincided with his own interests and furthered them. From an early age he had displayed a talent for political manoeuvre and

administrative strategy which were to characterize his extraordinary life and career. His own 'energy and sagacity' (Stein, 1929, p.5) were vital elements in this charismatic projection: sufficient and favourable contemporaneous accounts exist to confirm these qualities (Caroe, 1965; Hay, 1934; Stein, 1929):

> like the Emperor Akbar a past-master in the political management of men, one who knew to a nicety the moment to seize whether in council or in battle, resolute in action, devout yet free of all cant, again like Akbar illiterate but blessed with a prodigious memory, he set to all around him a pattern of leadership hard to equal in his own country and such as the annals of any land would be proud to boast (Caroe, 1965, p.427).

Charisma creates following and following creates charisma. The Miangul's successes by 1917 proved him a hero in war, a saint in peace, a man endowed with 'supernatural', 'superhuman' and 'extraordinary powers' (Weber, 1947, p. 358). None the less, his greatest asset, and the base for his political career, remained the charismatic reverence inherited from his grandfather, the Akhund. This inheritance provided a sufficient backdrop to enable his political fortunes to develop and dominate events in Swat. The Miangul manipulated the symbols that reactivated personal networks and opened charismatic channels of communication with his grandfather's following. Though the initial deposit of 'family' charisma, subject to the law of diminishing returns, was inherited at birth, each new member of the family had to reactivate that network which would give him easiest access to maximum authority and power. It was an individual, not corporate family, struggle. In Miangul Wadud's case 'inherited charisma' reinforced 'personal charisma' but more than his agnatic ascendants he wished to establish a formal State. After his agnatic cousins and only brother were dead he became the sole family heir to the vast properties and spiritual position of his grandfather.

Rival religious challenge

The first direct and religious threat appeared in the rather unlikely figure of Mastan Mullah, the Fakir of Buner, who had claimed extraordinary and magical powers and become a rallying point against the British in 1897. The Fakir made his camp at Landakai, which must have been uncomfortable for the Mianguls, but a more serious act was his claim that a boy protégé in his train was heir to the Mughal throne at Delhi. Could he not alter his direction

and make a similar claim for Swat? However, his advancing age was against him and the Fakir, already an old man at the turn of the century, saw his following break up after the failure of the movements and as a result of his incapacity to live up to his magical exploits and inflated promises. His second attempt for Swat leadership ended abortively in 1908, partly foiled by the Miangul.

Sayyed Abdul Jabbar Shah, descended from the famous Pir Baba of Buner and Sayyed Akbar Shah, was a more serious threat to the Miangul and was actually appointed 'Badshah' of the Swat confederacy of tribes by the Yusufzai Khans from 1915-17:

> In total disregard of my wish and resolve the people of Swat invited Sayyid Jabbar Shah of Sitana in Hazara, who was in the line of Sayyid Akbar Shah, first Amir of Swat, to become their ruler.... Sayyid Jabbar Shah, acquiescing in the arrangements, arrived in Swat and set up his rule over the areas across the River Swat. The people there accepted his authority (Miangul, 1962, pp.33-4).

The Mianguls went into temporary exile: 'So we left our hometown and removed to our property in Dalbar, a village in Adinzai, outside Swat, where we lived in exile for quite some time' (ibid., p.35). The Miangul however was not long in returning with the aid of Dir forces. Resuming his religious mantle, and assisted by the Sandakei Mullah, he raised a rebellion against the Sayyed by declaring him a heretic connected with the Qadiani sect (Barth, 1959a, p.128). This appealed to the orthodox who rallied behind the Miangul as defender of the faith and the Sayyed was quietly expelled from Swat. The Miangul was elected the new 'Badshah' of Swat. The nature of the contest was uneven. The Miangul was a shrewd, dynamic figure acutely aware of Swat political processes and the alliances and groups that ordered them, whereas the Sayyed was a scholarly and retiring person all too keen to quit the contest. The latter's headquarters in remote Sitana kept him isolated from the hurly burly of Swat politics and a relative stranger to its developments.

The aspect of political power derived from religious leadership was not forgotten by the Miangul: 'his first action on having established himself as Ruler was therefore to expel, as politically undesirable, all Saints and mystics who did not own property' (ibid., p.102).

Dialectics of politico-symbolic factors

The Miangul surveying the field in the early twenties assessed the political situation: 'I had to fight on the following five fronts:

I To put down the mutinous Khans of Swat at Manja.

II To repulse the invading Kohistani 'lashkar' at Madyan.

III To beat back the aggressive Nawab of Amb at Karakar.

IV To repulse the concentrated forces of my old and powerful adversary, the Nawab of Dir in Adinzai.

V To outmanoeuvre the seditious activities and clandestine dealing of the British Political Agent' (Miangul, 1962, p.73).

The Nawab of Dir provided a constant and the most dangerous expansionist threat to Swat leadership. At one stage the Khan had occupied the right bank of the Swat river and in the time-honoured tradition of Yusufzai conquest and 'according to Pathan custom he at once established guards in the country under Akhundzadas, who habitually bully and harass the people' (PP Encl. 2, dated 21 July 1897). The proud Yusufzai Khans looking around desperately for Swat leadership and a symbol of supratribal unity threw in their lot with the Miangul who led them as a political and military commander in successful and decisive battles with the Dir forces. Having consolidated his western (Dir) front the Miangul, in rapid and successful battles, defeated his enemies to the north and south of Swat. These military successes consolidated and expanded his territories and they also illustrated his relative invincibility to the Swat Khans. He was now the unchallenged ruler of Swat.

To further consolidate the support of loyalist Khans he implemented numerous 'reforms' such as the abolition of the custom of 'wesh', whereby his enemies were permanently deprived of their lands and his allies permanently obligated. The nature of his rule, however, was personal and informal rather than courtly or imperial. The village peasant felt nearer to it than to the aristocratic schema of the Khans:

> The amount of this work could be inferred merely from the crowds of Jirgahs (tribal councils), local Khans, and other individual applicants whom I saw early in the morning already gathered in front of the Miangul's terrace. It seemed a very convenient substitute for that 'takht' or raised seat of judgement which Indian as well as Central-Asian tradition necessarily associates with the function of a ruler (Stein, 1929, p.69).

Bureaucratization was on its way with the process of the

'institutionalization of charisma' and its functions.

Colonial interaction

When discussing what the greatest achievement of his life was the Miangul had explained

> once in the days of the British rule, the Governor of the Frontier Province, Sir Ralph Griffith, was in Swat on a visit. We were returning to Saidu Sharif from Buner in the same car when, in the course of a conversation he asked me the question: 'Badshah Sahib, what do you regard as the greatest achievement of your life?' promptly and without hesitation, I answered: 'That I have succeeded in establishing friendly relations with the British Government, is no doubt a great achievement in my life' (Miangul, 1962, pp.109-10).

The British presence provided the Miangul opportunity to display his diplomatic skill and shrewd reading of past and future events. The lessons of the millenarian movements followed by the swift and irresistible British advance were not lost on him. He won the British over with arguments based on the logic of mutual benefit; they could be assured of a peaceful border and the Miangul of non-interference in Swat's affairs. The Miangul walked a tight-rope; his negotiations had to be conducted without alienating his followers or compromising his role as a religious leader. The British soon saw the Swat State become 'a haven of peace on our troubled border' (Hay, 1934, p.246). Troops and resources were diverted to other parts of the Frontier where they were always desperately required (in the late thirties, for instance, there were as many troops in Waziristan as in the rest of the Indian subcontinent).

The Wali was left free to deal with the Swat problems. By maintaining that '"local autonomy" as interpreted in Swat allowed the indigenous population complete freedom to work out their own political problems in any manner they chose' (Barth, 1959a, p.8), Barth misreads the British administrative concept of 'local autonomy' and its implications for Swat political organization. 'Local autonomy' was never meant literally. The Political Agent, Malakand, (after the Agency was established in 1895), was officially responsible to the Indian Government for the 'situation' in Swat (apart from Malakand, Dir and Chitral). The Political Agent arranged princely 'privy purses', tribal allowances, government agricultural loans, development schemes etc. He was a distant but powerful force. By ensuring 'local autonomy' or 'non-interference' in Swat, the

British became a vital factor in upsetting local political equilibrium permanently in favour of the Wali. British support implicitly supported and reinforced the Wali's authority. 'Local autonomy' in this context is not of a structural kind underwriting an acephalous stateless tribal system but an 'autonomy' for the imperial protégé to consolidate his power and ensure internal peace. The Wali blocked any moves on the part of the Khans to contact the British directly which could have exposed a flank the latter might well have exploited. An early British report mentions 'the Mianguls whose sole object has been to exclude the Pathan Maliks from direct contact with Government' (PP Encl. 2, dated 21 July 1897). He thus secured his borders, and political arena, against British interference.

The Miangul, having cleared every hurdle in his path and consolidated every important section of the community behind him by demonstrated and repeated success, emerged as the main political and religious leader of the valley restoring order and establishing law. Revolt against him was not only a revolt against the political saviour of Swat but the most influential living religious male agnate of the Akhund. His 'electorate' was the poor and illiterate villager who saw in him the continuing local religious tradition of the Akhund; a factor that balanced any group of overly ambitious Khans. Political charisma was sanctified by religious charisma.

From millennium to Statehood

Final and formal recognition came in 1926:

> On May 3rd of the same year, Col. J.W. Keen, Acting Chief Commissioner of the Frontier Province, held a 'durbar' at Saidu Sharif, in which he read out the letter of the Government of India proclaiming me the Ruler of Swat and my son, Miangul Jahan Zeb, the Heir Apparent (Miangul, 1962, p.94).

The establishment of the State carried within it the seeds of 'the routinization of charisma' (Weber, 1947, p.358). The interests of the main loyalist followers and the Wali's immediate family coincided to bring some regularity and legality to the problem of the successor. With the declaration of the Waliahad, positions of authority in ranked administrative hierarchy and social prestige were systematically and quickly legitimized.

The aid of Figures 2-4 is enlisted to show the shift in functional relationship between the Khan (from that of a patron to his tenants, to a broker with the State) and the

tenant (who continues as universal client) and their relationship with the Wali, and with each other, both before and after the establishment of the State.



FIGURE 2 Pre-Wali Swat

Horizontal lines of socio-political alignment (between Khans) contrast with vertical lines relating 'patron' Khans with their 'client' tenants. Patronage is expressed in various forms: land tenure, membership of 'hujras',



FIGURE 3 Post-Wali Swat

rates of rents etc. Clientship involves regular contractual obligations which presuppose political loyalty. With the emergence of the Wali and the State many aspects of the Khans' patronage are taken over by official administrative functions, for example, taxes and corvée labour. In return, the State provides free schools, hospitals etc. The Khan finds himself as a broker, for the peasant to the State. The other equally strong link with the State is spiritual as it symbolizes a spatial reference to the Akhund for the peasantry. It is notable that the Akhund's sphere of authority is primarily religious but the Wali adds a new dimension to the relationship with the Khans and, more important, directly with the tenant through the introduction and use of all-pervasive administrative channels (Figure 3).

Figure 4 will illustrate the post-State situation whereby vertical lines of 'dalla' alignment convert to vertical lines of conflict as new horizontal lines of socio-political identity emerge cross-cutting previous alliances and corporate groups (Asad, 1972).



FIGURE 4 Post-State Swat

The typological sequence in the progress of charismatic organization from a 'band' or 'audience' of followers to a

regular following to political/religious 'movement' and finally to State/administrative 'organization' was completed during the life of Miangul Wadud. He rounded off his career by an act which is perhaps difficult to define in terms of material maximizing man and is yet comprehensible in the Islamic Sufic tradition and terminology discussed in the last chapter. His grandfather, the Akhund, had refused temporal power to the end. The Miangul established a State and at the noonday of the State's history he abdicated in 1949 (Barth, 1959a, p.129) to lead the monastic life of a religious recluse by fasting, praying and contemplation,

> Two life-long ambitions of mine remained to be fulfilled. I had always cherished the desire of acquiring knowledge, especially to acquaint myself thoroughly with the Holy Quran and the 'Sunnah'. Secondly, I wished to work for spiritual and moral amelioration of the Swatis and, travelling with a group of enlightened and sophisticated scholars from village to village, endeavour to mould their actions and character according to Islamic precepts so that they might become true Muslims (Miangul, 1962, pp.129-30).

He still had twenty-two years of life ahead of him. His eldest son inherited the State.

As we have seen the Miangul inherited charisma but had to reactivate and re-establish it to gain ascendance. The charismatic leader does not passively await events. He creates events. To understand his success it is essential to understand the milieu that produced him and the social groups who resisted him or supported him. He was all things to all men. He represented and focused in his person the interests of his followers. From horizontal politics of dissensus in a hierarchical social order the Wali came to symbolize, for a large majority, the focal point for a general politics of consensus.

SYNTHESIS: THE STATE OF SWAT

The central thesis of popular millenarian activities in the Malakand partly explained the milieu, and partly provided a base, for the antithesis in the form of the emergence of a charismatic leader and institutionalization of authority. It also explained the logic of the socio-political developments which provided a unique synthesis in the State of Swat. The holistic framework, applied to the analysis of the millenarian movements, was largely abandoned for an individualist one to explain the emergence of the Wali of Swat and with the establishment of a

formal centralized and bureaucratized State the analysis shifts away from an understanding of charisma to explaining the processes of 'institutionalization' of charisma. Unfortunately the undefined boundaries between 'personal charisma' and 'institutional charisma' and the transition between them have not been sufficiently dealt with in Weber's analysis of charismatic authority. The argument again shifts to a holistic frame of sociological reference: the State through its symbols of authority now pervades social life at all levels of Swat society and social relations are, in turn, and in varying degree, an interaction with its ubiquitous agents.

Barth's analysis of the development of the State and its all-embracing impact on the Swat social structure is as marginal and brief as his account of the rise of the Wali. He almost dismisses the most significant political development in Swat history (and an important one in Pathan society) by an explanation resting on 'some technological innovations, mainly the telephone' (8) (Barth, 1959a, p.135). This renders unsatisfactory Barth's account of political developments in Malakand from the turn of the century, encompassing as they do the two major and interconnected events discussed above. The implication for his Game-Theory model is evident. Recalcitrant Khans find it increasingly difficult to 'manoeuvre' and 'manipulate' in a game that does not pretend to have either fixed rules or impartial umpire; they and their plans become a function of the State's over-all strategy and not a function, as in the past, of 'maximizing' individual ambitions.

Individuals are no longer entirely free 'to plan and make choices in terms of private advantage and a personal political career' (ibid., p.2). 'Group commitments' can no longer 'be assumed and shed at will' nor 'self-interest' alone 'dictate action' (ibid.). 'Seizing' land or 'attacking' and 'ousting' rivals involves confrontation with the laws of the State and its ever-present forms of 'coercive authority'. 'Maximizing' man was up against the strait-jacket structural framework of a highly centralized State; 'manoeuvre' and 'strategy' could only operate within radically changed tactics and networks.

The three traditional sources of the feudal power base of Swat were affected by the State, irreparably emasculating the Khan and thereby altering the nature of the network of dyadic social relationships that he created around him (both with client peasants and other Khans). Social structure on all levels was thus altered and social relationships redefined:

I 'Wesh' was frozen and therefore, by confirming the

possession of land held at that moment in time, the State left the Khan in a vulnerable position as he could no longer claim land as his lineage right based on belonging to a segmentary Pukhtun group. The unit of land he owned was his in perpetuity and therefore his main economic base but if the State took it on some pretext, he could do little about it. Under the previous 'wesh' system the entire tribe would be affected and react jointly to the challenge. Freezing of rights in landed property struck at the roots of Yusufzai Pukhtun mystification regarding inherent rights to the land. The formal ending of this custom meant a loss of symbolic status and implied rejection of the Yusufzai myth.

II Just as land was the source of economic power and social prestige to the Khan, his weapons were the means to translate this power to political action. The Wali attempted what no ruler of Pathans had ever done: (9) he disarmed his subjects:

> The time at last came, when an order restricting the possession and use of fire-arms could be safely enforced.... My friends were the first to do so, closely followed by others, till all present disarmed themselves there and then; the rest of the public did likewise; and before long the rather tricky task of disarming the people had been completed successfully (Miangul, 1962, p.109).

Simultaneously, 'loyalists' and 'supporters' were issued arms in each village to discourage revolt or to contain it until official forces acted. The socio-political significance of this act cannot be overemphasized in Pathan society. Pathans believe in the right to carry arms from childhood and even the administration of the Settled Districts of the Frontier Province found it exceedingly difficult to restrict their use and transportation.

III The traditional tax on grain and agricultural products was partly diverted from the Khan to the State in the form of 'ushar' and indicated to the peasantry that the State had succeeded and substituted the Khan as a sort of universal landlord and patron. The change in the revenue collection underlined the altered status of the peasant; from a vassal tied to a particular Khan through dyadic links he became a citizen of a State where, theoretically at least, all were equal in the eyes of the law. In turn the State provided free schools, medical dispensaries etc. Thus the Khan's 'redistributive' economic system (gathering of goods and services upwards to a central point and then a downwards redistribution of resources to numerous points) was reflected structurally in the homologous nature of the State.

IV The military and temporal authority of the feudal warlord was replaced by the patriarchal and moral authority of the State. The latter was legitimized both in temporal and spiritual terms. A revolt against the State was a revolt against the Islamic Pathan State of the House of the Akhund of Swat. Saidu symbolized the temporal capital of the State and the Akhund's shrine in it a spiritual focus. A new social and religious order was emphasized. The establishment of this new order was symbolized in the formal recognition of the Wali's eldest son as the Waliahad, the heir-apparent. A dynasty was established.

The role of the State itself was seen as partly reformist:

> Womenfolk were restored to their rightful place in society, and were given the rights and privileges expounded in the 'shariat'. Gambling and other objectional modes of entertainment were legally banned. In short, I spared no effort in weeding out all moral and social evils (ibid., p.115).

And

> no sooner was a territory annexed to the State than I appointed learned Molvis to instruct the people in Islamic theology and to teach them to read and write. Stress on religious instruction was necessary then, for the Swatis had little knowledge of the religion they practise (ibid., p.116).

Pashto became the official lingua franca representing the folk language rather than the traditional subcontinental court languages such as Persian or Urdu, often only spoken by the rural élites:

> On coming into authority, I declared Pashto to be the official language of the State and adopted the Urdu script as the style of writing.... Both officials and the public were directed to employ simple, everyday language in all their writings, and express themselves briefly and to the point; especially avoiding lengthy salutations and adulatory phrases (ibid., p.117).

'Swati' ethnicity was created and further reinforced in the border wars of conquest and consolidation that the Wali embarked upon immediately after establishing centralized authority in Swat. Territory was annexed as a result of battles with the Nawab of Dir, the Nawab of Amb and the Kohistanis in the north. These military encounters served two connected purposes: while ostensibly providing new conquests they also offered a valid justification to crush rebellious Khans. Ethnically, they created geographical boundaries of 'Swatiness' and therefore helped define it in spatial rather than phyletic terms.

It is worth noting that though the facts and figures

pertaining to the authority of Swat State, given in 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans', add up to an arithmetical total of awesome proportions they are relegated in the analysis to an auxiliary position. The sum-total of the arithmetic reveals a form of Oriental Despotism (Wittfogel, 1957) and not a variety of those African tribal societies, organized into states around a central authority, like the Zulu (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940). Power is absolute; the individual is reduced to a function and extension of the State's will. The State as the final expression of the ruler is omnipresent and omnipotent. This is all the more remarkable in a Pathan society that bases its social organization and cultural ethos on democratic concepts of individuality:

> The Pathans, who reside in the tribal territory on our border, are essentially a democratic race, and though from time to time a Khan or Mullah has arisen amongst them who has acquired such influence that he has come to be regarded locally more or less as a king, it is doubtful whether any individual has ever before succeeded in establishing over any part of their country such absolute power as that now enjoyed by the Ruler of Swat, Miangul Gulshahzada Sir Abdul Wadud, KBE (Hay, 1934, p.236).

However, a comparison with other forms of Oriental Despotism must be qualified by the nature of the ruler and the ruled. The Swat court never attained the formality and inaccessibility of imperial Mughal or Saffawid dynasties. The Wali was highly mobile, accessible and visible.

The features whereby Wittfogel defines the mathematics of Oriental Despotism are basically in terms of a highly centralized political system organized around, and as a function of, vast irrigation schemes that require mass corvée labour (for flood protection etc.) drawn from a subject peasantry and directed by a powerful bureaucracy; exalted rulers with unlimited authority rule this pyramidal organization. If the structural concept could be borrowed without its concomitant and grandiose superlatives then an examination of the Swat State could be seen as a template for a miniature hydraulic State or Oriental Despotism.

Swat is demographically dense and thereby satisfies an essential characteristic of an Oriental Despotic State. For a purely agricultural and herding population 'settlement is extremely dense; it can be roughly estimated at eight hundred persons per square mile of productive land' (Barth, 1959a, p.6). Complex and extensive irrigation systems are maintained, 'water is drawn from the main Swat river and from its smaller tributaries by a complex system

of channels, which irrigate a large part of the valley bottom' (ibid.). This justifies the growth of bureaucracy based on careful recording of land units and land is periodically assessed by the Revenue officers of the administration and two-thirteenths of all agricultural produce taken as tax (ibid., p.130).

The Wali embodies unlimited supreme authority: 'The Ruler claims absolute power, and conceives of his administration as "a family concern" in which duties and responsibilities are informally delegated, at his pleasure, to trusted individuals' (ibid., p.129). The Wali is the State ('charisma' in the process of its 'institutionalization'): 'All persons employed by the State of Swat are the "servants" of the Ruler ("da Badshah naukaran")' (ibid., p.48).

A network of communication meets in the person of the Wali

> He is, furthermore, in constant telephonic communication with administrators in the districts. One of the first acts of the Badshah after his election as Ruler was the construction of (1,500 miles of) telephone lines from the capital to the main local centres. The radial pattern of construction offered the further advantage that while he had direct communication with every place, persons in the different centres could not communicate with each other without his knowledge. Roads (375 miles) have also been constructed to give direct access to all areas (ibid., p.131).

His policy is therefore reflected in all State decisions:

> Information and appeals travel upwards in this hierarchy, while instruction and decisions are passed downward and implemented by it. The personnel of this organization are civil servants, many of them of Saint caste; they are frequently transferred and rarely permitted to serve in their native area (ibid., p.129).

The army numbering about ten thousand

> which can be mobilized only from the centre, constitutes the final sanction against leaders. Moreover the Ruler maintains a rough balance between the blocs by supporting now one and now the other. The powers of the Khans are offset also by those of the appointed administrators, such as the 'Tahsildars' - who are transferred frequently to prevent collusion with local leaders. Their local powers of subversion are further limited by their dependence on the local police officers - independently appointed by the Ruler - for actual force (ibid., p.131).

The police supplement the strength of the army: 'the police forces permanently on duty, which are distributed

between eighty fortresses in different parts of the State, have a strength of two thousand' (ibid., p.130).

Every manipulable device heightens and strengthens the central authority of the ruler. Power in such cases can only be assessed in total sums; so can individual terror or impotence. In the classical tradition of the Oriental Despots the main deputies are extra-ethnic who owe total loyalty to the ruler and remain politically emasculated: of Chitrali descent (Hazrat Ali Khan, the Wazir-i-Azam or Chief Minister, and his brother, the Sipah-Salar or Commander-in-Chief) or Punjabi (the Chief Secretary and the Chief Medical Officer).

It is difficult to envisage how in this monolithic State structure the Khan and his alliances have, except the most marginal, room for manoeuvre at any level of social action. Alliances and blocs formed around political functions cannot exist in a centralized system like the one just described. Even the local power of the Khan is now balanced by the Tehsildar, the Police and the Army. Barth gives an example of Khans stepping out of (State) line:

> an appeal a few years ago by a number of landowners was punished by severe beating with the rifle-butts of the Ruler's bodyguard, and thus cost most of the pleaders their front teeth - enough to make them feel they had got off easy without encouraging them to try again. But though the local Khan thus wields autonomous power within his own area, he is in no position to challenge the Ruler's wider authority (ibid., p.132).

The State as described above is conceptually antonymous to an acephalous tribal society within which powerful warlords may play power games. Yet Barth maintains that 'the description of the bloc organization thus remains valid and accurate within the area of Swat State as well as outside its boundaries' (ibid.) - as if the State and its all-pervasive agencies simply do not exist or affect the social structure in Swat. In spite of the structural web that the State has spun around him, requiring holist analysis, Barth's Swat Pathan is still seen in individualist terms and his socio-political milieu continues to be equated to that of 'transactionalist' Western man: 'the political life of Swat resembles that of Western societies' (ibid., p.2).

In 1969 the Government of Pakistan merged the State of Swat within its administrative structure. Swat became a District and the Wali, stripped of all administrative authority, was replaced by a Deputy Commissioner. The inherent ambiguity in accepting the Wali as a spiritual, informal leader and the emergence of a centralized State

with increasingly impersonal power was never really resolved. Although in 1969 there was considerable, often latent, political opposition to the Wali in Swat, his son and heir was returned in the National Assembly elections, based on adult universal suffrage, the next year. This illustrates that loyalty to the Wali, and his family, was based on more factors than just State patronage and authority. The last traces of familial charisma were barely, but still, visible.

8 Models and method in anthropology

THE KHAN'S EYE-VIEW OF THE WORLD

The Introduction suggested that Barth's analysis of Swat society was 'synecdochic' in nature i.e. it saw the world through the eyes of the Khan and that view was taken as representative of what is apperceived by Swat society as a whole. The main sources of information, and certainly those providing the material for the four chapters that analyse Swat political organization and social action (Barth, 1959a, chapters 5, 7, 8 and 9), appear to be the big Khans such as Nalkot Pacha, Khan Bahadur Sahib and Taj Mahomed Khan (Figure 7, p.103). Paragraphs describing informants in these chapters might well begin: 'Malak Baba of Maruf Khel and the chief of Juna khel' (ibid., p.113), or 'There were four Khans: Mohammed Awzel Khan, Taj Mohammed Khan, Amir Khan and Biha Malak' (ibid., p.71). Some of these Khans (or as in the case of Nalkot Pacha, 'Saints') were personal acquaintances of Barth during his field-work and presumably his 'respondents'. Thus 'the Nalkot Pacha, my sometime host' (ibid., p.99), and 'one of my acquaintances among the more prominent chiefs had an approximate income of 50,000 Pakistan rupees (then about £5,000) from the sale of grain' (ibid., p.79).

Examples exhibiting the social prejudices of the Khan, which confirm the theme of this section, appear frequently in 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans', for instance, the reference to the 'wife of a mullah' (ibid., p.47). The 'Mians' are seen as miserly and mean (ibid., p.101). Concubinage, an institution based on wealth and feudal power, and unknown in the tribal or 'nang' areas, is observed (although this is empirically difficult to verify): 'Chiefs may employ them as servants on more exclusive occasions in their men's houses, to add spice to the life of distinguished visitors, though their sexual

services are apparently usually monopolized by their owners' (ibid., p.50).

An inevitable Khan's eye-view of politics enters Barth's analysis of Swat society, which partly explains the 'minimization' of the impact of the Wali on Swat society and the exaggeration of the role of the Khans. The Swat thesis is structured around the Khan, his genealogical charters, his avunculate and agnatic rivalries, his institutions and his alliances which explain his participation in and the political extrapolation of the Swat Game-Theory.

Barth's is thus more a 'macro' than a 'micro' view of social relations and political processes. His is not the usual anthropological 'village study'. And because of its macro construction and diachronic theoretical assumptions and treatment it sees the wood clearly but often at the cost of neglecting the trees. At times the theory appears to be outpacing the ethnography and therefore retains the quality of an abstraction lacking ontological contact with the object under study (which is the polychromic socio-political process in motion and over time in Swat society). Because of this macro view-point, and the inbuilt equilibrium of the model, the Swat study appears to concentrate on the maintenance and circulation of élites in a fashion almost reminiscent of Pareto (1965). The Yusufzai Khan élite is seen as perpetuating itself in power over an autochthonic majority up to this century as feudal lords. Because Barth's study focuses on this élite rather than the entire society and is more an 'élite' study than a 'total' one it leads to major socio-political trends being overlooked, for example, the underlying class tension and conflict situation. 'The peasant view of the bad life' (Bailey, 1971) is conspicuously absent in the analysis. Talal Asad, never having visited Swat, and basing his critique on Barth's data alone, puts his finger accurately on the interaction among Swat hierarchies, drawn along horizontal class lines, and anticipates the armed confrontation that was to develop in Swat: 'I have been arguing, against Barth, that horizontal cleavages into asymmetric classes are more important than vertical ones into homologous blocs. The tenant's class interests are always opposed to those of his landlord' (Asad, 1972, p.85).

Professor Barth was based in the capital town of Swat, Saidu, and it might be reasonable to assume that his informants in Saidu were more urbane and educated than those living in remote villages (of the seven villages on which he based his data only two were 'remote'; the others were either towns or within the radius of towns). The fact that he did not live in one of the villages ensured the

exclusion of data based on first-hand empirically observed social behaviour of the entire village and consequently the representation of majority non-Khan categories and groups. A similar suggestion was made regarding Professor Barth's field-work situation among the Basseri where he spent his three months in the chiefly Darbar camp (Tapper, 1971, p.132).

DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN SWAT

The impact of post-colonial 'national' independence cannot be over-emphasized in its pervasive and universal influence on tribal or marginal societies and crystallization of new political directions and social configurations. Today, the component elements of social change involve (i) the politics of the universal vote, (ii) undisguised, often Western, symbols of material values and (iii) a universal desire for social mobility and rejection of castes and social hierarchies. These factors may have been somewhat underplayed by anthropologists looking for factors of continuity and 'equilibrium' within social structures. The anthropological quest for an 'ethnographic present' may result in either a dated or a distorted picture. The vote, the radio and the bus can change a society, however remote and tribal, almost beyond recognition. Those anthropologists who revisit their initial areas of field-work study find substantial signs of change. Professor Firth found this in Tikopia (Firth, 1959) which he visited in 1952 after his field-work in 1929, and Professor Mayer when he revisited Fiji after twenty years in 1971 (Mayer, 1971).

Professor Barth also saw visible changes in Swat during his visit in 1960 (Barth, 1966). What is important to note is that unlike Firth and Mayer visiting after two or three decades Professor Barth was visiting Swat only six years after his field-work. Some of the institutions on which his cherished analytic concepts were based, like the 'men's houses', had radically altered in function. Yet nothing of socio-political significance occurred between 1954 and 1960 to escalate observable change unless one were to argue that the processes of change were already in visible motion in 1954 but Professor Barth had either overlooked them or ignored them in order to build models:

> A brief revisit to Swat in 1960 revealed a predominant change in the main valley, with men's houses serving mainly as places for the demonstration of wealth towards co-members of the wealthy élite and clientship disappearing as a vital relationship (ibid., p.17).

The 'hujra' had become a club for equals emphasizing horizontal lines of social equality rather than a political focus connecting the Khan to his clients.

Looking back, Barth even recognizes trends he saw in 1954 but did not incorporate in his study (so as not to disturb the construction of his 'models'): 'The use of force was controlled and punished with increasing rigour by the ruler, so the effectiveness of a large following for expansive and even defensive purposes was declining' (ibid., p.16). In 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans' Barth had argued that the centralized State system was 'merely superimposed' on the acephalous, segmentary system, but Barth's observations in 1960 surely describe the ruler as an all-powerful oriental potentate as defined in chapter 7 of this book and not one who would allow himself to be checked and balanced by powerful Khans in a constant 'zero-sum' game.

Sociologically, feudal landlords divert their energies to accumulating wealth as the new symbol of prestige when their estates are 'encapsulated' by national or centralized politics. The 'political lord' becomes an 'economic master'. This explains the sterility in continuing traditional politics for the Khan after the establishment of the State. His alternative is to make money. Barth recognizes this in 1960

> a few chiefs started acting in deviation from the old pattern as early as the late nineteen-thirties; they gained greatly in wealth but lost their political following by discontinuing their men's house feasting; they lost their autonomy through having to rely on the ruler and his power for the protection of their estate (ibid.).

In turn, when the Government of Pakistan absorbed the State of Swat the Wali's family turned to economic enterprise for the outlet of their energies. Like the princes of Bali they changed from 'political princelets' into 'economic lordlings' (Geertz, 1963).

Swat, twenty years after Professor Barth did his field-work, but mainly after his 1960 visit, has undergone deep structural social changes as a result of three major and interconnected developments: (a) the removal of the Wali as the ruler in 1969; (b) the absorption of the State into the administrative structure of Pakistan; and (c) the 1970 universal election (adult franchise was brought to Swat within a year of its loss of status as a State). These changes have created new rapidly shifting alliances, the breakdown of established social networks and phyletic boundaries, and a dramatic reversal of roles as, for instance, in the 1970 election when the Khans were backing

non-Pukhtun candidates for Assembly seats. There is much more mobility between Swat and the rest of the country and the processes of 'encapsulation' and integration have begun. The famous 'purdah' of Swat has finally been removed. Powerful Khans stripped of mystagogy can no longer play power games based on local politics alone: national alignments, economics and education are now factors of importance.

THE RELEVANCE OF MODELS IN ANTHROPOLOGY

One of the penalties of fame for a classic work, such as Barth's, is that it becomes a standard reference for the people under study. Unfortunately, partly understanding the ethnographic application of Barth's theoretical models or using, or often simply picking tendentious models from, Barth the most unlikely homologues and analogies to Pathan society have also resulted. Barth's Swat Pathan has become the Pathan, or more specifically, Barth's eye-view of the Khans of Swat has become the general image of Pathan society. The particular has become the general. This section will give some examples of how the understanding of Pathan society has been affected in varying degrees by Barth's study of the Swat Pathans. These examples will also show the widespread popularity and influence of Barthian models.

Talal Asad argues that Barth views Swat Pathan society through Hobbesian eyes: 'The similarity of this view of Swat Pathans with the Hobbesian vision of human nature and political society is striking and significant' (Asad, 1972, p.80). Professor Bailey goes one step further. Swat Pathan society is not only Hobbesian in nature, nasty, brutish and short, but is generally representative of entire Pathan society (cf. section on 'Pakhtouns in conflict' in chapter 6, Bailey, 1970). Stimulated by a television programme, he sees Pathan bloc and alliance structures as homologous to the 'cosa nostra' ('our thing' or 'our affair') criminal organization in the USA: 'The people of Swat and the criminals of the American "cosa nostra" arranged their violent successions in broadly the same fashion' (ibid., p.viii). It appears there is little substantial progress or difference in the stereotype of 'the wild Pathans' (ibid., p.ix) that featured in the swashbuckling turn of the century novels about the North-West Frontier of India and those studied in the social sciences. This leads to a general reflection on the nature of anthropology and the study of primitive people:

> Social anthropology, it seems, picks on the exotic and the eccentric and the deviant and the aberrant: it cannot deal with the normal and the usual. The subject is as one particularly obtuse critic said, merely barbarology: and my implied excitement at discovering the Pathans behaved like the 'cosa nostra' gangsters would have confirmed him in this view (ibid., p.viii).

Bailey would even employ value judgments, unusual for contemporary anthropologists, such as the adjective 'wild' when referring to 'the Pathans' (ibid., p.ix). Unusual examples, among them a highly suspect one, (1) of a 'successful Pakhtoun politician with over two hundred murders to his credit' (ibid., p.91), are cited to support this.

Professor Bailey sums up Pathan society: 'There are some straightforward cultures like the Pathans, the gangsters and racketeers of the American cities, or some totalitarian nations of our own day, where the job can be simply carried out by murder' (ibid., p.79).

Concepts and figures that explain Swat structure and society are developed into caricatures: 'the Pathan Saint who whistled' (ibid., p.64) or 'the cunning saint' ('I look like a simple man; I live simply - but oh! the things I do!' - ibid., p.141). The ambiguity in Barth's general application of the word Saint to all 'religious' men and its consequences in explaining Swat social interaction (opposed in a discussion in chapter 4 for this very reason) are apparent in Bailey's comprehension of socio-political organization in Swat. To Bailey Nalkot Pacha (the 'Saint' who whistled - Barth, 1959a, p.99) is a Saint with a capital 'S' which the latter never was. Nalkot Pacha was a powerful landlord from north Swat

> Thus the Nalkot Pacha, as well as being the headman of his own village, owns plots of land in various others, and so has a personal hold over some villagers in the men's houses of most of the neighbouring chiefs, while he himself is removed from the direct control of any one chief (ibid., p.96).

By pushing him into 'Saint' category his behaviour and consequently the Saint-Khan analysis and balance, become skewed. Similarly, the Wali is equated to Saint 'The man who emerged as ruler of the Swat valley was a Saint' (Bailey, 1970, p.141). In 'Conceptual systems in the study of politics' Professor Bailey attempts to develop the thesis that a Saint's stature diminishes as his land holdings increase (the Saint is defined as a gloss for 'pir', 'baba', 'sayyed', and 'mian') and offers a graphic illustration:



Point 6 on the graph illustrates the 'theoretical position of a Saint who has disqualified himself from saintliness by becoming a large landowner' (Bailey, 1972, p.32). This statement, supported by the graphic illustration, clearly express both Bailey's empirical and theoretical misunderstanding of Barth's thesis. For example, one of the crucial factors in the Wali's struggle for power was his great landed property and he had, as Bailey himself observes, not 'disqualified himself from saintliness'. As mentioned above, Bailey's other Saint, Nalkot Pacha, also owned large tracts of land (Barth, 1959a, p.96). Barth is unambiguous on the point of the increase in a Saint's power and political influence with the increase of his property (ibid., p.93). The misunderstanding springs from the development of the concept of Saint. Bailey is unthinkingly imposing a Western and Christian connotation of the term, (2) 'When Western anthropologists talk about Islamic Saints, they use the term as a shorthand for a diversity of social roles' (Turner, 1974, p.61).

As Barth's model gains in anthropological popularity and currency its finer points get lost in its more general structure. The 'mullahs', for instance, are equated to Saints, something Barth had assiduously avoided (Barth, 1959a, p.57), as it raises serious conceptual problems in the analysis of Islamic societies. While stating that Khans provide one segment of leadership for political power in Swat it has been analysed that 'the second segment of leadership is composed of the saints, "fakirs" or "mullahs" (dedicated and propertyless men)' (Tuden, 1966, p.280). In the same work it is also suggested that, like Bailey's Saint, the 'mullah's' religious status declines with an increase in material possessions, which prevents him from participating in the pursuit of land and power: 'Because of their religious position the mullahs cannot employ the violent techniques of land seizure practised by the Khans' (ibid.).

The influence and popularity of Barth's study is

evident in its wide usage for cross-cultural analysis, as for example in Professor Haimendorf's work (Fürer-Haimendorf, 1969). The Swat study is referred to in an account titled 'Pir and Murshid: an aspect of religious leadership in West Pakistan' by Professor Mayer (1967). Dr Parkin draws a comparison of Swat Pathans with the Giriama in East Africa. However, he is critical of Barth's analysis of Swat in terms of political power based on transactional relationships alone. Other factors, such as economic and religious ones, play a crucial role in explaining social interaction and behaviour as Dr Parkin develops in his Giriama study (1972). He finds that Barth's 'Swat chiefs seem preoccupied with acquiring political support at all costs.... However much land they have, in the end, Swat chiefs have nothing in which to invest their wealth except political support' (Parkin, 1972, p.78).

To Professor Gluckman, Barth's 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans' becomes 'an analysis of the two-party system' in a discussion of Anuak headmen and factions in villages (Gluckman, 1971, p.166). The noted Indologist, Professor Dumont, sees Swat society as divided into groups 'linked together by something equivalent to a jajmani system, they are ranked by status, and a high proportion of marriages are endogamous. The influence of the Hindu model is obvious, and the lowest castes are considered impure (barber, washerman, etc)' (Dumont, 1972, pp.254-5). The discussion on endogamy and stratification early on in this book attempts to show how the concepts of 'purity' and 'caste' are not satisfactory ones in the Swat situation and that social divisions are based on ownership of land corresponding to membership in genealogical charters and consequently, Pukhtun political status.

Professor Mair pins the Swat study to a particular 'ethnographic present' with a confidence even Barth does not exhibit: the study 'describes the essence of Swat politics as they were observed in 1954' (Mair, 1972, p. 135) in an otherwise useful summary of the Swat analysis.

Barth's influence is not restricted to the social sciences alone. Berry, for instance, in his legal monograph called 'Aspects of the Frontier Crimes Regulation in Pakistan' warns the reader of two important caveats, that (a) 'no field research was undertaken' (Berry, 1966, p. viii) and that (b) 'there is a deviation in Swat from the normal Pathan social structure' (ibid., p.12). None the less the book leans heavily on Barth's anthropological material and quotes extensively from it. He might have added another caveat for the student of law: that the Frontier Crimes Regulation did not apply to Swat. Berry also, and inevitably, falls into the familiar pitfall

created by Barth's use of Saints that has claimed others and betters. He sees Swat as a unique Pathan society because of its proliferation of Saints and their political power (ibid., p.36). Even the 'Encyclopaedia Britannica' includes Barth's Swat study in the limited bibliography for its section on India-Pakistan (1967, p.158).

Descriptions of 'wild Pathans', 'savages' and 'barbarians' would have been understandable in the writing of imperial administrators whose job was to maintain Pax Britannica over the most troubled frontier in the British Empire or in those of popular novelists like John Masters, but in the writings of social scientists they appear unusual and incomprehensible. Compared to some anthropologists imperial administrators have been kinder to the Pathans and their society. (3) Herbert Edwardes, a famous name on the Frontier, in the last century wrote of Pathan 'jirgas':

> The 'Mullicks' talked Pushtoo. The deliberate way in which each delivered his opinion, the expressive gestures with which they enforced it, and the courteous silence observed by all the rest while one was speaking, was a model for any deliberative assembly (Edwardes, 1846-9, vol.v, p.43 quoted in Caroe, 1965, p.455).

This impression is confirmed by an ex-Governor of the North-West Frontier Province: 'It is true that the "jirga" tradition is all in favour of order at time of council, and "jirgas" can often give points to any parliament in matters of usage and decorum' (ibid., p.402). To a contemporary American writer a Pathan assembly 'is probably the closest thing to Athenian democracy that has existed since the original' (Spain, 1963, p.69).

Methodological individualists hope to understand social action through ego: 'To understand a man who is acting socially (rather than simply behaving) we need to grasp the intentions of his actions' (Turner, 1974, p.70). Turner's thesis in 'Weber and Islam' is that 'Although Weber accepted these procedures as a necessary part of any sociological inquiry, he often ignored them in his own research' (ibid., p.71). It appears that Weber was not the only one guilty of ignoring the actor's definition of the situation and concepts. A certain ethnocentric stance is discerned in many of the examples given above regarding the Swat Pathans which touches a wider general criticism:

> The irreducibility of cultures leads to a questioning of the cultural background of the anthropologist and to the introduction of the notion of 'cultural relativism': one's vision of the other culture is in part determined by one's own culture and can be seen in

> ethnocentrically formulated projects (Bonte, 1974, p. 54).

Barth's Swat Pathan has become the Pathan. A theoretical model has been accepted and substituted for ethnographic reality. Swat, a 'unique' (4) Pathan situation has become representative of Pathan society at large. The aberrant or deviant has become the standard and the normal.

CONCLUSION

The Swat study is a strong demonstration for methodological individualist analysis; but not an entirely successful one. One of the aims of this essay has been to show that the Swat Pathan is not entirely in a position where 'group commitments may be assumed and shed at will' and 'self-interest may dictate action which does not bring advantage to the group' (Barth, 1959a, p.2). It has been argued that on the contrary, he is born into an interconnected number of social matrices that may continue to determine or limit his 'choices' and 'strategies'. Neither the single application of individualist analysis nor an entirely holist one is advocated in this essay. For instance, the concept of charisma is not found 'sociologically sterile'. In the Swat context it is of particular interest as it exhibits itself both in various stages of development in one person and in its applicability in response to particular social situations. The contrast in the example of Miangul Hannan, the son of the Akhund, and Miangul Wadud, is worth recalling: in spite of a considerable spiritual and material legacy and repeated attempts the former made little headway in consolidating the authority of his father into a formal political organization.

The analysis of mystical Sufic behaviour and its impact on the Akhund and his society is understood within a general methodological holist framework. A note on Sufism has been found necessary; the note does not concern itself with metaphysical or eschatological Sufic problems but how their cognition of these problems affect their social behaviour and, as a direct result, the social behaviour and organization of their followers. Therefore the ethnic origin, social background and Sufic practice of the Akhund is not an academic matter only.

This essay also offers a straight sociological reinterpretation of socio-historical developments in Swat that helps explain social structure and behaviour. Historical events, like anthropological societal sequences, require

dates to remove ambiguity and provide useful diacritical boundaries. This has been attempted and helps to view Barth's material in better relief. A Weberian and vectorial quality is observed in the development of types of authority: from the paternal, traditional authority of the Yusufzai Khans to that of the charismatic Miangul Abdul Wadud and finally to the highly centralized State of Swat. Alongside this linear political progression the definition of Swat ethnicity becomes relevant: a 'Swati' consciousness replacing a Yusufzai Pukhtun one defined by new political boundaries and changed socio-political circumstances. The elastic geographical boundaries of the Yusufzai tribe are now firmly replaced by the known and defined political boundaries of the State. The symbolism of Yusufzai origin, which was so effective in articulating a great deal of the organizational functions of this interest group, is replaced by the symbols of the new State and its ruler.

Granted that Barth's society and his theoretical analysis of it are not static in the classic structuralist-functionalist tradition, their inherent 'equilibrium models' still deny them evolutionary, sequential or structural change. Each Khan as 'a central island of authority' (ibid., p.91), symbiotically surrounded by a cluster of client groups, and interlocked in functional reciprocal dependence expresses a somewhat unreal social picture. Motion through conflict is circulatory among the Khans but is sterile of new social developments; the analysis is like a static and well-regulated machine that could function ad infinitum if undisturbed. The 'static' elements in Swat ethnography and the 'dynamic' elements in Barth's theory do not relate fully and remain on different levels of analysis. This is precisely why the Swat 'model' does not account for the Wali whose emergence disrupts and restructures the old equations with ramifying consequences on all levels of Swat society. Barth largely ignores the intrusion of the Wali, as his emergence cannot be comprehended entirely in the 'model'. He explains the Wali and the organization of the State as merely superimposed on the acephalous tribal system, 'presupposing rather than attempting to replace it' (ibid., p.132).

This essay has attempted, if the term is understood correctly, a 'dynamic' approach in studying the socio-political factors lying outside synchronic situations and static social relationships. It has attempted to relate the milieu that allowed the growth of the Miangul to his unchallenged ruler status within a tribal situation, and the creation of the State with those social forces opposing both the former and the latter; and on the other

hand, those forces converging through mutual interest to elevate the Miangul to the Walidom, and thereby encouraging the subsequent morphological reordering of Swat society. The sequence is complex and polychrome but has a pattern and a cause-effect relationship: it is the development of a typological sequence starting from the generalized spiritual authority of the Akhund to the millenarian mass movements which act as catalyst in static feudal and tribal societies and ending in the institutionalization of charisma symbolized in the establishment of a State. The unfolding of the socio-historical sequence also brings into relief one of the contentions of this essay that Swat man is not simply 'political man'; he is also 'economic' and 'religious man'. The attempt to include the latter leaves Barth's study open to criticism of a form of academic ethnocentricity, reductionism and synecdochic approach already referred to in the introductory chapter.

Formerly, the Pathans, probably the largest tribal grouping in the world, did not even feature on anthropological global tribal maps (Gluckman, 1971; Sahlins, 1968, p.4). It is a tribute to Professor Barth that he has put them firmly on the map of the social sciences. Apart from creating brilliant theoretical models which enable an understanding of Pathan social organization in general, Professor Barth's Swat study provides the heuristic conditions that lay the academic foundations for further sociological work. It is a lasting and rich ethnographic contribution to the limited number of serious books on the North-West Frontier Province.

Notes

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1 The future of social anthropology: disintegration or metamorphosis? (Needham, 1970) and Crisis of British anthropology (Banaji, 1970).

2 Which partly explains the steady growth in academic influence and general popularity of the subject: 'In Great Britain alone there are at least 97 people who hold University teaching posts specifically as social anthropologists, 26 of them are Professors. There are numerous others who masquerade under the label of "sociologist"' (Leach, 1974, p.6).

3 The iconoclasts, in turn, face new idol-breakers:

> The combination of these factors determines what I have called the crisis of modern anthropology and adds new dimensions to the problem of the critique of anthropology. Today this critique is at the centre of an extensive theoretical, ideological and political debate which began, especially in France, in the sixties. The scale and the sharpness of this debate are related to the central positions of anthropology in the construction of a general theory of human societies and to the ideological functions it fulfils. The critique of anthropology in fact directly exposes the central ideological and metaphysical presuppositions at the foundation of a new materialist and dialectic conception. Every success achieved in this arena is of major importance; it is therefore important to denounce revived forms of criticism, which I have already labelled as the 'Rightist Critique' of anthropology (Bonte, 1974, p.60).

4 These positions can be strongly stated and defended:

> I feel uneasy when faced with any analysis which does not allow man a central role as an entrepreneur. In Britain Raymond Firth has been the proponent of this view and I acknowledge the influence of his writings and those of Fredrik Barth (Bailey, 1970, p.18).

5 Actually the substitution of the reality-principle for the pleasure-principle denotes no dethronement of the pleasure-principle, but only a safeguarding of it. A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its results, is given up, but only in order to gain in the new way an assured pleasure coming later (Freud, 1925, p.18).

6 Pathan is the popular name for Pukhtuns; they refer to themselves as Pukhtun. This essay will use Pathan generally and Pukhtun specifically with reference to the Swat Yusufzai dominant tribal groups, while following the convention established by Professor Barth of using Pathan and Pukhtun interchangeably.

7 The analysis of boundary-maintaining processes in different parts of the Pathan areas, which will be made below, requires an understanding of three such institutions which dominate three major domains of activity: 'Melmastia' - 'hospitality', and the honourable uses of material goods, 'jirga' - councils, and the honourable pursuit of public affairs, and 'purdah' - seclusion, and the honourable organization of domestic life (Barth, 1969, p.120).

Such Codes are characteristic of tribal Muslim groups; the Bedouin have a Code identical to Pukhtunwali:

> By 'nuruwwa' the Arab means all those virtues which, founded in the tradition of his people, constitute the fame of an individual or the tribe to which he belongs; the observance of those duties which are connected with family ties, the relationship of protection and hospitality and the fulfilment of the great law of blood revenge (Turner, 1974, p.30).

8 Sahlins in his study, 'Tribesmen' (1968, p.5), takes a Hobbesian view of his subject:

> In its broadest terms the contrast between tribe and civilization is between War and Peace.... Lacking these institutional means and guarantees, tribesmen live in a condition of War, and War limits the scale, complexity, and all round richness of their culture, and accounts for some of their more 'curious' customs.

This would appear strange judgment to a 'tribesman' pronounced by a 'civilization' standing for 'peace' which has recently involved mankind in two global wars

lasting for years and costing millions of lives.

9 The great Pashto poet, Khushal Khan Khattak (1613-89), recalls in a poem that seven ruling Indian dynasties were Pathan.

10 A parallel situation is described for another Muslim tribal people, the Berbers of the Atlas mountains: 'Here, it is perfectly clear why the geographical boundary between plain and mountain, was also, for so long, a political boundary between the "land of government" and the "land of dissidence". Prior to modern times, there is no record of an army of the central state successfully penetrating these gorges, though some did try' (Gellner, 1969a, p.31).

11 'Settled' is a relative term: during British rule Peshawar, the main District of the Frontier Province, usually recorded as many annual murders as the Punjab Province which in turn equalled those for the rest of the Indian subcontinent (Coen, 1971, p.202).

12 Some of the extra-ethnic leaders who appear in this essay have received a similar treatment: thus the 'Mad Mullah' of Swat and the 'False Prophet' of Sudan. The Akhund is immortalized in the English language through Lear's famous poem, 'Akond of Swat', with the refrain that asks:

> Who or why, or which or what
> is the Akond of Swat?

13 Malakand Division today comprises the former princely states of Dir, Chitral and Swat, and takes its name from the Malakand Agency which was formed in 1895.

CHAPTER 2 THE SWAT PATHANS AND THE THEORY OF GAMES

1 All Pashto proverbs in the text and their translations are from Ahmed, 1975.

2 A two 'bloc' system is mentioned in 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans' (pp.4, 134) but why there are two and how they are restricted to two only is not examined. In fact, were there only two 'dallas'? Dr Ahmad, who was doing his field-work contemporaneously to Professor Barth, observed that 'even during the time Dr Barth was in Swat the centuries old two-"dalla" society had four "dallas"' (Ahmad, 1962, p. 71).

3 M.T. Ahmad in the Introduction to his 'Social Organization of Yusufzai Swat', while commenting on Barth's book, expresses his views on this point: 'in other words, what existed before 1925 when there was no central political authority in the State has been

confused with what exists today' (ibid.).

4 'The Story of Swat', by Miangul Abdul Wadud (1962), is mentioned as an undated and 'undistributed translation of an Urdu account' titled 'History of Swat' in the 1965 edition of 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans'. The work suffers from minor historical inaccuracies and poor editing, and its chief value lies in the fact that it is the only written account purporting to tell the story of Swat by its founder.

5 Rebellious Khans are promptly and permanently exiled 'south' of the Malakand Pass and out of Swat. There is a colony of Swat Khans still living south of the Malakand Pass testifying to this fact. The all powerful 'deputy' of the Miangul was thus abruptly banished (Barth, 1959a, p.129).

6 The Pathan would make a rebellious subject under centralized authority. He has 'a reputation for willingness to defend his honour and interests, for violence and impetuousness, for bravery and valour' (ibid., p. 85).

7 Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, who created the NWFP in 1901, observed 'no man who has read a page of Indian history will prophesy about the Frontier' (1916, p.43).

8 References to Parliamentary Papers (1898) are based on 'Military Operations on the N.W. Frontiers of India', vol.2, printed for Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1898, but will be abbreviated to 'PP Encl.' and the date in the text.

CHAPTER 3 THE SWAT PATHAN UNDERSTOOD

1 The Yusufzai in the rural areas still retain this memory by referring to themselves as Afghan, which is used interchangeably with Pathan.

2 The Yusufzai, far from their mountain homes, in Rampur, India, retained this consciousness of military aristocracy:

> Pushtoo is the principal language, and one sees in the square before the 'Nabob's' palace, fair, strong, and handsome young men, sitting or lounging on beds, with that air of idleness and independence which distinguishes the Eusofzyes - All admit that the Rohillas are the bravest soldiers we have ever contended with in India (Elphinstone, 1972, II, p. 36).

3 The Fakeers are much more numerous than the Eusofzyes. The greatest part of them are Swautees, who

remained in their country after it was conquered, a considerable number of Deggauns, some Hindkees, (who have been driven by famine to emigrate from the Punjab) a few Cashmeeres and Hindoos (classes which are led into all countries by the desire of gain) and some members of Afghaun tribes (who have migrated into the Eusofzye country in circumstances which have degraded them to the rank of Fakeers), or the rest of that body. Most of the Fakeers work in husbandry, and many feed herds of buffaloes on the mountains (ibid., p.27)..

4 From the Pashto verb, 'weshal', 'to distribute'.

5 The lands of the Naikpeekhail are divided into two parts, equal in extent, but, of course, not exactly equal in fertility; the Oolooss is also divided into two parts, which draw lots every ten years for the choice of land. If the lot falls on the half which is already possessed of the best share it retains its possession; but if it falls on the other half, an immediate exchange takes place, the two half Ooloosses meet every ten years to draw lots (ibid., p.15).

6 The godfather-godson relationship symbolizes the patron-client relationship in Sicily; the contract is formal, solemn and moral. The patron is a 'santo' or saint substitute (Boissevain, 1966). No such formality or morality marks patron-client relations in Swat society. Barth's Khan is neither a formal nor a moral superordinate and his status and authority are based on possessions of land and a certain mystification about its ownership and his rights to it.

7 Of the societies on the Indian subcontinent Rajput society has many parallels with the Pathan one (Hitchcock, 1958). For an interesting socio-political comparison of Pathans and Rajputs see Caroe, 1965, pp. 85-8, who draws in his arguments from H.W. Bellew and Vincent Smith.

CHAPTER 4 THE SWAT PATHAN MISUNDERSTOOD

1 Evans-Pritchard (1962), Gluckman (1971).

2 Professor Dumont is led to comment on this point, 'in the case in question, Barth, curiously enough, was led to exaggerate the similarity with Hindu India on certain points' (Dumont, 1972, p.256).

3 Miangul Jahanzeb, the great-grandson of the Akhund, contradicts this by stating that the Akhund's wife was a Mian from Spal Bandai, near Saidu, and not a

Yusufzai Pathan. This does not affect the point at issue which is the relationship between social status, hypergamy and hypogamy.

4 C. McPastner (1972) for similar trends in Baluchistan tribal endogamy.

5 Sexual intercourse with a saintly person is considered beneficial. Chenier speaks of a saint in Tetuan who seized a young woman and had commerce with her in the midst of the street; 'her companions, who surrounded her, uttered exclamations of joy, felicitated her good fortune, and the husband himself received complimentary visits on this occasion' (Westermarck, 1968, p.34, quoted in Turner, 1974, p.68).

6 'Where, as among the Cyrenaica Bedouin (Evans-Pritchard, 1949), descent groups have fixed territories, there is a natural tendency for opposed groups, on re-establishing peace, to locate the grants to Saints along the border between them' (Barth, 1959a, p.93).

7 It was not possible to locate the source or authenticity of such examples in recent history in spite of extensive questioning in Swat. Miangul Jahan Zeb's reaction and incredulity were typical: 'simply impossible' he said.

8 This attribute of Pathan social behaviour is recorded on first British contact with the Pathans at the turn of the last century:

> One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Afghauns, is their hospitality. The practice of this virtue is so much a national point of honour, that their reproach to an inhospitable man, is that he has no Pooshtoonwullee (nothing of the customs of the Afghauns). All persons indiscriminately are entitled to profit by this practice (Elphinstone, 1972, I, p.295).

9 Mrs Ali writes of Indian, non-Pathan, Muslims in the last century,

> You perceive a system of charitable feeling is inculcated by the laws of Mahumud; and in every-day practice it is found to be the prominent feature in their general habits. It is common with the meanest of people to offer a share of their food to any one calling upon them at mealtime. I have seen this amiable trait of character in all classes of the people (Ali, 1973, p.257).

10 Figure 6 (Barth, 1959a, p.41) based on data from four villages pertains to 'marriage frequencies' and subdivides Pukhtun 'chiefs' from 'other' Pukhtuns but

this still does not reveal data or proportion of non-landowning to landowning Pukhtuns.

11 M.T. Ahmad writes of 'ting sarays' or 'mercenaries' the Khan used as 'muscle' to intimidate tenants (Ahmad, 1962, p.28).

12 'At the same time, the introduction of an effective monetary economy made possible the conversion of perishable wealth into cash. The result of these inter-connected changes was the disappearance from Peshawar District of the men's house' (Barth, 1959a, p.80).

13 (a) 'Brakha-khor' as category of tenant who 'eats the share' is mistranslated as 'sister-of-the-plot' (ibid., p.44). (b) Miangul Wadud admits to killing both his agnatic cousins, Sayyid Badshah and his brother Amir Badshah, personally (Miangul, 1962, pp.9, 13), whereas Barth writes that 'in 1903, Amir Badshah, killed his brother' (Barth, 1959a, p.128). (c) The index to 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans' would benefit if important words such as 'wesh', 'zberge' and 'ushar' were included, as the use of those like 'daftar' indicate that Pashto words are not excluded in favour of their English equivalents. (d) The Wali of Swat is referred to as His Royal Highness (ibid., Preface). In fact the ruler of Swat was only given the title of 'Wali' in 1926 by the British; the Pakistan Government added 'His Highness' subsequently. This is an important distinction when the rulers of over 560 Indian Princely States vied for such symbols of status and the corresponding privileges they conferred. (e) The use of two different spellings, Wahdood and Wahdud, for the Wali's name could have been resolved by the selection of one. The Wali himself used Wadud (Miangul, 1962) which is nearer the Arabic name, one of the ninety-nine names of God, than Wahdood. (f) The caste list includes 'landap' (cotton-carder), 'qasai' (butcher) and, at the end, 'kashkol' (Barth, 1959a, p.17). In Swat, as indeed in other Yusufzai areas, these names are 'nandap', 'qasab' and 'kachkol'.

CHAPTER 5 A THEORY OF PATHAN ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

1 'The general type so defined would include the following: (a) The peasant family farm as the basic unit of multi-dimensional social-organization. (b) Land husbandry as the main means of livelihood directly

providing the major part of the consumption needs. (c) Specific traditional culture related to the way of life of small communities. (d) The underdog position - the domination of peasantry by outsiders' (Shanin, 1971, p.14-15).

CHAPTER 6 A NOTE ON SUFIC ORDERS AND ISLAMIC REVIVALISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

1 To begin this argument it is useful to accept the Sufi's own cognitive definition of socio-religious reality. A comment by an anthropologist on problems of religious definition would be helpful: 'The most obvious basis for religious behaviour is the one which any religious actor tells us about when we ask him - and, unlike some anthropologists, I believe him' (Spiro, 1973, p.112).

2 Professor Gellner writes of the Berber tribesmen of the Atlas mountains, 'Tribes of siba-land are, indeed, politically independent. But they are not culturally independent. They are in this case embedded in the wider civilisation of Islam. In large measure they share the religion, concepts, symbols of the whole of the Muslim world' (Gellner, 1969a, p.2) and of the Berber 'he is, firmly and in a manner pregnant with consequences for his life, a Muslim - irrespective of whether he is specially pious or well-informed in matters of religion' (ibid., p.15).

3 Paradoxically, the closure of these channels of communication is threatened in the post-colonial era by the growth of modern nationalist Muslim States putting up border barriers that require documents and permits for ingress and egress. Another level of pan-Islamic communication has opened through the mass media of radio and newspapers but this is largely politically slanted, secular and nationalist as distinct from the traditional, religious, pan-Islamic content of past communication.

4 A dramatic, if somewhat rare, example is the communication from Shah Waliullah seeking assistance to check the liquidation of Muslim power in India to Ahmad Shah Abdali, the King of Afghanistan, which is said to have resulted in the battle of Panipat in 1761 and the final defeat of the Hindu Maratha and Jat confederacy (Ahmad, 1964, p.209). Similarly, one of the answers to Pathan lack of response to the 1857 'Indian Mutiny' is that it was seen primarily as a distant, localized and non-Muslim rebellion. The effete and impotent

Mughal Emperor, confined to Delhi, did not symbolize Islamic rule. Except for some excitement caused by the revolt of the 55 Native Infantry and its passage to Swat and eventual destruction in the Kaghan valley, the trans-Indus areas passed without a murmur in 1857.

5 Most modern nationalist Muslim intellectuals, with the maximum impact on their societies, passed through a 'Sufic phase' at one stage of their lives: Mohammad Abduh and Hassan al Banna (in Egypt), Mohammed Iqbal (in India-Pakistan) and Zia Gokalp (in Turkey) (Smith, 1957, p.56).

6 Many 'modernists', like Sir Sayyed, arguing that Islam in its primitive form is compatible with rational existence derived their inspiration from the Wahabis. The Wahabis, in the eighteenth and nineteenth century provided an intense stimulus to Islamic activity based on rational reform within Islam. They were deliberately opposed to 'baraka' exploiters and Sufi orders as having compromised the purity of Islam. They shocked the Islamic world by destroying tombs of Saints and especially that of Imam Husain ibn Ali (the grandson of the Prophet) at Karbala in 1802. Wahabi thinking laid down the template for what eventually became 'modernist' Islam.

7 The reference to Arabia is not wholly improbable. The Wali of Swat drew up a picture of pre-Wali Swat and compared it to pre-Islam Arabia:

> It would not be wrong to compare the Swat of a few years before and after 1915, to Arabia prior to the advent of Islam - both were as ignorant and licentious. The powerful and the rich were cruel and immoral: the poor and the down-trodden were weak and uninformed (Miangul, 1962, p.58).

8 'Even if Islam had been miraculously shut off from contacts with foreign religions and philosophies, some form of mysticism would have arisen within it, for the seeds were already there' (Nicholson, 1914, pp.19-20).

9 This universalistic philosophy is condensed in the famous Sufic precept of 'sulh-i-kul' or 'peace with all'. The great thirteenth-century Andalusian Sufi, Ibn al-Arabi, summed it thus: 'Love is the creed I hold - whether the Kabah, the Torah or the Cloister.' Centuries ago there were bands of passivists facing social and political persecution - and often death - by their co-religionists for declaring that they believed in 'love not war'.

10 'Fana' or 'annihilation' is the bedrock concept of Sufic thinking and practice: 'annihilation' of self, of desire, of ambition etc. Proximity to the Supreme

Being is seen as inversely proportionate to involvement with material possessions and their symbols and with total 'fana' a total state of identification is aimed at.

11 Talal Asad's powerful 'crie de coeur' (1973) against Orientalists and social scientists studying Islamic societies in the traditional nineteenth-century Victorian mould brings to bear on this division of Islam. Orientalists and Western journalists (Asad is moved to remark bitterly that there is often little difference in the two) usually confront and grapple with the militaristic, urban, orthodox form of Islam - and react to it with predictable hostility. The pacific and mystical category of Islam is lost in its esoteric and often disguised forms and therefore more difficult to locate or comprehend for Western man.

12 These categories derive sociologically from Ibn Khaldun's circular theory of tribal élites: tribes possessing 'asabyah', or social cohesion, invade civilized urban centres, assimilate, and over three generations are, in turn, subject to tribal invasion by tribes that are more vigorous. Tribes, at the moment of conquest, begin the process of losing their most vital qualifying social factor. The seeds of destruction are carried in the situation of triumph.

13 The frailty of these categories, divided by Professor Gellner (1969b) into those containing a 'syndrome of characteristics' P (puritanical, egalitarian, non-mystical, formal) in opposition to those with a 'syndrome of characteristics' C (hierarchical, mystical, informal) is exhibited when typologizing in such obvious examples as those mentioned in note 5, p.150.

14 For the sake of brevity these labels will be employed.

15 For methods and examples of Sufic proselytizing see the collection of essays in Lewis (1969) for Africa, and Ahmad (1964) for India.

16 Like his contemporary, Ahmad at-Tijani (1737-1815), the founder of the great West African order that bears his name, who also had to shift deeper into the desert to avoid trouble with the Turkish administration.

17 The Saints had attempted early in the eighteenth century to provide political leadership but got their fingers badly burnt. Their leader was captured and executed and thereafter they stayed in the mountains.

18 Holt (1958a and b) for a historical survey of this period, Churchill (1972) for a contemporary view and Saburi Biobaku and Muhammad Al-Hajj in Lewis (1969) for a modern nationalist one.

19 Sayyed Akbar came from the Sayyed family of Sitana and

was a descendant of Pir Baba, the famous Saint, buried in Buner, Swat. Sitana for decades provided a sanctuary for the 'Mujahidin' (called Hindustani Rebels by the British). Sayyed Akbar was no Sufi recluse, on the contrary, he was an active political leader and a prominent follower of Sayyed Ahmed Barelvi in his 'jihad' against the Sikhs.

20 If this standing force is abstracted as a percentage of the total Swat population then of less than 100,000 (Wylly, 1912, p.108) the figures assume significance. A regular military force representing over 4 per cent of a total population is vast by any standards: it would mean an army of over two million for Britain and one of almost twenty-five million for India.

21 Which is not to say that Barth is unaware of the presence of Sufic organization in Islamic tribal societies. See for instance his Kurd study (Barth, 1953).

CHAPTER 7 MILLENNIUM AND CHARISMA AMONG PATHANS

1 The mood over the Frontier was captured by the account of Sir Winston Churchill, an eye-witness of the 1897 Frontier campaigns:

> A vast, but silent agitation was begun. Messengers passed to and fro among the tribes. Whispers of war, a holy war, were breathed to a race intensely passionate and fanatical. The tribes were taught to expect prodigious events. A great day for their race and faith was at hand (Churchill, 1972, p.27).

2 A prophet is he or she who organizes the new assumptions and articulates them; who is listened to and found acceptable; whose revelation is accorded authority for however brief a period. But a prophet cannot identify himself in terms of the community as it is: he identifies himself in an image of what might or should be (Burridge, 1969, p.14).

3 Apart from regular British Regiments there were the 35th and 45th Sikhs, 38th Dogras, 10th and 11th Bengal Lancers, No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners, No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners (Wylly, 1912, pp. 137-9).

4 Among the British expeditions in 1897-8 the biggest was led by Sir W. Lockhart to Afridi Tirah and had some 60,000 troops (Elliot, 1968, p.199): this reflects the size of the operations as much as the difficulty of the terrain and campaigning.

5 'Mast' derives from a form of ecstasy or trance-like

state. The Mullah was also called 'sartor baba'. 'Sartor' literally meaning 'black head' and implying one who is either too poor, too demented or too ecstatic to cover his head.

6 The main border town of Swat on the Malakand road and known as 'the Gate of Swat'.

7 A contemporary account explains the authority of the Akhund: 'He also now issues circular edicts regarding religious ceremonies and secular observances. These are acted on and considered as binding as the "shariat", which, indeed, they are considered to be by his followers' (Bellew, 1864, p.107).

8 Swatis themselves offer a similar simplistic explanation:

> The entrance to Swat State, a picture-book fort with four square towers stands beside the rushing waters of the river. We stopped for tea in the police station placed in the base of one of the towers. An elderly sub-inspector with waxed handle-bar moustache worthy of a British sergeant-major presided over the tea-pot. The few hundred words of English he had at his disposal, as well as his hearty, no-nonsense manner and bulging muscles, would also have become his British counterpart. He pointed at an antique telephone hanging on the wall, 'with those our Miangul conquered this state,' he announced. 'He built forts like this everywhere. He put telephones in them. Every time those beggars in the hills made trouble, we would call him up and tell him. Then he would send more men or come himself. We tell his son the Wali Sahib, who is now our king, everything too. You watch' (Spain, 1962, pp.66-7).

9 The problems facing Amir Abdur Rahman, 'the Iron Amir of Afghanistan', in his attempts to centralize political authority and to effectively incorporate and encapsulate Pathan tribes into the State structure are documented in his autobiography and reflect the difficulties inherent in such a situation (Abdur Rahman, 1900; Fraser-Tytler, 1950; Gregorian, 1969; Kakar, 1968).

CHAPTER 8 MODELS AND METHOD IN ANTHROPOLOGY

1 See n.7, chapter 4.

2 'What counts as a saint in the Christian tradition is any canonized, dead, orthodox Christian, regarded as an inhabitant of heaven. All of this contrasts

sharply with so-called Islamic saintship' (Turner, 1974, p.60). In concluding the chapter, Saint and Sheikh, in his book on 'Weber and Islam' Turner writes: 'Similarly, Weber informed us that Islam "was diverted completely from any really methodological control of life by the advent of the cult of saints, and finally by magic". One answer to this assertion would be that Islam could not be diverted by something it never possessed' (ibid., p.71).

3 For highly readable and general accounts of administration in the Frontier Province by administrators see Woodruff, 1953-4, and Coen, 1971.

4 Spain begins the section entitled 'Swat, a unique State', with 'Before we leave the tribal area, it is desirable to look briefly at its most unusual phenomenon, Swat State' (Spain, 1963, p.223).

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